RUTH S. MITCHELL, APPELLANT,
v.
THE SCHOOL BOARD OF LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Mitchell challenged the abolition of her position as supervisor of guidance and testing by the Leon County School Board. She sought discovery of communications between school board officials and their attorney regarding the reorganization plan, but the trial court upheld the attorney-client privilege against disclosure under the Sunshine Law. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the Sunshine Law requires a "meeting" to apply, and no such meeting was involved in private attorney-client communications.
The court affirmed that the attorney-client privilege applies to communications between the school board and its attorney and that the Sunshine Law does not abrogate this privilege. The court limited its holding to the specific facts presented: since the Sunshine Law applies only when two or more public officials have a "meeting," and no such meeting occurred in the private attorney-client communications at issue, the Sunshine Law was not applicable.
[1] The Government in the Sunshine Law does not abrogate the attorney-client privilege as applied to a public body.
[2] Application of the Government in the Sunshine Law requires a meeting between two or more public officials.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The public's representatives must be afforded at least an equal position with that enjoyed by those with whom they deal. The public should not suffer a handicap at the expense of a purist view of open public meetings, so long as the ultimate debate and decisions are public and the 'official acts' and 'formal action' specified by the statute are taken in open 'public meetings.'”
Establishes the court's rationale for protecting attorney-client privilege of public bodies—public officials need the same ability to seek counsel as private parties without disclosure disadvantage.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMitchell's position as supervisor of guidance and testing was abolished pursuant to a reorganization plan. Mitchell sought declaratory judgment and ot…
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BOYER, Chief Judge.
Pursuant to a reorganization plan, appellant’s position as supervisor of guidance and testing was abolished. She sought declaratory judgment and other relief. The question ultimately to be decided in that litigation is whether appellee acted properly in abolishing appellant’s position. Appellant, via discovery, sought to discover who participated in formulation of the plan. Two persons deposed by appellant were the Superintendent and Director of Pupil Personnel Services. When appellant sought to elicit the substance of the conversations with the school board attorney concerning the reorganization plan, appellee’s counsel instructed the deponents not to answer. Upon application to the trial judge for an order compelling discovery it was held that the “Government in the Sunshine Law” (F.S. 286.011) did not abrogate the attorney-client privilege as applied to a public body. This interlocutory appeal followed.
Requisite to application to the Sunshine Law is a meeting between two or more public officials. (Hough v. Stembridge, Fla.App.3rd 1973, 278 So. 2d 288). That law was never intended to become a millstone around the neck of the public’s representatives when being sued by a private party, nor should it be construed to discourage representatives of the people from seeking legal counsel. Although the Sunshine Law applies to actions of school boards (see Canney v. Board of Public Instruction of Alachua County, Sup.Ct.Fla. 1973, 278 So. 2d 260. See also City of Miami Beach v. Berns, Sup.Ct.Fla.1971, 245 So. 2d 38, Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, Sup. Ct.Fla.1974, 296 So. 2d 473 and Time Publishing Company v. Williams, Fla.App.2nd 1969, 222 So. 2d 470) those cases do not reach the point here urged by appellant. The situation sub judice is analogous to that involved in Bassett v. Braddock, Sup.Ct.Fla. 1972, 262 So. 2d 425, wherein our Supreme Court, emphasizing that a labor negotiator employed by the school board was an attorney, said:
“The public’s representatives must be afforded at least an equal position with that enjoyed by those with whom they deal. The public should not suffer a handicap at the expense of a purist view of open public meetings, so long as the ultimate debate and decisions are public and the ‘official acts’ and ‘formal action’ specified by the statute are taken in open ‘public meetings.’ This affords the adequate and effective protection to the public on the side of the ‘right to know’ which was intended.” (Cites omitted: 262 So. 2d 427)
Sub judice, appellant takes a broad approach, asserting that the trial judge erred in holding that the attorney-client privilege between the school board and its attorney is waived by F.S. 286.011, the Sunshine Law. The facts of this case do not require us to rule so broadly. As above recited, application of the Sunshine Law must be bottomed upon a meeting. Sub judice no meeting was involved; therefore the Sunshine Law is not applicable. Whether we would hold all communications between a public body and its attorney to be exempt from application of the Sunshine Law must await a case involving appropriate facts requiring that decision. (But compare Bassett v. Braddock, supra and Time Publishing Company v. Williams, supra.)
AFFIRMED.
McCORD and SMITH, JJ., concur.
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Knox v. Dist. Sch. Bd. OF Brevard, 821 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…d recommending candidates to the school superintendent. Thus Knox argues these interviews are governed by section 286.011 and must be open to the public. The Sunshine Law applies to actions of school boards. Mitchell v. School Board of Leon County, 335 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).. If the school board delegates a portion of its decision-making authority to an advisory group, those meetings must be open to the public. See, e.g., Wood v. Marston, 442 So. 2d 934 (Fla.1983) (committee appointed by university…
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Blackford v. The Sch. Bd. OF Orange Cnty., 375 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979)…e the dilemma, information was adduced to the effect that conversation between staff and a single board member would not be a “meeting” under decided [*580] case law. We agree there is law to this effect. See Mitchell v. School Board of Leon County, 335 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Hough v. Stembridge, 278 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973), and Florida Parole and Probation Commission v. Thomas, 364 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). We also agree that the board’s staff (which, of course, includes the superintende…
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Forehand v. Sch. Bd. OF Gulf Cnty., 600 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…n or made at such meeting. Unquestionably, this law applies to school board meetings and attendant decision-making process. Canney v. Board of Public Instruction of Alachua County, 278 So. 2d 260 (Fla.1973); Mitchell v. School Board of Leon County, 335 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). “A county school board should not be authorized to avoid the Government in the Sunshine Law by making its own determination that an act is quasi-judicial. Secret meetings would be prevalent.” Canney, 278 So. 2d at 263. In this…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Town OF Palm Beach v. Jules T. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1974)
- Canney v. Bd. OF Pub. Instruction OF Alachua Cnty., 278 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1973)
- City OF Miami Beach v. Hendrik J. Berns, 245 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1971)
- Times Publ'g Co. v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)
- Bassett v. Braddock, 262 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1972)
- Hough v. Stembridge, 278 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)