CLARENCE COLEMAN, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court reversed a robbery conviction because the trial court erroneously admitted hearsay testimony that the victim had been offered money not to testify, which was immaterial and prejudicial.
Testimony that a robbery victim was offered money not to testify is inadmissible hearsay that is immaterial to whether the defendant committed the robbery and serves only to create prejudice.
[1] Testimony that a witness was offered money not to testify is inadmissible hearsay that is immaterial to the defendant's guilt and serves only to create prejudice.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceClarence Coleman, Jr. was charged with robbing Kenneth James Hanna. At trial, the victim testified that he had been offered one hundred dollars not to…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant-defendant, Clarence Coleman, Jr., appeals a judgment adjudging him guilty and imposition of sentence for the offense of robbery. We reverse.
Appellant was charged by information with the robbery of one Kenneth James Hanna. Trial was by jury. The jury returned a verdict finding appellant guilty of the robbery charged. The trial court entered judgment accordingly and imposed sentence. It is from this judgment and sentence that the appellant takes his appeal.
On appeal appellant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting testimony of Kenneth James Hanna to the effect he, Kenneth James Hanna, had been offered one hundred dollars not to testify against appellant at trial. We must agree. Such testimony was not only hearsay but was totally immaterial to the issue at trial, viz., did the appellant rob Kenneth James Hanna. The only purpose that the testimony could have served was to create prejudice in the minds of the jury based on the suggestion that appellant himself offered or appellant procured a third person to offer Kenneth James Hanna one hundred dollars not to testify against him (appellant) at trial.
Accordingly, the judgment and sentence herein appealed is reversed and the cause is remanded for new trial.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.
CROSS, J., and WEAVER, SIDNEY M., Associate Judge, concur. DOWNEY, J., specially concurs, with opinion.
DOWNEY, Judge
(concurring specially).
In my judgment the appellant is entitled to a new trial because the circuit court should have granted appellant’s motion for a mistrial after Kenneth Hanna, the purported robbery victim, testified that someone other than appellant — not acting with appellant’s knowledge — offered him $100 to not testify in the case. That testimony was inadmissible hearsay, and I therefore concur in the decision to reverse.
I would also point out that the circuit court should have granted appellant’s motion to strike the unresponsive testimony of Carl Lord, a polygraph operator, that appellant had been convicted of a narcotics charge in 1974.
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Special v. W. Boca Med. Ctr., 160 So. 3d 1251 (Fla. 2014)…made against witnesses is inadmissible to prove guilt unless the threats are shown to be attributable to the defendant.”) (citing Duke v. State, 106 Fla. 205, 142 So. 886 (1932); Jones v. State, 385 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Coleman v. State, 335 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)); see also State v. Price, 491 So. 2d 536, 536-37 (Fla.1986) (“A third person’s attempt to influence a witness is inadmissible on the issue of the defendant’s guilt unless the defendant has authorized the third party’s action.”);…1 / 2
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Koon v. State, 513 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1987)…f threats made against witnesses is inadmissible to prove guilt unless the threats are shown to be attributable to the defendant. Duke v. State, 106 Fla. 205, 142 So. 886 (1932); Jones v. State, 385 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Coleman v. State, 335 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). There is no indication in those cases that the evidence of the threats was introduced except as part of the state’s case on direct or redirect examination. Here, however, the state was seeking to impeach the credibility of a def…
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Jones v. State, 385 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)…the denial thereof would be reversible error. Johnson v. State, 355 So. 2d 200 (Fla.3d DCA 1978). Furthermore, the admission of such evidence could only serve to create undue prejudice in the minds of the jury against the accused. Coleman v. State, 335 So. 2d 364 (Fla.4th DCA 1976). [*1044] Since there was no evidence presented to connect appellant to any threats against the witness as insinuated by the prosecution in its examination, appellant’s motion for mistrial should have been granted. Inasmuch as app…
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