ANNETTE MEADOR EDWARDS, APPELLANT,
v.
DORA HUGHES PRATT AND ROBERT A. CLAIBORNE, ADMR. C.T.A., APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A Florida appellate court upheld the denial of a petition to revoke a will, rejecting the appellant's claim that she was denied a fair hearing due to the trial judge's refusal to grant a second continuance. The court found no abuse of discretion in denying the continuance, noting that the appellant had already received one continuance and maintained continuity of representation throughout the proceedings.
The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the second motion for continuance. The appellant had already been granted one continuance providing new counsel adequate time to prepare, and continuity of representation was maintained throughout the proceedings by the North Carolina attorney.
[1] The granting or denial of a motion for continuance is within the discretion of the trial judge.
[2] A gross or flagrant abuse of discretion must be demonstrated to overturn a trial judge's decision on a motion for continuance.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The granting or denying of a motion for continuance is within the discretion of the trial judge and a gross or flagrant abuse of this discretion must be demonstrated by the complaining party before this court will substitute its judgment for that of the trial judge.”
Establishes the standard of review for continuance denials and the heavy burden on appellant to show abuse of discretion
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceH. Harris Meador executed a will on July 29, 1974, leaving all his property to his fiancée Dora Pratt. Meador died on August 21, and the will was admi…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Testamentary Capacity cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Appellant-petitioner seeks review of an order denying her petition for revocation of probate of will in that she was deprived of a fair hearing upon the denial of her second motion for continuance.
H. Harris Meador, deceased, executed a will on July 29, 1974 leaving all his real and personal property to his fiancee, Dora Pratt. On August 21 Mr. Meador died and the will was admitted to probate. On December 26 a petition to revoke was filed on behalf of appellant, Annette Edwards, Mr. Meador’s sole heir-at-law, on the ground that through the exercise of undue influence, Dora Pratt procured the execution of the July 29 will by Meador who lacked testamentary capacity at the time. Appellant, a resident of North Carolina, employed a North Carolina attorney, Mr. Griffin, to represent her. He, in turn, retained a local firm to file the petition. Dissatisfied with its slow progress, in March 1975 Griffin discharged that firm and hired present counsel. On March 25 appellant moved for a continuance of the final hearing set for April 1. The continuance was granted and the hearing rescheduled for April 24. On April 17 appellant again filed a motion for continuance which was denied. After final hearing the judge entered the order denying the petition for revocation.
Appellant primarily contends the judge committed reversible error in denying her a second continuance since she changed local counsel and as a result her present attorney did not have enough time to adequately prepare for the final hearing.
The granting or denying of a motion for continuance is within the discretion of the trial judge and a gross or flagrant abuse of this discretion must be demonstrated by the complaining party before this court will substitute its judgment for that of the trial judge. S & S Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Hirschfield, Fla.App. 1969, 226 So. 2d 874; Williams v. Gunn, Fla.App. 1973, 279 So. 2d 69. Further, requests for a second continuance are seldom favored. McWhorter v. McWhorter, Fla.App. 1960, 122 So. 2d 504.
In view of the facts that (1) appellant, after new local counsel was retained, was granted a continuance rescheduling the final hearing from April 1 to April 24; (2) appellant’s North Carolina attorney remained on the case throughout the entire proceedings so there was a continuity of representation for the appellant, we find no abuse of discretion in the denial of the second motion for continuance.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (16 total)
-
Padgett v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n OF Santa Rosa Cnty., 378 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)…inuance is within the discretion of the trial judge and a gross or flagrant abuse of this discretion must be demonstrated by the complaining party before the reviewing court will substitute its judgment for that of the trial judge. Edwards v. Pratt, 335 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1976). . Rule 1.460, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, is explicit in its requirement that the motion for continuance “shall state fully and clearly all of the facts which the movant conceives may entitle him to a continuance”. . Of…
-
Ralfe O.P. Silverman, Jr. v. Millner, 514 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…an abuse of discretion. Stem v. Four Freedoms Nat’l Medical Services Co., 417 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Buckley Towers Condominium, Inc. v. Buchwald, 340 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), cert. denied 348 So. 2d 945 (Fla.1977); Edwards v. Pratt, 335 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). Special circumstances sometimes exist, however, in which the denial of a motion for continuance creates an injustice for the movant. In these circumstances, this court’s obligation to rectify the injustice outweighs its policy of…
-
Thompson v. Gen. Motors Corp., Inc., 439 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)…n the judge and Glickstein’s doctor in which the doctor’s statements concerning counsel’s health were said to be “substantially in accord with his letter.” The trial court has broad discretion in granting or denying a continuance. Edwards v. Pratt, 335 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Williams v. Gunn, 279 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973). Yet, there are instances in which a trial court’s denial of a motion for continuance may be an abuse of discretion. In Courtney v. Central Trust Co., 112 Fla. 298, 150 So. 276…
Previewing 3 of 16 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Zeke Williams et ux. v. Gunn, 279 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)
- McWHORTER v. Grady McWHORTER, 122 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960)
- S & S Pharms., Inc. v. Hirschfield, 226 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)