CHARLES LAMOND PRIDGEN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A minor waived juvenile court jurisdiction and negotiated a plea bargain for reduced charges with specified concurrent sentences. When the trial judge departed from the agreed terms by imposing longer sentences to run consecutively, the appellate court vacated the sentence and allowed plea withdrawal, holding that judges who cannot honor plea bargains must affirmatively permit defendants to withdraw their pleas.
When a trial judge determines he cannot in good conscience honor a plea bargain, he must affirmatively take action to permit the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea. The court vacated the sentences and remanded to allow appellant to withdraw his pleas since the trial court departed from the agreed concurrent sentencing structure.
[1] A trial court must allow a defendant to withdraw their guilty plea if the judge cannot, in good conscience, honor the plea bargain.
[2] When a trial court vacates judgments and sentences due to an inability to honor a plea bargain, the defendant may be permitted to withdraw their plea.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“when the trial judge finds that he cannot in good conscience honor a plea bargain, he must affirmatively take action to permit the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea”
Establishes the binding nature of plea bargains and the mandatory remedy when a trial judge cannot honor agreed terms
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant, a minor, waived juvenile court jurisdiction and was charged with robbery and larceny of a motor vehicle. The plea bargain specified attempt…
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BOARDMAN, Judge.
Appellant, a minor, waived juvenile court jurisdiction and was charged with robbery and larceny of a motor vehicle. The waiver agreed to by the state noted that the possible sentences for the crimes charged were life and five years respectively. The waiver also provided that appellant would enter a plea of guilty to attempted robbery and larceny and that both of these crimes were felonies of the third degree with possible sentences to five years and/or $5,000. The waiver also provided that the state would recommend to the court concurrent sentences and rely on the presentence report.
Thereafter, pursuant to the plea bargain, appellant entered his pleas of guilty. The court agreed that it would accept the recommendation of the state attorney and the sentences would run concurrently. Whereupon, the court sentenced appellant to ten years for attempted robbery and five years for auto theft to be served concurrently. Appellant pointed out to the trial court that he was informed that both crimes were punishable by no more than five years and that any sentence would run concurrently. The court then set aside the sentences and announced it would resentence in accordance with the plea bargain. The court then imposed five-year sentences on each count to be served con secutively. Appellant filed a motion for mitigation of sentence which was denied. This timely appeal followed from the judgments and sentences.
This court has held in several cases that when the trial judge finds that he cannot in good conscience honor a plea bargain, he must affirmatively take action to permit the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea. Kiefer v. State, Fla.App.2d 1974, 295 So. 2d 688, and cases cited therein.
Accordingly, we vacate the judgments and sentences and permit the appel-. lant to withdraw his pleas. Should he do so, the state would be permitted to prosecute appellant for the robbery and larceny of a motor vehicle since the reduction of the charges was part of the plea bargain.
REVERSED and REMANDED with directions to the trial court consistent with this opinion.
McNULTY, C. J., and SCHEB, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Fairweather v. State, 505 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)…So. 2d 27 (Fla.1975). When, as in the present case, the plea agreement involves “charge bargaining,” if the plea is withdrawn the defendant must again face the original charge as it existed prior to the state’s offer of reduction. Pridgen v. State, 335 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). Likewise, “[w]hen a defendant withdraws or successfully challenges his plea, the bargain is abrogated and he must be prepared to accept all of the consequences which the plea originally sought to avoid.” Commonwealth v. Ward, 493…
Authorities Cited
- Kiefer v. State, 295 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)