CHARLES EDWARDS, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Charles Edwards appeals his conviction for breaking and entering and grand larceny, arguing that retrial after a mistrial declaration violated double jeopardy protections. The court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declaring a mistrial based on manifest necessity when the defendant failed to timely disclose his wife as an alibi witness, prejudicing the state's ability to prepare.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declaring a mistrial where manifest necessity existed. The trial judge was best situated to determine that the circumstances presented a legally sufficient reason to justify the mistrial declaration. Therefore, the double jeopardy defense is not available to the defendant.
[1] A mistrial declared due to manifest necessity does not bar a subsequent retrial on double jeopardy grounds.
[2] A trial court has discretion to declare a mistrial when the circumstances present a legally sufficient reason to justify such a declaration.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“under all the circumstances the Court feels that the interest of justice would best be served by the granting on the Court's own motion of a mistrial.”
The trial court's reasoning for declaring a mistrial based on the defendant's late disclosure of witnesses and resulting prejudice to the State.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn March 3, 1975, a jury was empaneled. On March 4, defense counsel revealed three additional witnesses he intended to call, including two character w…
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PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Charles Edwards, takes this appeal from his conviction and sentence following a jury trial on the charges of breaking and entering and grand larceny. He urges reversal on the grounds of double jeopardy.
The record reflects that on March 3,1975, a jury was empaneled and sworn. On March 4, defense counsel revealed to the State the names of three more witnesses whom he intended to call; two were character witnesses and the third was the defendant’s wife whose testimony appeared to be in the nature of an alibi. On March 5, the State moved to exclude the three witnesses. The trial court determined that the two character witnesses could testify, but after a proffer of the wife’s testimony, ruled that since the State was not able to take her statement due to the defendant’s failure to supply the names sooner, the State was prejudiced, and
. . under all the circumstances the Court feels that the interest of justice would best be served by the granting on the Court’s own motion of a mistrial.” (emphasis supplied)
A new trial date was set. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the information and discharge the defendant, alleging that manifest necessity had not required a mistrial, and that a new trial would place the defendant in jeopardy a second time on the same charge. The motion was denied. The defendant sought a writ of prohibition which was denied by this court and the cause proceeded to a jury trial culminating in a judgment of conviction and sentence.
In our opinion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declaring a mistrial where such mistrial was required by manifest necessity. The trial judge had discretion to determine that the situation which confronted the court and the parties at the time presented a legally sufficient reason to justify the declaration of a mistrial. The trial judge was best situated, under the circumstances and conditions then presented, to intelligently make such a decision. No abuse of this discretion has been established. See Adkins v. Smith, 205 So. 2d 530 (Fla.1968), and Strawn v. State ex rel. Anderberg, 332 So. 2d 601 (Fla.1976). Accordingly, the defense of double jeopardy is not available to the defendant.
Affirmed.
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Moreland v. The Honorable Arthur I. Snyder, 459 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…d 599 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); State v. McNeil, 362 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978),1 we grant the defendant’s petition for prohibition to preclude his retrial in violation of his rights against double jeopardy.2 . The state relies on Edwards v. State, 336 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). We distinguish the case on its facts without endorsing or repudiating its holding. . We are sure that the issuance of the formal writ will not be required.…
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Campbell v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr. (Lee County) (M.D. Fla. 2022)…not sworn and heard no evidence against the Defendant. Prejudice did not attach to the Defendant’s case and the double jeopardy issue is not applicable. See Corneiro v. Solomon, 450 So. 2d 599 (3d DCA 1984); Edwards v. State, 336 So. 2d 447 (3d DCA 1976). (Doc. 20-8 at 49) (citations to the record omitted). Petitioner does not point to errors in the state courts’ reasoning that would entitle him to federal habeas corpus relief. “The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment pro…
Authorities Cited
- Adkins v. Smith, 205 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1967)
- Honorable David U. Strawn v. State of Fla. ex rel. Jon Anderberg, 332 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1976)