GUSSIE ERLICHSTEIN, JOINED BY HER HUSBAND, NATHAN ERLICHSTEIN, AND NATHAN ERLICHSTEIN,
v.
J. R. RONEY AND GRACE RONEY, HIS WIFE
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This case concerns whether a plaintiff's declaration sufficiently stated a cause of action under Florida's guest statute. The court found that the declaration alleged facts showing more than ordinary negligence, thus allowing the case to proceed.
Yes, the declaration sufficiently stated facts that, if proven, would constitute more than ordinary negligence, thus meeting the requirements of the guest statute.
“In an ordinary action to recover damages for the negligent operation of an automobile we do not require a detailed statement of the facts constituting negligence.”
This quote establishes the general rule for negligence cases, contrasting it with the stricter requirements for guest statute cases.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe plaintiff, a guest in the defendant's car, alleged that the defendant operated the vehicle at an unlawful speed during a dim-out, failed to observ…
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The plaintiff, a guest, sued to recover damages pursuant to Sec. 320.59, F.S. ’41, F.S.A., commonly known as our guest statute. The lower court held the declaration bad on demurrer and entered judgment for the defendant.
On appeal here the question is whether the declaration is sufficient where it alleged in substance that the automobile in which plaintiff was a guest was operated at night in the City of Miami Beach at an unlawful rate of speed, to wit, 35 miles per hour, at a time when a dim out ordinance was in effect and the street lights were shaded; that just prior to reaching street intersection defendant, disregarding plaintiff’s warning to look where she was going, looked to her left and did not observe a parked truck that was visible and parked near a city street light until it was too late to avoid the collision which caused plaintiff’s injury.
In an ordinary action to recover damages for the negligent operation of an automobile we do not require a detailed statement of the facts constituting negligence. Where a guest sues pursuant to this statute, however, it is required that sufficient acts of neglect be stated to constitute a prima facie cause of action. The legal sufficiency of the detailed charge is necessarily difficult and has already been commented on by us. Shams v. Saportas, 152 Fla. 48, 10 So. 2nd 715; Jackson v. Edwards, 144 Fla. 187, 197 So. 833; Koger v. Hollahan, 144 Fla. 779, 198 So. 685; Cormier v. Williams, *335148 Fla. 201, 4 So. 2nd 525; McMillian v. Nelson, 149 Fla. 334, 5 So. 2nd) 867. The effect of this statute was to alter the degree of negligence as a prerequisite to recovery. The degree of negligence is solely and exclusively a question for the jury subject to judicial review. See Nelson v. McMillian, 151 Fla. 847, 10 So. 2nd 565. The declaration must, however, state the facts from which the court can say that there is something more than ordinary negligence, but where that appears, as in this case, then a plea is required.
The judgment is reversed for further proceedings.
BUFORD, C. J., TERRELL and CHAPMAN, JJ., concur.
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Frank v. Lurie, 157 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)…Carraway v. Revell, Fla.1959, 116 So. 2d 16; Bridges v. Speer, Fla.1955, 79 So. 2d 679. The burden of pleading is accordingly more meticulous than in ordinary negligence cases which permit a more general mode of pleading. Erlichstein v. Roney, 1944, 155 Fla. 333, 20 So. 2d 254; 3 Fla.Jur., Automobiles, etc., § 124. The trial court’s dismissal of these complaints was tantamount to holding that gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct was neither apparent nor reasonably inferable from the specific fa…
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Brown v. Roach, 67 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1953)…plaint states sufficient facts to show a prima facie case of “gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct” on the part of the driver which warrants that the question or issue shall go before a jury. Dexter v. Green, supra; Erlichstein v. Roney, 155 Fla. 333, 20 So. 2d 254. For the reasons stated the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith. ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS and DREW, JJ., concur.…
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Hoisington v. Kulchin, 172 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 1965)…n as a guest in the car owned by the defendant, Sylvia Kulchin.” Petitioners assert that a direct conflict exists between the instant case and the following cases: Cormier v. Williams (1941), 148 Fla. 201, 4 So. 2d 525; Erlichstein v. Roney (1944), 155 Fla. 333, 20 So. 2d 254; Bridges v. Speer (Fla.1955), 79 So. 2d 679; Faircloth v. Hill (Fla.1956), 85 So. 2d 870; Klems’ Inc. v. Cline (Fla.1958), 105 So. 2d 881; Farrey v. Bettendorf (Fla.1957), 96 So. 2d 889; Farrey v. Bettendorf (Fla.App.1960), 123 So. 2d…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Cormier v. Williams, 148 Fla. 201 (Fla. 1941)
- McMillan v. Nelson, 5 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 1942)
- Koger v. Hollahan, 144 Fla. 779 (Fla. 1940)
- Nelson v. McMILLAN, 151 Fla. 847 (Fla. 1942)
- Ivey Jackson v. Edwards, 144 Fla. 187 (Fla. 1940)
- Shams v. Saportas, 152 Fla. 48 (Fla. 1942)