BOYCE GILLETTE, D/B/A MAC'S AUTO PARTS, APPELLANT,
v.
WALTER STAPLETON, APPELLEE
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Gillette, an auto repair shop owner, retained an automobile belonging to Stapleton and refused to return it when demanded. The trial court improperly instructed the jury to calculate conversion damages based on replacement rental value rather than fair market value, resulting in an excessive verdict that was reversed and remanded for a new trial on damages.
Compensatory damages for conversion are limited to the fair market value of the property at the time of conversion plus legal interest to the date of verdict, not replacement value. The trial court's instruction to use replacement rental value was improper. Additionally, the judgment on punitive damages must be reversed and remanded because proper procedure requires that punitive damages be awarded by the same jury that awards compensatory damages, and the general verdict here does not establish whether both juries addressed the issue.
[1] Damages for conversion are limited to the reasonable value of the property at the time of conversion, not its replacement value.
[2] The measure of damages in an action for conversion is the fair market value of the property at the time of the conversion plus legal interest.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“damages for conversion are limited to the reasonable value of the property when converted and are not to be based on the replacement value”
Establishes the controlling legal standard for conversion damages, citing Lilly v. Bronson
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn July 1972, Gillette orally agreed to repair Stapleton's damaged automobile for $1,170 but did not complete the repairs. When Stapleton demanded ret…
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BOARDMAN, Judge.
Appellant/defendant brings this timely appeal from a judgment awarding appel-lee/plaintiff $8,808 compensatory damages and $2,000 punitive damages.
The appellant alleges that in July, 1972, he orally agreed with appellee to repair appellee’s damaged automobile for $1,170. Appellant did not repair the vehicle and refused to return it to appellee upon his demand made about July or August, 1973. During the time the automobile was on the appellant’s premises it had deteriorated from neglect and exposure to the elements so that at the time of trial its value was between $50 and $100. The case was submitted to the jury on two causes of action— breach of contract1 and conversion.
The jury was instructed that if it found that appellee had converted the vehicle, an element of the damages was the “reasonable value of a comparable replacement unit” from the time of the demand to the date of trial. The amount of the jury verdict indicates that the award was based in large measure upon appellee’s testimony that average rental costs for a similar automobile were $14 per day.
The Supreme Court of Florida has specifically stated that damages for conversion are limited to the reasonable value of the property when converted and are not to be based on the replacement value. Lilly v. Bronson, 1937, 129 Fla. 675, 177 So.
218.
Thus, compensatory damages are not properly assessed according to the value of a replacement unit. It was improper and incorrect for the trial court to give such an instruction. It is well settled in Florida and other jurisdictions that the measure of damages in an action for conversion is the fair market value of the property at the time of the conversion plus legal interest to the date of the verdict. See Pettigrew v. W & H Development Co., Fla.App.2d, 1960, 122 So. 2d 813; 18 Am.Jur.2d, Conversion § 82 (1965, Supp.1976); 7 Fla.Jur., Conversion § 23 (1958, Supp.1976).
See also Sun First National Bank of Melbourne v. Batchelor, Fla.App.4th, 1975, 308 So. 2d 649, rev’d on other grounds, Fla.1975, 321 So. 2d 73. The conversion in this case occurred at the time the appellee refused to return the appellant’s property when he was requested to do so. Star Fruit Co. v. Eagle Lake Growers, Inc., 1948, 160 Fla. 130, 33 So. 2d 858; Murrell v. Trio Towing Service, Inc., Fla.App.3d, 1974, 294 So. 2d 331.
Therefore, the proper measure of compensatory damages is the fair market value of the damaged automobile as of July or August, 1973.
Although we do not decide whether sufficient evidence was adduced to support an award of punitive damages, the judgment on the issue of punitive damages must be reversed and remanded for a new trial. The general rule is that better practice and procedure requires that “if punitive damages are to be awarded it must be by the same jury that awards the compensatory damages.” Touchette v. Bould, Fla.App.4th 1975, 324 So. 2d 707; DuPuis v. 79th Street Hotel, Inc., Fla.App.3d, 1970, 231 So. 2d 532, cert. den. Fla.1970, 238 3o.2d 105; see Baynard v. Liberman, Fla.App.2d, 1962, 139 So. 2d 485.
REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings on the issue of damages consistent with this opinion.
McNULTY, C. J., and SCHEB, J., concur. . The plaintiff’s counsel stated during trial that the suit was on two causes of action: negligence of a bailment and conversion. He specifically stated that he was not suing on the contract. The trial judge, contrary to plaintiffs counsel’s requested jury instructions, did not instruct the jury on negligence, but did instruct on breach of contract. The trial judge did instruct as to the proper measure of damages for negligence of a bailment.
The jury returned a general verdict not specifying which cause of action the damage awards were predicated upon.
The jury could not, as a matter of law, award damages on a cause of action not pleaded or proved or on a cause of action upon which it had not been instructed. The amount of the verdict indicates that the jury awarded damages on the conversion theory and we restrict ourselves to discussion of that issue,
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Citator
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Bergen Brunswig Corp. & Health Application Sys., Inc. v. State of Fla. Dep't OF Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 415 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)…lway Co., 355 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). On cross-appeal appellee contends that the lower court erred in denying the claim for prejudgment interest. Such interest may be awarded in conversion and ex contractu actions. See Gillette v. Stapleton, 336 So. 2d 1226 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), and Srybnik v. Ice Tower, Inc., 183 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966). Although it has sometimes been indicated that prejudgment interest is appropriate only where damages are liquidated, in Florida the distinction between liquidated…
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In re the Est. of Brewer Corbin v. Corbin, 391 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…hearing regarding the reasonable market value of the business at the time and place of its conversion; that value, plus interest up until the date of final judgment is entered upon remand, Klein, supra, 153 So. 2d 344; contra, Gillette v. Stapleton, 336 So. 2d 1226 (Fla.2d DCA 1976), shall constitute appellant’s award. Fees and costs regarding operation of the business after the time of conversion shall not be considered in computing the award. Reversed and remanded. . As Prosser, infra, at 81-83, notes, con…
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Talbot v. Rosenbaum, 142 So. 3d 965 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)…s entitled to a damage award amounting to the market value of the subject property on the date of the conversion plus interest accruing from that date. See Exxon Corp. v. Ward, 438 So. 2d 1059, 1060 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (citing Gillette v. Stapleton, 336 So. 2d 1226, 1227 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)). Because evidence must be presented to establish the value of the property on the date of conversion, the damages alleged by Rosen-baum in her complaint are, by definition, unliquidated. See Heritage Circle Condo. Ass’n v.…
Previewing 3 of 19 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Star Fruit Co. v. Eagle Lake Growers, Inc., 160 Fla. 130 (Fla. 1948)
- DuPUIS v. 79TH St. Hotel, Inc., 231 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)
- SUN First Nat'l Bank OF Melbourne v. Lael N. Batchelor, 321 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1975)
- Lilly v. Bronson, 129 Fla. 675 (Fla. 1937)
- Pettigrew v. W & H Dev. Co., 122 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960)
- Baynard v. Liberman, 139 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)
- Murrell v. Trio Towing Serv., Inc., 294 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
- Touchette v. Bould, 324 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)
- SUN First Nat'l Bank OF Melbourne ad litem of the Est. of Ralph E. Balch & Bess D. Balch v. Lael N. Batchelor, 308 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)