LEROY WILLIAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant Williams was convicted of escape but was denied his constitutional right to self-representation when he requested to defend himself without counsel. The court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that once an accused makes a voluntary and intelligent election to proceed pro se, the trial court must permit it.
The trial court erred by denying appellant's request to represent himself. When an accused is mentally competent and sui juris and makes a voluntary and intelligent election to conduct his own defense, the court must permit it. The court should have conducted an inquiry into whether appellant was making an intelligent and voluntary decision before refusing his request.
[1] An accused who is mentally competent and sui juris has the right to conduct his own defense without counsel in the absence of unusual circumstances.
[2] A defendant in a state criminal trial has a constitutional right to proceed without counsel when they voluntarily and intelligently elect to do so.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“an accused who is mentally competent and sui juris has the right to conduct his own defense without counsel”
Establishes the fundamental rule that competent defendants have a right to self-representation absent unusual circumstances, as approved in State v. Cappetta
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFollowing an information filing for escape, the court appointed private counsel to defend appellant because a co-defendant was involved. Before trial …
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GRIMES, Judge.
Appellant appeals his conviction for escape on the ground that he was unconstitutionally denied his right to defend himself at the trial.
Following the filing of the information, the court appointed private counsel to defend appellant because a co-defendant was involved. On the date of the trial but prior to its commencement, appellant’s attorney asked leave to withdraw because the appellant wanted to represent himself. The motion was denied. When the case was called to trial, the attorney renewed his motion to withdraw, and it was again denied. Thereafter, a motion for mistrial was made by appellant’s attorneys on the same ground with the same result.
In State v. Cappetta, Fla.1968, 216 So. 2d 749, our Supreme Court approved the rule that in the absence of unusual circumstances, an accused who is mentally competent and sui juris has the right to conduct his own defense without counsel. Accord, McCain v. State, Fla.App.2d, 1973, 275 So. 2d 596. More recently, the United States Supreme Court in Faretta v. California, 1975, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, held that a defendant in a state criminal trial had a constitutional right to proceed without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elected to do so.
The foregoing authorities make it clear that when appellant’s counsel advised that appellant wished to defend himself, the court should have conducted an inquiry to see if appellant was making an intelligent and voluntary decision. Upon the determination that appellant had made a voluntary and intelligent election to defend himself, the court should have permitted him to do so. There was no such inquiry made in this case, though to the extent that appellant was permitted to speak, it does appear that he was seeking to represent himself. While better practice would have dictated the filing of a motion to withdraw as counsel at an earlier date, the record reflects that appellant’s attorney had not seen appellant for about three months because he had been incarcerated in the state prison system for conviction of another crime and had only been returned for trial just before it was scheduled to begin. Therefore, the late request could not justify the refusal to permit appellant to defend himself, though it may well have been a good reason to deny him a continuance for the purpose of preparation.
The judgment is reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
McNULTY, C. J., and SCHEB, J., concur.
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Mitchell v. State, 407 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)…ia, 95 S.Ct. 2541. In the instant case the trial judge failed to comply with either the Florida rule or the Faretta standard. There was no inquiry into Mitchell’s capacity to intelligently and understandingly make the choice. Cf. Williams v. State, 337 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). More specifically, there was no inquiry of record as to Mitchell’s mental condition, age, education or experience. While the record strongly suggests that nothing the trial court could have done, short of discharge of the defend…
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Ausby v. State, 358 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)…have conducted an inquiry to see if he was making an intelligent and voluntary decision. Upon making a determination that Ausby had made a voluntary and intelligent election, the court should have permitted him to defend himself. Williams v. State, 337 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). The record furnished us discloses that the trial court did no more than make inquiry of Ausby as to his educational background and why he wished to discharge the public defender. The record does not disclose what inquiry the cou…
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Drago v. State, 415 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)…emarkably apropos: In the instant case the trial judge failed to comply with either the Florida rule or the Faretta standard. There was no inquiry into Mitchell’s capacity to intelligently and understandingly make the choice. Cf. Williams v. State, 337 So. 2d 846 (Fla.2d DCA 1976). More specifically, there was no inquiry of record as to Mitchell’s mental condition, age, education or experience. While the record strongly suggests that nothing the trial court could have done, short of discharge of the defenda…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975)
- State v. Cappetta, 216 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1968)
- Mirabel v. State, 275 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)
- McCAIN v. State, 275 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)