STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
DANNY EVANS AND WILLIAM BECK, APPELLEES
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Florida appealed a trial court's discharge of defendants Evans and Beck based on speedy trial violations. The appellate court reversed, holding that separate arsons in different counties involving different victims and property are not the same criminal episode under the speedy trial rule, so the discharge was improper.
The separate arsons charged in Orange County were not grounded on the same conduct or criminal episode as the Seminole County charges, and therefore the speedy trial rule did not require consolidation. The trial court erred in granting the discharge motions.
[1] A trial court may err by misinterpreting the legal effect of evidence when ruling on a motion for discharge based on speedy trial rules.
[2] For speedy trial purposes, informations based on separate substantive acts are not considered "grounded on the same conduct or criminal episode" if they involve different…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the informations filed against defendants in Orange County were based on separate substantive acts independent of those offenses previously set forth in Seminole County informations and were not as a matter of law "grounded on the same conduct or criminal episode" within the contemplation of Rule 3.191(h)(2)”
Establishes the core holding that the separate offenses do not constitute the same criminal episode for speedy trial purposes
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDefendants were charged in Seminole County based on an information. Subsequently, separate informations were filed in Orange County charging the defen…
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PER CURIAM.
Upon due consideration of the briefs, oral argument and records in these consolidated appeals we are of the opinion that the trial court misconceived the legal effect of the evidence in granting defendants’ motion for discharge predicated upon the applicability of the speedy trial rule (section 3.191(h)(2), Fla.R.Crim.P.).
In particular, the informations filed against defendants in Orange County were based on separate substantive acts independent of those offenses previously set forth in Seminole County informations and were not as a matter of law “grounded on the same conduct or criminal episode” within the contemplation of Rule 3.191(h)(2), Fla.R. Crim.P. See State v. Boren, 273 So. 2d 415 (Fla.3d DCA 1973); see also State ex rel. Meyer v. Keough, 325 So. 2d 75 (Fla.2d DCA 1976). Moreover, the record does not reflect that any of the substantive offenses alleged in the Orange County informations were either a direct or an indirect result of the conspiracy charged in the Seminole County information.
Simply stated, the Orange County infor-mations were based upon separate criminal conduct and episodes alleging arsons which occurred at different times involving different owners, different property and different victims from those set forth in the Seminole County informations; the Orange County informations did not as a matter of law charge “a new crime grounded on the same conduct or criminal episode” within the meaning and contemplation of Rule 3.191(h)(2), supra.
Accordingly, the orders granting the defendants’ motions for discharge in these consolidated appeals are vacated and set aside and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
MAGER, C. J., ALDERMAN, J., and WEAVER, SIDNEY M.; Associate Judge, concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Wright v. State, 387 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)…Seminole County might allow the prosecution to charge Wright with the commission of two different crimes,3 but it is clear both crimes grew out of the same criminal episode. Richardson v. State, 340 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). State v. Evans, 338 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), cert. denied, 346 So. 2d 1248 (Fla.1977) is not controlling because in Evans, the defendant was charged with committing different acts of arson at different times, against different property and victims. Had Wright been charged…
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State v. Catalano, 60 So. 3d 1139 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)…ruling of the Second District.” See Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665, 667 (Fla.1992) (“[I]f the district court of the district in which the trial court is located has decided the issue, the trial court is bound to follow it”) (quoting State v. Hayes, 338 So. 2d 51, 53 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)). The State of Florida filed this timely petition for certiorari review arguing that the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of the law because section 316.3045 does not invite arbitrary enforcement, it co…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Boren, 273 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)
- State of Fla. ex rel. Michael W. Meyer & Dale James Schultz v. The Honorable Lawrence E. Keough, 325 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)