MARY A. PORTER AND J. H. PORTER, APPELLANTS,
v.
COLUMBIA COUNTY, FLORIDA, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. | 1954-11-12
TERRELL, Acting Chief Justice, SE-BRING, J., and BIRD, Associate Justice, concur.
75 So. 2d 699 Florida Supreme Court (1954) Caution
Cited by 14 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

In this eminent domain proceeding, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that testimony regarding ownership interests and damages to property should be excluded during the initial valuation phase of an eminent domain action and that the trial court properly excluded unqualified opinion testimony regarding property damage valuation.


Holding

The court held that: (1) questions of ownership and interest in property should be determined in a summary proceeding after the jury has rendered a verdict on the value and damages, not during the initial valuation phase; (2) J. H. Porter's testimony regarding property damage was properly excluded because he lacked the necessary qualifications as an appraiser or real estate expert; and (3) the answer's denial of necessity did not properly raise a jury issue because it contained no allegations of fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion.


Key Quotes

“It is not the purpose of an eminent domain proceeding to try title to the property [...] The purpose of the eminent domain proceeding is to determine the value of the property taken and damage to the remainder, irrespective of ownership.”

Establishes the fundamental purpose and scope of eminent domain proceedings, limiting inquiry to valuation rather than title disputes.

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Facts & Procedural History

Columbia County initiated an eminent domain proceeding to acquire land for construction of State Road No. 25. The county named only Mary Annie Porter …

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Opinion of the Court
MATHEWS, Justice.

MATHEWS, Justice.

This is an eminent domain proceeding. An appeal was prosecuted from final judgment entered from the Circuit Court in Columbia County.

It will not be necessary to discuss all of the assignments of error as most of them have been long settled as fixed law in this state. No good purpose can be served by continuing to repeat law about which there is no longer any dispute. The appellant insists that the Court committed reversible error because it would not permit one J.

H. Porter to testify that he was one of the fee simple title owners of the property in question. It appears from the petition in eminent domain that the petitioner made the diligent inquiry required by the statute and so far as ascertainable by said diligent research, named only Mary Annie Porter as the owner of the property.

J. H. Porter claimed that he was a joint owner and his testimony was offered as to his interest in the property. The Court sustained objections.

It is not the purpose of an eminent domain proceeding to try title to the property. See Peeler v. Duval County, Fla., 66 So. 2d 247. The purpose of the eminent domain proceeding is to determine the value of the property taken and damage to the remainder, irrespective of ownership. Such questions as interest in the property, ownership, liens on property, may be determined in the same action in a summary proceeding after the jury has ascertained and rendered a verdict as to the value of the property taken and damages to the remainder. The appellants contend that a denial in the answer of the necessity'for the taking of the land raised an issue which should have been submitted to the jury.

The petition is full and complete and sets forth that the petitioner is exercising its right of eminent domain by virtue of Chapter 341.22 and Chapters 73 and 74, Florida Statutes, 1951, F.S.A. It then alleges that the land sought to be acquired is necessary for public use for the purpose of constructing and maintaining a state highway designated as State Road No.

25. The answer does not deny that the petitioner found it necessary to acquire the lands in question and the fact that’ petitioner alleged that it had determined that the lands were necessary, the answer in effect admits that the petitioner found it necessary. The answer does not properly raise the question of necessity as determined by the petitioner. The answer contains no allegation of fraud, bad faith, or any facts showing an abuse of discretion. Spafford v. Brevard County, 92 Fla. 617, 110 So. 451; Inland Waterway Development Co. v. City of Jacksonville, Fla., 38 So. 2d 676; State v. Florida State Improvement Commission, Fla., 75 So. 2d 1.

It is assigned as error that J. H. Porter was not permitted to testify and express an opinion as to the value of the damage to the property. The record shows that he was not an appraiser or real estate expert and failed to show any necessary qualifications in order for him to testify as a witness in expressing an opinion as to the value or damage to the property. Orange Belt Ry. Co. v. Craver, 32 Fla. 28, 13 So. 444.

We have considered all assignments of error, the record and the briefs and we do not find any reversible error. Affirmed.

TERRELL, Acting Chief Justice, SE-BRING, J., and BIRD, Associate Justice, concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Division of Administration v. Allen, 447 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)
    …or the jury only include the damages suffered by the owner of the fee to a tract and subsequently thereafter the trial judge apportion the jury verdict between the various claimants. The court then quoted approvingly from Porter v. Columbia County, 75 So. 2d 699 (Fla.1954): [Sjuch questions as interest in the property, ownership, liens on property, may be determined in the same action in a summary proceeding after the jury has ascertained and rendered a verdict as to the value of the property taken and dam…
    1 / 2
  • …g liens thereon, is determined by the court in the same action after the jury has rendered a verdict for the value of the property as a whole. Cravero v. Florida State Turnpike Authority, Fla.1956, 91 So. 2d 312; Porter v. Columbia County, Fla.1954, 75 So. 2d 699. The statute authorizing interventions was not intended to allow parties to intervene who had no interest in the specific property sought to be condemned, but had other property rights adversely affected by the proposed improvement. Their rights sho…
  • Davis v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 715 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
    …itness is qualified to offer opinion testimony. See Harrison Land Dev., Inc. v. R&H Holding Co., 518 So. 2d 353, 355 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). Here, the witness had an extensive background in both economics and real estate. Cf. Porter v. Columbia County, 75 So. 2d 699, 700 (Fla.1954) (witness was incompetent because he was neither an appraiser, a real estate expert, nor a person with any necessary qualifications to express an opinion as to the value of property). Appellants further seek a new trial for improper…

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