FRANCISCO CHURRUCA ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
MIAMI JAI-ALAI, INC., ET AL., APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1976-09-14
No. 75-838
Before HENDRY, HAYERFIELD and NATHAN, JJ.
338 So. 2d 228 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1976) Negative Treatment
Cited by 9 cases

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Synopsis

Professional jai-alai players who struck in 1968-1969 and were replaced sued for tortious conspiracy when they could not obtain re-employment. The court affirmed dismissal of their second amended complaint, holding that without allegations of available positions and given defendants' lawful right to hire replacement workers, no civil conspiracy claim existed.


Holding

Plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action for civil conspiracy because: (1) the gist of civil conspiracy is the underlying civil wrong, not the conspiracy itself, and here no underlying actionable wrong was alleged; (2) plaintiffs made no allegation that positions were available for them; and (3) defendants had the lawful right to refuse employment and hire replacement workers, which could be done individually or in combination without creating liability.


Headnotes

[1] A civil action for conspiracy requires a civil wrong done pursuant to the conspiracy that results in damage to the plaintiff.

[2] An act that does not constitute a ground of action against one person cannot be the basis of a civil action for conspiracy.

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Key Quotes

“The gist of a civil action for conspiracy is not the conspiracy itself, but the civil wrong which is done pursuant to the conspiracy which results in damage to the plaintiff.”

Establishes the fundamental principle that conspiracy requires an underlying actionable civil wrong; mere combination without such a wrong is insufficient.

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Facts & Procedural History

In 1968, plaintiffs, professional jai-alai players, formed a union and struck, refusing to honor their player contracts for the 1968-1969 season to ob…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiffs appeal an order dismissing with prejudice their second amended complaint in an action for tortious conspiracy.

In 1968 plaintiffs, professional jai-alai players, formed a union and attempted to receive higher wages and increased benefits from the defendant jai-alai frontons by striking and refusing to honor their player contracts for the 1968-1969 season which caused their replacement by other players. Plaintiffs then sought re-employment for the 1969-1970 and ensuing seasons at the prevailing wages and conditions being offered to other jai-alai players; but because employment by a fronton is a prerequisite, they were unable to obtain licenses from defendant State Department of Business Regulation. In 1971 plaintiffs filed suit against the frontons for intentional interference with an advantageous relationship and conspiracy to deprive them of their right to earn a livelihood. The case was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action and the dismissal was affirmed by this court, 279 So. 2d 107. A writ of certiorari to the Florida Supreme Court was discharged “without prejudice to whatever rights, if any, petitioners may have for tortious conspiracy, if any, occurring subsequent to the 1968-69 jai-alai season.” See Churruca et al. v. Miami Jai-Alai et al., Fla.1974, 289 So. 2d 395. Thereafter plaintiffs filed this action against the defendant frontons and Department of Business Regulation alleging a conspiracy on the part of all defendants in that they conspired not to employ plaintiffs. Their original and amended complaints having been dismissed, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint which was dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs seek review of this dismissal. We affirm.

The gist of a civil action for conspiracy is not the conspiracy itself, but the civil wrong which is done pursuant to the conspiracy which results in damage to the plaintiff. Thus, it is generally held that an act which does not constitute a ground of action against one person cannot be made the basis of a civil action for conspiracy. Liappas v. Augoustis, Fla.1950, 47 So. 2d 582; Loeb v. Geronemus, Fla.1953, 66 So. 2d 241; Ocala Loan Company v. Smith, Fla. App.1963, 155 So. 2d 711. Further, general allegations of conspiracy are inadequate; the allegations must be clear, positive and specific. Gair v. Lockhart, Fla.1950, 47 So. 2d 826; Renpak, Inc. v. Oppenheimer, Fla.App.1958, 104 So. 2d 642; Stringfellow v. Breidegam, Fla.App.1962, 138 So. 2d 75; Kutner v. Kalish, Fla.App.1965, 173 So. 2d 763.

The allegations of the second amended complaint are legally insufficient to state a cause of action for conspiracy as there was no allegation that there were positions available for the plaintiffs who had been replaced. Plaintiffs also admitted that they refused to honor their contract for the 1968-1969 season and it follows that each defendant fronton has the right to hire players other than plaintiffs. Each defendant fronton exercised its right to refuse plaintiffs employment and the fact that the defendants were alleged to have acted in combination instead of individually has not effected a result different from anything that could have been accomplished separately.

We find the allegations of the instant complaint substantially the same as the allegations in the complaint filed in 1971 which was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.

Affirmed.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Churruca v. Miami Jai-Alai, Inc., 353 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 1977)
    …SUNDBERG, Justice. This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, reported at 338 So. 2d 228, which is alleged to be in conflict with Snipes v. West Flagler Kennel Club, Inc., 105 So. 2d 164 (Fla.1958), and Margolin v. Morton F. Plant Hospital Assn., Inc., 342 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), on the issue of whether a complaint is actionable…
  • Churruca v. Miami Jai-Alai, Inc., 354 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
    …PER CURIAM. WHEREAS, the judgment of this court was entered on September 14, 1976 (338 So. 2d 228) affirming the order of the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida in the above styled cause, and WHEREAS, on review of this court’s judgment, by certiorari, the Supreme Court of Florida by its opinion and judgment filed November 17, 1977, 353 So. 2…
  • Verone Marin Fehlhaber v. Fehlhaber, 502 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
    …sen v. Marlin, 486 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Senfeld v. Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Company (Cayman) Limited, 450 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); In Re Estate of Vettese, 421 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 4th [*35] DCA 1982); Churruca v. Miami Jai-Alai, Inc., 338 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); United States v. Plotke, 725 F. 2d 1303 (11th Cir.1984); In Re Mortgage America Corporation, 714 F. 2d 1266 (5th Cir.1983). At the time the appellant accepted the California money judgment, rather than pursue her community prop…

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