WILLIE MANSFIELD AND TOMMIE LOUIS HARRIS, APPELLANTS,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE; WILLIE MANSFIELD, APPELLANT, V. THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Willie Mansfield and Tommie Harris were convicted of trespass and grand larceny after being found hiding in a warehouse during a police response to a burglar alarm. They appealed their convictions and Mansfield also appealed his probation revocation, arguing that a police officer's testimony about Harris's invocation of his right to remain silent violated their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
The court held that the admission of Harris's statement invoking his right to silence was not fundamental error because the statement was made voluntarily after Miranda warnings and not in the face of an accusation or confrontation with incriminating evidence. Even if there was error, it was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt. The court also held that Mansfield's probation revocation was proper.
[1] A police officer's testimony that a defendant invoked their right to remain silent after receiving Miranda warnings, without the statement being made in the face of an ac…
[2] A comment on a defendant standing mute or refusing to testify in the face of an accusation constitutes fundamental error requiring a new trial.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Bennett v. State, Fla.1975, 316 So. 2d 41 holds that any comment upon the defendant standing mute or refusing to testify in the face of an accusation is fundamental error requiring a new trial. This principle of law does not apply here as Harris' statement was not made in the face of accusation.”
Establishes the court's distinction between comments on remaining silent in the face of accusation versus voluntary invocation of silence outside that context
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePolice responded to a silent burglar alarm at Douglas Freight Salvage warehouse and conducted a search, finding Harris hiding in a clothing drawer and…
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PER CURIAM.
Willie Mansfield and Tommie Harris seek reversal of their convictions for trespass and grand larceny. Mansfield also appeals his revocation of probation.
In response to a silent burglar alarm, the police surrounded Douglas Freight Salvage warehouse and began a search of the building. Harris was found hiding in a clothing drawer and Mansfield hiding in a refrigerator. The two were informed against for breaking and entering with intent to commit grand larceny, and grand larceny. They were tried together and the jury found them guilty of trespass (as a lesser included offense of breaking and entering), and grand larceny. A revocation hearing was then held on Mansfield’s prior probation. Whereupon, the court found him to be in violation of his probation, entered an order of revocation and imposed a three-year sentence.
Defendants urge as reversible error the denial of their motion for mistrial where one of the police officers testified that Harris exercised his right to remain silent during a police interrogation thereby violating both defendants’ privilege against self-incrimination based upon the following colloquy:
“Q Did you have occasion to speak with either one of these defendants after this?
“A Yes, sir. “I began the interview with Tommie Harris first, and he said he knew his constitutional rights but that he didn’t want to talk to me then and he was going to wait and talk to a lawyer first.
“So, at this point, I terminated the interview with him and those were the only questions that he answered.
“MR. FLYNN: I move to strike the answer. I move for a mistrial.
“THE COURT: The objection is sustained. The motion is denied.”
Bennett v. State, Fla.1975, 316 So. 2d 41 holds that any comment upon the defendant standing mute or refusing to testify in the face of an accusation is fundamental error requiring a new trial. This principle of law does not apply here as Harris’ statement was not made in the face of accusation. Harris voluntarily made the statement, after he was given Miranda warnings, that he knew his constitutional rights but didn’t want to talk. Thereupon the questioning terminated and no effort was made by the officer to confront him with any accusation of guilt or any incriminating evidence. Cf. State v. Flanagan, 443 S.W. 2d 25 (1969).
If there was error, the error was harmless as the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and we are satisfied that the above testimony did not contribute to the conviction of the defendants. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Bennett v. State, supra, at 44.
Mansfield’s contention that the order revoking his probation was erroneous lacks merit.
Affirmed.
[*859] PEARSON, Judge
(dissenting).
I am convinced that these judgments must be reversed under the holding in Bennett v. State, Fla.1975, 316 So. 2d 41. Under that holding, the harmless error doctrine is not applicable. The constitutional rights of an individual are of such importance that they cannot be violated and then excused. These rights must be enforced even in the most difficult cases.
Appellants in their motion for leave to supplement petition for rehearing cites this court to Shannon v. State, 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla., opinion filed June 30, 1976) which holds that the harmless error doctrine is inapplicable to the error complained of in Bennett v. State, 316 So. 2d 41 (Fla.1975). We hereby grant appellants’ motion to supplement petition for rehearing and strike the next to the last paragraph of our opinion with respect to the issue of harmless error.
Nevertheless, the rule is that any comment upon the accused’s exercise of his right to remain silent in the face of an accusation of guilt of the crime for which he is arrested and charged constitutes reversible error. Bennett v. State, 316 So. 2d 41, 42 (Fla.1975). We adhere to our primary finding that Harris’ statement to the arresting officer that he didn’t want to talk to them was not made in the face of accusation and, therefore, distinguishable from the factual situation in Bennett, supra. After Harris stated he knew his rights and did not wish to talk, the officer made no effort to confront Harris with any accusation of guilt and terminated the interview.
Accordingly, the petition for rehearing as supplemented is denied.
PEARSON, J., dissents.
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Willinsky v. State, 360 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 1978)…la. 4th DCA 1976); Lucas v. State, 335 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Farese v. State, 328 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Carter v. State, 335 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Bostic v. State, 332 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Mansfield v. State, 338 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) and Davis v. State, 342 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). The decision of the District Court in the case sub judice conflicts with those decisions and we have jurisdiction. Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution. In our o…
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Tsavaris v. Scruggs, 360 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1977)…District Courts of Appeal have answered this question, "No." Nevels v. State, 351 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) *759 Clark v. State, 336 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1976) Greenfield v. State, 337 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1976) Mansfield v. State, 338 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1976), Cert. dismissed Fla., 342 So. 2d 1102 Cridland v. State, 338 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1976) Farmer v. State, 326 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), Cert. dismissed, Fla., 340 So. 2d 927 Sylvester v. State, 341 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 4th…
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Sylvester v. State, 341 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)…in certain circumstances an improper reference to a defendant’s exercise of his right to remain silent may be harmless error. Manning v. State, 336 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Clark v. State, 336 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Mansfield v. State, 338 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). Because of this divergence of views we will, upon proper application of either party, certify as a matter of great public interest the following question to the Supreme Court of Florida: Where the prosecutor in a criminal case…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (U.S. 1967)
- Shannon v. State, 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1976)
- Bennett v. State, 316 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 1975)
- Madge P. Ball v. Ball, 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1976)