WILLIE JOE BROWN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Willie Joe Brown appeals the denial of his motion for discharge based on a violation of his speedy trial rights under Florida Rule 3.191. The court found that Brown was denied a speedy trial through no fault of his own due to administrative errors by state officials, and reversed the trial judge's order denying discharge.
The court reversed, holding that through no fault of the defendant, he was denied his speedy trial right, and his motion for discharge should have been granted. The court disagreed with the State's contention that the demand was invalid due to improper filing.
[1] A defendant's demand for trial is not properly filed if it is not filed with the court having jurisdiction and served on the prosecuting attorney.
[2] A defendant is denied the right to a speedy trial when, through no fault of the defendant, a trial is not held within the statutory period.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“While there is some confusion as to the degree of fault between the officials of the State of Florida and the State of New Jersey, it is clear that through no fault of the defendant he has been denied his right to a speedy trial.”
The court's core holding that the defendant's speedy trial right was violated through administrative error, not the defendant's fault
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBrown escaped from a Florida correctional institution on February 11, 1971, and was charged in Palm Beach County on February 22, 1971. He was arrested…
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ALDERMAN, Judge.
Defendant appeals the trial judge’s order denying his motion for discharge pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191. Defendant had entered a plea of nolo contendere to the offense of escape, was adjudged guilty, and sentenced to serve six months consecutively with any sentence now being served. He reserved his right of appeal.
Defendant escaped from the Glades Correctional Institution in Palm Beach County on February 11, 1971. An information charging him with this offense was filed in the Circuit Court of Palm Beach County on February 22, 1971. In December of the same year he was arrested in New Jersey and charged with robbery. On September 5,1972, based upon information provided by the State of Florida, prison officials in New Jersey erroneously advised defendant that a detainer had been lodged against him based upon a warrant from Dade County, Florida, charging him with escape. On April 30, 1973, defendant mailed a “Demand for Trial” which complied with Rule 3.191(b)(3), except that the document was not filed with the Circuit Court or served on the prosecution attorney of Palm Beach County. Instead the papers were mailed to the court and prosecutor in Dade County, the Attorney General and the Governor of Florida, as well as the Governor and Superintendent of the State Prison in New Jersey. In addition, a legal aid person, on behalf of the defendant, on May 1,1973, wrote to the Director of Corrections for the State of Florida concerning defendant’s demand for speedy trial. No action was taken. Finally in March of 1974, defendant was returned to prison in Florida. His trial was set on October 7,1974, but was not held because of defendant’s plea of nolo contendere.
The State contends that defendant’s demand for trial was not properly filed because it was not filed with the court having jurisdiction and served on the prosecuting attorney as provided by Rule 3.191(b)(3). We disagree and reverse. While there is some confusion as to the degree of fault between the officials of the State of Florida and the State of New Jersey, it is clear that through no fault of the defendant he has been denied his right to a speedy trial. Defendant’s motion for discharge should have been granted.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
MAGER, C. J., and CROSS, J., concur.