ALLIE WILLIAM CAMPBELL ET AL., PETITIONERS,
v.
JAMES W. MAZE, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court held that attorney's fees are not recoverable as taxable costs when a plaintiff takes a voluntary dismissal of an action, resolving a conflict between two district courts of appeal.
Attorney's fees are not recoverable as part of the taxable costs for taking a voluntary dismissal. The court adopted the reasoning of Judge Wigginton's dissent in Royal-Globe, which established that Florida law prohibits recovery of attorney's fees except where specifically authorized by statute, agreement of parties, or in equity from a specific fund.
[1] Attorney's fees are not recoverable as part of taxable costs upon a plaintiff's voluntary dismissal of an action.
[2] Attorney's fees may only be recovered when specifically authorized by statute or by agreement of the parties, except in equity from a specific fund.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It has long been the law of Florida that except where attorney's fees may be allowed in equity from a specific fund or property which may be lawfully charged with their payment, attorney's fees may not be recovered except when specifically authorized by statute or by agreement of the parties.”
Establishes the fundamental principle that attorney's fees are not recoverable in Florida except in limited circumstances—the core holding of the case.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePlaintiff Maze voluntarily dismissed his personal injury action before trial began. The defendant moved in trial court for taxation of costs, includin…
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OVERTON, Chief Justice.
This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal reported at 307 So. 2d 234 (Fla.App.4th 1975). The decision reported there conflicts with Royal-Globe Insurance Companies v. Indian River Gas Company, 281 So. 2d 380 (Fla.App.1st 1973). We have jurisdiction.1
The issue to be decided is whether costs taxable to a plaintiff taking a voluntary dismissal include reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in preparation for trial.
Plaintiff-respondent Maze took a voluntary dismissal of his personal injury action before trial began. Petitioner then moved in the trial court for taxation of costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees (stipulated to be $3,600). The trial court denied the motion as to the attorney’s fees, but ordered payment of the other costs requested. In so doing, it cited as support the dissent of Judge Wigginton in Royal-Globe.
Petitioner sought review in the Fourth District Court of Appeal through common law certiorari. The Fourth District Court agreed with the trial judge and discharged the writ, expressly declining to follow the majority holding of the First District Court of Appeal in Royal-Globe. The majority in Royal-Globe held that it was within the discretion of the trial judge to award attorney’s fees upon voluntary nonsuit as part of the defendant’s costs. The First District cited as authority Troutman Enterprises, Inc. v. Robertson, 273 So. 2d 11 (Fla.App.1st 1973) and Goldstein v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, 142 So. 2d 115 (Fla.App.3rd 1962). In his dissent, Acting Chief Judge Wigginton stated,
“It has long been the law of Florida that except where attorney’s fees may be allowed in equity from a specific fund or property which may be lawfully charged with their payment, attorney’s fees may not be recovered except when specifically authorized by statute or by agreement of the parties. . . . ” 281 So. 2d at 381, citing Granoff v. Cherin, 270 So. 2d 430 (Fla.App.3rd 1972); Kittel v. Kittel, 210 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1967); Thibert v. Thibert, 106 So. 2d 918 (Fla.App.3rd 1958).
Judge Wigginton also noted that neither case cited by the First District majority supports taxation of attorney’s fees as costs. In both cases, the costs awarded were solely for payment of expenses incurred in obtaining depositions, photographs, and witnesses, not for payment of attorney’s fees.
We hold attorney’s fees are not recoverable as part of the taxable costs for taking a voluntary dismissal for the reasons expressed by Judge Wigginton.
We affirm the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal and discharge the petition for certiorari.
It is so ordered.
ROBERTS, ADKINS, BOYD, ENGLAND and SUNDBERG, JJ., concur. HATCHETT, J., dissents.
. Art. V, Sec. 3(b)(3), Fla.Const.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (18 total)
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Fla. Patient's Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985)…of substantive law properly under the aegis of the legislature,” in accordance with the long-standing American Rule adopted by this Court. See Whitten v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co., 410 So. 2d 501, 504 (Fla.1982). See also Campbell v. Maze, 339 So. 2d 202 (Fla.1976); Codorno v. Emanuel, 91 So. 2d 653 (Fla.1956). As difficult as the resulting application of this statute may be in certain eases, we conclude that section 768.56 is constitutional. Computing a Reasonable Attorney Fee. Through its enactm…
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Whitten v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 410 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1982)…a Constitution (1972). To the contrary, an award of attorney’s fees is a matter of substantive law properly under the aegis of the legislature. See Estate of Hampton v. Fairchild-Florida Construction Co., 341 So. 2d 759 (Fla.1976); Campbell v. Maze, 339 So. 2d 202 (Fla.1976); Rivera v. Deauville Hotel, Employers Service Corp., 277 So. 2d 265 (Fla.1973); Codomo v. Emanuel, 91 So. 2d 653 (Fla.1956); State ex rel. Royal Ins. Co. v. Barrs, 87 Fla. 168, 99 So. 668 (1924). This Court accordingly affirms the decisi…
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Wilson v. Rose Printing Co., Inc., 624 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1993)…r, this Court has consistently held that where a statute or agreement of the parties provides that the term “costs” includes attorneys’ fees such fees are taxable under rule 1.420(d). Wiggins v. Wiggins, 446 So. 2d 1078 (Fla.1984); Campbell v. Maze, 339 So. 2d 202 (Fla.1976); City of Hallandale v. Chatlos, 236 So. 2d 761 (Fla.1970). The present employment agreement is unambiguous: In connection with any litigation arising out of this agreement the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover all costs incur…
Previewing 3 of 18 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Kittel v. Anne B. Kittel, 210 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1967)
- Minerva Goldstein and her husband v. Great Atl. & Pac. TEA Co., 142 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)
- Thibert v. Thibert, 106 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958)
- Troutman Enters., Inc. v. Robertson, 273 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)
- Granoff v. Murray Cherin, 270 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)
- Allie William Campbell v. Maze, 307 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)
- Shannon v. State, 281 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)
- Royal-Globe Ins. Cos. v. Indian River GAS Co., 281 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)