GLIMMERT BECKHAM, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Glimmert Beckham appealed the denial of his motion to vacate his conviction and sentence, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The court affirmed the denial, holding that counsel's strategic decision to pursue an insanity defense after withdrawing a guilty plea does not constitute ineffective assistance even if it resulted in a worse outcome.
Beckham did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. To successfully collaterally attack a judgment on grounds of ineffective assistance, the facts must demonstrate that the trial was a mockery or farce. Mishandling of trial matters falling within counsel's judgment or strategy does not constitute ineffective assistance, and bad judgment in pursuing a defense strategy is not proper grounds for collateral attack.
[1] A collateral attack on a judgment based on ineffective assistance of counsel requires allegations demonstrating that the trial was a mockery or a farce.
[2] Mishandling of a trial concerning matters of judgment or strategy by counsel does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“To successfully collaterally attack a judgment on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, the facts alleged must demonstrate that the trial was a mockery or a farce.”
Establishes the controlling legal standard for ineffective assistance claims in Florida at that time.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBeckham was charged with robbery and a crime against nature. He initially pled guilty to both charges in exchange for a five-year sentence on advice o…
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[*222] PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals the denial of his motion to vacate judgment and conviction on the ground that he was ineffectively represented by court appointed counsel.
Defendant Glimmert Beckham was informed against for robbery and a crime against nature. An assistant public defender was appointed to represent Beckham and upon his advice, Beckham pled guilty to both charges in exchange for a five year sentence. At the same time the court appointed three psychiatrists to determine his competency to stand trial or to enter a guilty plea. At a hearing on Beckham’s competency, two of the three psychiatrists found him competent. Thereupon, the court adjudged him competent. Because of the conflicting psychiatric reports, Beck-ham’s counsel moved to withdraw his guilty plea and stipulated five year sentence. The motion was granted by the trial judge who announced in open court in the presence of both defendant and his counsel that he was withdrawing the guilty plea and vacating the stipulated five year sentence and adjudication of guilt. The judge also determined that defendant was competent to stand trial and a jury trial was held solely on the issue of Beckham’s sanity as all other facts involving the crimes were stipulated to by defense counsel. Beckham was found sane by the jury and sentenced to 50 years in the state penitentiary. His conviction was affirmed on appeal by this court. Beckham v. State, 264 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972).
Beckham contends in this appeal that he was ineffectively assisted by counsel because his counsel elected to submit him to trial on the sanity issue on the mistaken belief that the earlier stipulated five year sentence would still be in force if the jury found him sane.
To successfully collaterally attack a judgment on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, the facts alleged must demonstrate that the trial was a mockery or a farce. Simpson v. State, 164 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964); Quesada v. State, 321 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975).
Further, mishandling of a trial with regards to matters falling within the judgment or strategy of counsel does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Solloa v. State, 221 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969).
At most Beckham is claiming that counsel exercised bad judgment in pursuing the defense of insanity and withdrawing the negotiated guilty plea and five year sentence and this is not proper grounds for a collateral attack.
Affirmed.
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Foster v. State, 464 So. 2d 1214 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…assistance of counsel. See Messer v. State, 439 So. 2d 875, 877 (Fla.1983); Songer v. State, 419 So. 2d 1044, 1047 (Fla.1982); McNeal v. State, 409 So. 2d 528, 529 (Fla. 5th DCA), pet. for review denied, 413 So. 2d 876 (Fla.1982); Beckham v. State, 339 So. 2d 221, 222 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). Nor does the above language require that the trial court allow defense counsel at least thirty minutes to argue his case to the jury in all eases. Depending on the circumstances, it may very well be that restricting defense…
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Merrill v. State, 364 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)…Further, the lack of objection to certain jury instructions by appellant’s court-appointed counsel does not establish ineffective assistance of counsel since such matters fall within the judgment or strategy of counsel. See, e. g., Beckham v. State, 339 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). The trial court correctly denied appellant’s motion without an evidentiary hearing. SMITH, Acting C. J., ERVIN, J., and MASON, ERNEST E., Associate Judge, concur.…
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Glimmert Beckham v. State, 397 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…re being no showing of a violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial, the order denying the motion for discharge is affirmed. Affirmed. . Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191. . See Beckham v. State, 264 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); Beckham v. State, 339 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Beckham v. State, 353 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). . At that time the court also determined that the federal court’s order had given appellant the option of electing between the alternative remedies. . In 1974 the Florida Leg…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Simpson v. State, 164 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)
- Delfin Quesada v. State, 321 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)
- Lemuel Sharp v. State, 221 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969)
- Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Wolf, 264 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)
- Glimmert Beckham v. State, 264 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)