METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
SERGEANT GERALD MINGO, APPELLEE
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The circuit court erred in finding a lack of competent substantial evidence to support the administrative finding that the officer left the scene of an accident without reporting it, and in reducing the suspension.
[1] A circuit court reviewing an administrative agency's quasi-judicial proceeding is limited to determining whether procedural due process was accorded, essential legal requ…
[2] The weight and credibility of evidence in an administrative proceeding are for the agency, not the reviewing court, to determine.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn officer was suspended for ten days for leaving the scene of an accident and providing false information. An administrative hearing upheld the suspe…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal by Metropolitan Dade County, respondent in the trial court, from an order entitled “Final Judgment” on a petition for writ of certiorari filed by Sergeant Gerald Mingo, appellee herein, to seek review of a decision of the county manager of Dade County, upholding a ten day suspension of Mingo from his position as a police officer, by the director of the Dade County Public Safety Department.
The record reflects that on July 23, 1974, Sergeant Mingo was suspended for ten days without pay for violations of two departmental rules: (1) acting in a manner tending to bring discredit upon himself or the department, and (2) knowingly entering or causing to be entered in any records, inaccurate, false or improper information. Min-go was informed of the suspension by letter from the director of the Public Safety Department stating that he was a passenger in a vehicle involved in a vehicular accident, that he left the scene without reporting the accident; and that during an official investigation he denied being at the scene of the accident or being in the vehicle which fled the scene.
Following a full administrative hearing, the hearing examiner made specific findings of fact with reference to the accident as well as to Mingo’s sobriety and his truthfulness in the Internal Review investigation. The hearing examiner further found that Mingo’s conduct justified the disciplinary action taken. On appeal to the county manager, on the basis of the hearing examiner’s findings and recommendations, and the record of the hearing, the decision was upheld, and the suspension was confirmed.
Mingo then sought review by filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the circuit court, which resulted in the final judgment herein appealed. The judge found that since by statute in Florida, the duty or responsibility to remain at the scene of an accident is imposed on the driver and not the passenger, there was not competent, substantial evidence to sustain the hearing examiner’s finding that Mingo left the scene of an accident without reporting it. The judgment provides that the ten day suspension “is deemed harsh in view of all the facts and circumstances and is hereby reduced to a five day suspension.”
On appeal from the final judgment, Dade County contends that the court (1) erred in finding that there was not competent substantial evidence to support the finding that Mingo left the scene of an accident without reporting it, and (2) erred in reducing the suspension from ten days to five. Mingo has cross-assigned as error the reduction of the suspension from ten days to five days as being inconsistent with the finding of lack of substantial, competent evidence.
In certiorari proceedings from an order of an administrative agency in a quasi-judicial proceeding, the circuit court is limited in the scope of its review to a determination of whether procedural due process had been accorded, whether essential requirements of law had been observed and whether the charges were supported by substantial, competent evidence. City of Miami v. Babey, 161 So. 2d 230 (Fla.3rd DCA 1964); McGuaran v. Susskind, 175 So. 2d 218 (Fla.3rd DCA 1965). The question of the weight and credibility of the evidence is for the administrative agency and not the reviewing court, even though the court may have reached a different conclusion on the same testimony. McFall v. Florida State Board of Dental Examiners, 173 So. 2d 458 (Fla.2nd DCA 1965); Florida State Board of Dental Examiners v. Graham, 187 So. 2d 104 (Fla.3rd DCA 1966). The court should not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative fact finder who heard the testimony and was in a position to evaluate the credibility of witnesses. Pauline v. Lee, 147 So. 2d 359 (Fla.2nd DCA 1962).
Appellate review by this court is limited to a determination of whether the circuit court applied the applicable law and acted in accordance with established procedure. Morris v. City of Hialeah, 140 So. 2d 615 (Fla.3rd DCA 1962); McGuaran v. Susskind, supra. Neither the circuit court in its appellate capacity, nor this court should reweigh the conflicting evidence. Chastain v. Civil Service Board of Orlando, 327 So. 2d 230 (Fla.4th DCA 1976).
The Dade County Public Safety Department, through its director, has the authority to promulgate rules and regulations regarding the behavior and duties of its officers and is competent to determine what constitutes conduct of an employee “tending to bring discredit upon himself or the department.” Having a position of trust and civic responsibility, a police officer should instill respect for himself and the department, and should so demean himself as to merit the confidence and respect of the public. Becker v. Merrill, 155 Fla. 379, 20 So. 2d 912 (1944). See Kennett v. Barber, 159 Fla. 80, 31 So. 2d 44 (1947). Therefore, we hold that the circuit court erred in its determination that there was a lack of competent, substantial evidence to support the hearing examiner’s determination of fact, and we reverse the final judgment entered in this cause, and reinstate those findings together with the ten day suspension.
Reversed.
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Cited By (22 total)
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Campbell v. Vetter, 392 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)…ed to a determination of whether procedural due process has been accorded, whether the essential requirements of law have been observed, and whether the decision is supported by substantial competent [*8] evidence. Metropolitan Dade County v. Mingo, 339 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1976); McGuaran v. Susskind, 175 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1965); City of Miami v. Babey, 161 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1964). In its review capacity, a circuit court may not reevaluate conflicts in the evidence to determine whether ther…
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Cherokee Crushed Stone, Inc. v. City OF Miramar, 421 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)…view of the administrative action, has not otherwise been made directly appealable to the Supreme Court, it is, under plain construction of Article V, Section 4(b)(1) ... reviewable here by way of appeal.” But see: Metropolitan Dade County v. Mingo, 339 So. 2d 302 (Fla.1976) in which the scope of review was said to be “limited to a determination of whether the circuit court applied the applicable law and acted in accordance with established procedure” which is indicative of certiorari although the proceeding…
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Cross KEY Waterways v. Reubin O'D. Askew, 351 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)…gh it has the power, duty and opportunity to designate areas of critical state concern, will not do so. Section 120.68(13)(a)1, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1976).19 State ex rel. Siegendorf v. Stone, 266 So. 2d 345 (Fla.1972); Met. Dade County v. Mingo, 339 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Sauls v. De Loach, 182 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966), cert. den., 188 So. 2d 823 (Fla.1966). In reaching the constitutional question, we have considered petitioners’ other points and have found them unavailing. The designating…
Previewing 3 of 22 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (13 total)
- Pauline v. LEE, 147 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)
- Morris v. City OF Hialeah, 140 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)
- Becker v. Merrell, 155 Fla. 379 (Fla. 1944)
- Kennett v. Barber, 159 Fla. 81 (Fla. 1947)
- Chastain v. Civil Serv. Bd. OF Orlando, 327 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
- Kubie v. THE Honorable Ross Williams, 159 Fla. 80 (Fla. 1947)
- City OF Miami v. Babey, 161 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)
- McFALL v. Fla. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 173 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965)
- Stewart v. Standard OIL Co. OF Ky., 173 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965)
- John v. McGUARAN, 175 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)