BERNARD B. BROWN, APPELLANT,
v.
WANDA MAY, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In a paternity suit, the Florida Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment because it admitted privileged marital communications between the appellant and his former wife, despite the appellee's concession that such admission constituted reversible error. The court reaffirmed that confidential communications between spouses during marriage are privileged and cannot be disclosed without consent.
The admission of such testimony was reversible error. Communications between husband and wife made during their marriage and while living together are privileged and cannot be disclosed by one spouse without the consent of the other. The trial court should not have admitted the former wife's testimony regarding statements allegedly made by the appellant during their marriage.
“Such confidential communications between husband and wife have always been regarded as privileged, and, when attempted to be detailed or divulged by either of the parties to whom the communication has been intrusted, the law not only forbids, and will not permit it to be done, but regards it as a character of testimony that such witnesses are not competent to depose”
Establishes the fundamental rule that marital communications are privileged and cannot be disclosed by either spouse
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe appellee filed a bill of complaint alleging that the appellant was the father of her out-of-wedlock child. The appellant denied all allegations. A…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Witness Competency cases and more on FLexlaw
MATHEWS, Justice.
In this case the appellee filed a bill of complaint charging that the appellant was the father of a child which she bore out of wedlock. All allegations of the bill of complaint were denied by the appellant. The appellee relied mainly on testimony of the former wife of the appellant to substantiate her claim. This testimony, admitted by the Court, was by the former wife when she and the appellant were living together and was with regard to a communication allegedly made to the former wife by the appellant at the time when the marital relationship was in full force and effect between them. They were divorced subsequent to this alleged conversation. At the trial of the cause the appellant strenuously objected to this testimony. The sole question necessary for a determination of this matter is whether or not the admission of such testimony was reversible error. After the appellant filed his brief in this cause, the appellee filed a brief in which it is admitted that the admission of the testimony was reversible error. Only on rare occasions will this Court reverse a decree of the Chancellor based solely on the admission of the appellee that reversible error has been committed. In this case the law seems to be well settled that communications between husband and wife made in the course of their marriage relationship and while they are married and living together are privileged and may not be disclosed by one without the consent of the other party. Mercer v. State, 40 Fla. 216, 24 So. 154; Ex parte Beville, 58 Fla. 170, 50 So. 685, 27 L.R.A.,N.S., 273; and Ranee v. Hutchison, 131 Fla. 460, 179 So. 777. In the case of Mercer v. State, supra [40 Fla. 216, 24 So. 157], which is cited in the case of Rance v. Hutchison, supra, this Court said:
“ * * * Such confidential communications between husband and wife have always been regarded as privileged, and, when attempted to be detailed or divulged by either of the parties to whom the communication has been intrusted, the law not only forbids, and will not permit it to be done, but regards it as a character of testimony that such witnesses are not competent to depose, and upon the same ground that it prohibits the violation by an attorney of the confidence reposed in him by his client, — that of public pol- ‡ Í tf
The final decree of the Chancellor be and the same is hereby reversed for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
ROBERTS, C. J., and TERRELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
COX v. State, 192 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)…ivil or criminal matters did not have the effect of empowering either of them to give testimony which would detail or expose confidential communications between them. See Rance v. Hutchinson, 131 Fla. 460, 179 So. 777 (1948); Brown v. May, Fla.1954, 76 So. 2d 652. We therefore, conclude that it was error to overrule appellant’s objection to the testimony of his wife and admit into evidence the statement made to her. Having determined that it was error to admit the privileged communication over the objection…
-
State v. Stewartson, 443 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)…officer who seized it. Little more than curiosity could have led the policewoman to open the envelope and read the letter. Of course hindsight shows the intuition might have paid off. Appellee’s caselaw citations are of little value. Brown v. May, 76 So. 2d 652 (Fla.1954) has to do with a communication completed during marriage but offered in evidence after termination of the marriage. This is hardly what occurred here. The other cases have to do with the fourth amendment, which is not raised in this appea…
-
State v. Norris, 352 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)…use as to any communications between them on the ground that they are confidential and therefore privileged, is applicable to communications that occurred prior to the time the persons were married to each other. We hold it is not. In Brown v. May, 76 So. 2d 652 (Fla.1954), in an action between parties formerly married but by then divorced, it was held to be reversible error to permit the wife to submit pertinent and material testimony of communications of the parties which took place during the time they w…
Authorities Cited
- Mercer v. State, 40 Fla. 216 (Fla. 1898)
- Rance v. Hutchinson, 131 Fla. 460 (Fla. 1938)
- Ex parte Beville, 58 Fla. 170 (Fla. 1909)