DOLORES M. RICHMOND, APPELLANT,
v.
COLIN F. LUMB AND P. H. JENNEFER LUMB, HIS WIFE, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The appellate court reversed a trial court's order denying attorney's fees to a buyer who prevailed in a breach of contract action. The court found that the buyer was entitled to attorney's fees based on the contract and the jury's verdict finding the seller in default.
Yes, the buyer is entitled to attorney's fees because the jury's verdict implicitly determined the seller defaulted, triggering the contract's attorney's fees provision.
[1] A prevailing party in a breach of contract action is entitled to attorney's fees when the contract expressly provides for such recovery upon resort to legal proceedings f…
[2] A jury's verdict for a plaintiff on monetary damages in a breach of contract action implicitly determines that the defendant defaulted on the agreement.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Implicit in the jury’s verdict for Dolores was the determination that defendants defaulted on the agreement which provides that if the sale does not close due to default on the part of the seller (i. e. the defendants), then Dolores, the purchaser, is entitled to attorney’s fees if she has to resort to legal proceedings for enforcement of her contract rights.”
Establishes the basis for the court's finding that the jury's verdict implied seller default.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDolores Richmond sued Colin and Jennefer Lumb for breach of a purchase and sale agreement after the sale of a townhouse failed to close. Richmond depo…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Attorney'S Fees Provision cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
In this interlocutory appeal plaintiff seeks reversal of an order denying her attorney’s fees after prevailing in a breach of contract action.
Plaintiff, Dolores Richmond, and the defendants, Colin and Jennefer Lumb, executed a purchase and sale agreement whereby Dolores agreed to buy their townhouse and deposited $5,690 with the real estate broker. The parties never closed and Dolores, alleging that defendants were at fault, filed suit for specific performance, money damages and attorney’s fees. Defendants answered contending that Dolores was in default and counterclaimed for monetary damages and attorney’s fees. Subsequently, the real estate broker who held the deposit was interpled. During the trial, Dolores abandoned her claim for specific performance, and a directed verdict was entered against her as to this claim. The jury found for Dolores on the issue of monetary damages and against defendants on their counterclaim. She was awarded her deposit of $5,690. The issue of attorney’s fees was heard separately by the trial judge who entered the appealed order of denial. We reverse.
Implicit in the jury’s verdict for Dolores was the determination that defendants defaulted on the agreement which provides that if the sale does not close due to default on the part of the seller (i. e. the defendants), then Dolores, the purchaser, is enti- tied to attorney’s fees if she has to resort to legal proceedings for enforcement of her contract rights. Dolores, having had to resort to legal action to enforce her rights, is entitled to recovery of a reasonable attorney’s fee. See All-Dixie Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Moffatt, 212 So. 2d 347 (Fla.3d DCA 1968); Carol Management Company v. Baring Industries, 257 So. 2d 270 (Fla.3d DCA 1972).
Accordingly, we reverse the order of denial and remand the cause to the trial court to hold a hearing on the issue of the amount of a reasonable attorney’s fee and based on the evidence and testimony adduced therefrom to make an award to Dolores.
It is so ordered.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Lhamon v. Retail Dev., Inc., 422 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)…able as a part of damages in a breach of contract case and, as such, are to be determined by the jury where a case is tried by a jury.” This Third District decision is apparently in conflict with an earlier Third District decision, Richmond v. Lumb, 339 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). See Parker v. Solar Research Corporation, 210 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968) which is in conflict, as well. The judgment awarding attorney’s fees is REVERSED. ORFINGER, C.J., and COWART, J., concur.…
-
Schwinder v. Wilson, 503 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…PER CURIAM. Appellee’s filing of a counterclaim fulfilled the contractual provision that entitled the seller to recover attorney’s fees if she were compelled to take “legal action to enforce” the contract. See Richmond v. Lumb, 339 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). Appellant’s remaining point lacks merit. See Stabinski, Funt & De Oliveira, P.A. v. Alvarez, 490 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). Affirmed.…
-
Purdy v. Brose, 515 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…ose was, and still remains, the prevailing party in this action, and therefore was entitled to such fees and costs under the contract between the parties. See Kendall East Estates v. Banks, 386 So. 2d 1245, 1247 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Richmond v. Lumb, 339 So. 2d 1147, 1148 (Fla. [*1042] 3d DCA 1976); Carol Management Co. v. Baring Indus., 257 So. 2d 270, 272 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972). Affirmed as modified, and remanded with directions to so modify the final judgment.…
Authorities Cited
- Reese v. The State of Fla. ex rel. Malcolm E. Gracy, 212 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- All-Dixie Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Moffatt, 212 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- Carol Mgmt. Co. v. Baring Indus., 257 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)
- Cioppa v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. OF Wash., 257 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)