JAMES EDWARD HOPSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A probation violation warrant issued during the probationary period, even if executed after expiration, is sufficient to allow revocation.
Appellant was charged with breaking and entering and grand larceny, pleaded guilty, and was placed on probation. A warrant for probation violation was…
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PER CURIAM.
By information filed on July 15, 1962, appellant was charged with breaking and entering and grand larceny. He pleaded guilty on January 9,1964 and was placed on five years probation. On September 27, 1967, a warrant issued charging appellant with probation violation in that he left his approved residence without permission. On May 14, 1976, appellant pleaded guilty to the charge of violating probation and was sentenced to fifteen years with credit for time served.
Appellant now appeals contending his probation could not be revoked on the basis of a nine-year-old warrant. We disagree.
It is clear that upon expiration of the probationary period the court is divested of all jurisdiction over the person of the probationer unless in the meantime the process of the court has been set in motion for revocation or modification of the probation pursuant to Section 948.06, Florida Statutes (1963). Carroll v. Cochran, 140 So. 2d 300 (Fla.1962).
It is our opinion that the processes of the trial court had been set in motion by the warrant for appellant’s arrest which was issued within the period of probation. Thus, revocation, though late in the coming, was timely initiated. Further, the sentence is not excessive as the maximum imprisonment authorized by statute at the time of conviction was fifteen years. Section 810.-01, Florida Statutes (1961).
Accordingly, the order of the lower court is affirmed.
McNULTY, C: J., and HOBSON and BOARDMAN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Gardner v. State, 412 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)…ner unless prior to that time the processes of the court have been set in motion for revocation or modification of probation. Bouie v. State, 360 So. 2d 1142 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); Carpenter v. State, 355 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Hopson v. State, 339 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Ard v. Shelby, 97 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1st DCA 1957). Here the state’s affidavit alleging appellant had violated his probation was not filed until one day after his term of probation expired. Therefore, the court had no jurisdiction…
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Harris v. State, 525 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)…ation, issues during the term of probation, the court has jurisdiction to consider the alleged violations even if the probationary term expires before the time of arrest and/or hearing. Carroll v. Cochran, 140 So. 2d 300 (Fla.1962); Hopson v. State, 339 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). There is no doubt but that a warrant for Harris’s arrest issued in timely fashion, because the violation hearing itself occurred prior to the expiration date of Harris’s probation. The trial court unquestionably had jurisdiction…
Authorities Cited
- Carroll v. Cochran, 140 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 1962)
- Bell v. Cochran, 140 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 1962)