CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK OF NAPLES, A UNITED STATES BANKING CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
INDIANA INSURANCE COMPANY AND NATIONAL AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, APELLEES
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Florida Supreme Court transferred the case back to the District Court of Appeal because the trial court's unconstitutional ruling on Fla. Stat. § 77.031 was neither assigned as error nor argued on appeal, making it an improper basis for jurisdiction.
A trial court's ruling that a statute is unconstitutional does not confer jurisdiction on the Florida Supreme Court when that ruling is neither assigned as error nor argued in any appellate brief.
[1] A trial court's determination that a statute is unconstitutional does not provide a basis for Florida Supreme Court jurisdiction when the constitutional issue is neither…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMr. Green's house burned down, triggering insurance obligations. Citizens National Bank sued Green and brought the insurers (Indiana Insurance Company…
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HATCHETT, Justice.
When Mr. Green’s house burned down, appellees and another insuror became obligated to make the loss good. Appellant sued Green, brought in appellees as garnishees, and eventually secured default judgments against them. When appellees prevailed on motion for rehearing, appeal was taken to the District Court of Appeal, Second District. We now transfer the cause back to that court for decision on the merits.
The parties sought to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court because the trial court ruled Section 77.031, Florida Statutes (1975) unconstitutional. See generally Unique Caterers, Inc. v. Rudy’s Farm Co., 338 So. 2d 1067 (Fla., 1976). Here, as in Hillsborough County Aviation Authority v. Walden, 196 So. 2d 912 (Fla.1967) on retransfer 210 So. 2d 193 (Fla.1968), the “trial judge did do this but his holding has never been assigned as error nor has it ever been argued in any appellate brief.” At 913. In the present ease, moreover, the appellant alleges in an assignment of error that the unconstitutionality of the statute “was irrelevant to [the] determination” being appealed. Accordingly, the cause is transferred to the District Court of Appeal, Second District. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority v. Walden, supra; Roberts v. State, 181 So. 2d 646 (Fla.1966); City of Miami v. Steckloff, 111 So. 2d 446 (Fla.1959).
OVERTON, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD, ENGLAND and SUNDBERG, JJ., concur. ROBERTS, J., dissents.
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Snyder v. Davis, 699 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1997)…ined: Where there is no surviving spouse, or minor child, the decedent’s homestead may be devised without limitation. Art. X, § 4(c), Fla. Const. Homestead property can be devised through the residuary clause in a decedent’s will. Estate of Murphy, 340 So. 2d 107 (Fla.1976). In a devise of a homestead to a spouse or heir of the testator/testatrix the exemption from forced sale inures to the benefit of the devisee. Bartelt v. Bartelt, 579 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). The question therefore is simply whether…
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McKEAN v. Warburton, 919 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 2005)…asset of the estate by a specific devise. In the absence of a specific devise, the property may pass through the residuary, which is a sufficiently precise indicator of testamentary intent to pass protected homestead property. See Estate of Murphy, 340 So. 2d 107 (Fla.1976) (finding that a specific devise of homestead property is preferred, but the general language of a residuary clause is a sufficiently precise indicator of testamentary intent). In this case, the will did not specifically devise the protect…
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In re Est. OF George B. Walters, Sr. v. Edwards, 700 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…testator died approximately one year later. A general rule of will construction is that the testator’s intent as expressed in the will controls the legal effect of the testator’s dispositions. See § 732.6005(1), Fla. Stat. (1995); Estate of Murphy, 340 So. 2d 107 (Fla.1976); Barnett First Nat’l Bank of Jacksonville v. Cobden, 393 So. 2d 78, 80 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). This intent is to be given full force and effect to the extent possible so long as it does not violate the law or public policy. See Adkins v. Woo…
Previewing 3 of 16 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- City OF Miami v. Steckloff, 111 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1959)
- Hillsborough Cnty. Aviation Auth. v. Walden, 210 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1968)
- Unique Caterers, Inc. v. Rudy's Farm Co., 338 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 1976)
- Roberts v. State, 181 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 1966)
- Hillsborough Cnty. Aviation Auth. v. Walden, 196 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1967)