JOHN L. JOHNS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that a stipulation for continuance to determine PTI eligibility does not constitute a complete waiver of speedy trial rights.
[1] A stipulation for continuance that expressly waives the right to a speedy trial until a specific event occurs does not constitute an indefinite waiver of that right.
[2] The speedy trial clock resumes running after a condition subsequent, such as the determination of eligibility for pre-trial intervention, has been met.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant was arrested and subsequently waived his speedy trial rights until his eligibility for Pre-Trial Intervention (PTI) was determined. Appellan…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant reserved his right to appeal a denial of his motion for discharge under the speedy trial rule (Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191) and pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor. Probation followed. We reverse the denial of the motion for discharge.
Appellant was arrested on February 13, 1975 for the offense charged herein. On June 18, 1975 he and his codefendant, in a stipulation for continuance, waived their right to speedy trial expressly “until such time as their eligibility for Pre-Trial Intervention (PTI) has been determined.” Appellant was thereafter informed on September 23,1975 that he was not eligible for PTI while his codefendant learned on November 18, 1975 that he was eligible. On April 2, 1976, appellant filed his speedy trial motion for discharge, the denial of which we here review.
Concededly, a stipulation for extension of the speedy trial time works so as to lengthen the maximum period in which timely trial is required. Kniffin v. Hall, 262 So. 2d 900 (Fla.2d DCE 1972). But it is not tantamount to a waiver altogether unless specifically denominated as such. Here, to the extent that the stipulation was a waiver, there was an express condition subsequent — determination of eligibility for PTI. This occurred, certainly, when the codefendant’s eligibility was determined on November 18 if not when appellant’s eligibility was determined (adversely) on September 23. The time meter then took up where it left off.
Having been arrested on February 13,1975, and the time for making the determination for eligibility for PTI having consumed only 150 days at most, appellant’s motion filed before trial and 414 days after arrest should have been granted. The state was then at least 84 days late.
In view whereof, the order appealed from should be, and it is hereby, reversed; and the cause is remanded with directions to forever discharge appellant from the charges herein.
McNULTY, C. J., and HOBSON and BOARDMAN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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State v. McCRERY, 429 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)…he transcript of the July 25 hearing is clear that the prosecutor agreed to and the court accepted defense counsel’s request that the speedy trial period be extended rather than waived. [378 So. 2d at 1246] Defendants’ reliance upon Johns v. State, 340 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1976), also misses the mark. There, counsel entered into a stipulation providing for a continuance and a waiver of the defendant’s right to speedy trial until such time as eligibility for pre-trial intervention has been determined. In…
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State of Fla. ex rel. Mary Louise Mullen v. Honorable William T. Swigert, 352 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)…me which elapsed prior to the tolled periods was allowed to be computed in determining whether the rule was violated. E. g., State v. Williams, 287 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1973); Grisham v. State, 319 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975); Johns v. State, 340 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1976). The court could, upon the state’s motion or upon its own motion, have extended the trial time upon a finding that exceptional circumstances existed by reason of the delay caused by relator’s filing petition for writ of prohibiti…
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State v. Kubesh, 378 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)…on of a rather lengthy hearing. The first issue presented for our consideration is whether the order of November 14, which reset Kubesh’s trial for January 16, commenced the speedy trial meter.1 Appellee contends that our holding in Johns v. State, 340 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), should control, arguing that it stands for the proposition that when a defendant is rejected for PTI the meter picks up where it left off. We disagree. We ruled that the speedy trial period was extended for a period equal to the…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Kniffin v. Honorable W. Troy Hall, Jr., 262 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972)