DONNIE SLIGHT SMITH, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court reversed a manslaughter conviction because the trial court improperly allowed the prosecutor to impeach the defendant's trial testimony by cross-examining him about his post-arrest silence following Miranda warnings, violating due process under Doyle v. Ohio.
A trial court errs in permitting the prosecutor to impeach a defendant's exculpatory statement made at trial by cross-examining the defendant about his post-arrest silence after Miranda warnings.
[1] A prosecutor may not use a defendant's post-arrest silence following Miranda warnings to impeach the defendant's exculpatory statement made at trial, as such use violates…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDonnie Slight Smith was charged with second-degree murder and waived jury trial. The trial court found him guilty of manslaughter instead.…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant-defendant, Donnie Elight Smith, appeals a judgment of guilty and imposition of sentence for the offense of manslaughter. We reverse. Smith was charged by information with murder in the second degree. Trial by jury was waived. The trial court adjudged Smith guilty of manslaughter. Judgment of guilty was entered and sentence imposed. This appeal followed.
The primary question for our determination is whether the trial court erred in permitting the state prosecutor, over objection, to seek to impeach a defendant’s exculpatory statement, made for the first time at trial, by cross-examining the defendant about his post-arrest silence after Miranda warnings had been given.
This identical question has been answered in the affirmative by the United States Supreme Court in the recent decision of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). It was there determined that the use of a defendant’s post-arrest silence to impeach his exculpatory statement made at trial violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. We adopt this view, and determine that the trial court in the instant case erred in permitting the state prosecutor to cross-examine the defendant at trial about defendant’s post-arrest silence.
Accordingly, the judgment and sentence appealed is reversed, and the cause is remanded for new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
MAGER, C. J.,1 CROSS, J., and CALHOUN, JAMES P., Associate Judge, concur.
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Citator
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Webb v. State, 347 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)…ere was nothing inconsistent with Webb’s police station silence and his alibi testimony at trial, and we also think the cross-examination as to appellant’s pretrial silence violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Smith v. State, 340 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). For these reasons the judgment and sentence must be reversed for a new trial. Since this case must be tried again, we will treat appellant’s second point on appeal. It will be recalled there were two other persons with Almond…
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Cyril Clinton Wythers v. State, 348 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)…ial, where the erroneous admission of damaging evidence may have deprived the defendant of a fair trial, a conviction will be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. Paul v. State, 340 So. 2d 1249 (Fla.3d DCA 1976). See also Smith v. State, 340 So. 2d 930 (Fla.4th DCA 1976), and Mackey v. State, 234 So. 2d 418 (Fla.3d DCA 1970). But we note Houston v. State, 337 So. 2d 852 (Fla.lst DCA 1976), in which the court considered the weight of the evidence as to appellant’s guilt, together with the fact that…
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Gifford v. State, 355 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)…anding this the prosecutor proceeded to elicit that fact from the appellant repeatedly. This constituted an improper comment on the appellant’s right to remain silent. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976); Smith v. State, 340 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). It makes no difference that the appellant was shown to have later given a statement. Williams v. State, 335 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). And the Florida Supreme Court has held that such error requires reversal without regard…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (U.S. 1976)
- Erle W. McGOUGH v. State, 293 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)