GULF LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
v.
MARY M. SHELTON, JOINED BY HER HUSBAND, RUFUS E. SHELTON
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Gulf Life Insurance Company appealed a judgment awarding benefits under an industrial insurance policy to the mother of a deceased insured. The court held that the insurance company failed to conclusively prove misrepresentation of health conditions, and affirmed the beneficiary's right to recover.
The insurance company failed to conclusively prove misrepresentation. The court held that when an insurer accepts an applicant as a risk without medical examination, misrepresentation must be conclusively demonstrated to avoid the policy, and conflicting evidence must be resolved by the jury which may reject expert testimony in favor of lay evidence.
“If the insured did not know that he had stomach ulcers, there was no misrepresentation and he cannot be held to have misrepresented his condition.”
Establishes that misrepresentation requires the insured's knowledge of the condition, not merely the existence of an undisclosed condition.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHolice E. Shelton applied for and obtained an industrial life insurance policy on July 15, 1940, from Gulf Life Insurance Company without medical exam…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Insurance Policy Conditions cases and more on FLexlaw
On July 15, 1940, Holice E. Shelton of Volusia County, Florida, applied for and secured a policy of insurance from Gulf Life Insurance Company, a Florida corporation. The insured died September 19, 1940. This action was brought by the beneficiary being the mother of the insured to recover under the contract of insurance. This appeal is from a final judgment for the plaintiff.
The policy was one of industrial insurance written without medical examination on representation of the insured as to *587condition of his health. The policy contained a provision that it should “not take effect unless on the date of delivery hereof the insured is alive and in sound health.” The insurance company contends that the beneficiary should not be permitted to recover because the insured misrepresented the condition of his health at the time he applied for and secured the policy.
The evidence shows that the insured died little more than two months after he secured the policy. The agent of the company testified that he issued and delivered the policy and that the insured was not sick at that time. The mother of the insured testified that he was living with her at the time the policy was issued, that he was a painter and worked every day he had work, that he had some puny spells and came home tired at night but so far as she could tell, he was in fine health.
Dr. E. A. Carter testified by deposition four years after the death of the insured that he called on him ten or twelve times, that his condition was such that he could have died from his heart condition, or a liver condition, but that he thought the immediate cause of death was ulcers of the stomach, that such condition had existed when the policy was issued but he would not say that the insured knew it at that time.
If the diagnosis of the doctor may be clothed with infallibility, we might assume that the insured misrepresented his condition when he applied for the policy but it is common, knowledge that errors in diagnosing occur. If the insured did not know that he had stomach ulcers, there was no misrepresentation and he cannot be held to have misrepresented his condition. The doctor stated positively that he may not have known it. In addition to this, there was the testimony of his mother as to his normal condition and the agent who wrote the policy took him to be in normal health.
The duty was on the insurance company to satisfy itself as to the normal health or the insurability of the insured when the contract was made. When it does this and accepts him as a risk, he will not be deemed to have misrepresented his condition except by conclusive proof to that effect. In *588this case, the evidence taken as a whole was not conclusive on this point. There were in fact conflicts which devolved on the jury to resolve and in doing so, it was within their province to reject the expert and rely oh the lay evidence. When the insurance company relies on misrepresentatiori to avoid a policy the misrepresentation must be conclusively shown.
There was some basis for the verdict rendered so the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
CHAPMAN, C. J., BUFORD and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Shaw v. Puleo, 159 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1964)…there are in fact conflicts which arise in testimony given during the trial, it is the function of the jury to resolve them and it is within their province to reject the expert testimony and rely on lay evidence. Gulf Life Insurance Co. v. Shelton, 155 Fla. 586, 21 So. 2d 39. For these reasons we must reiterate that even though the facts testified to by Dr. Albee were not within the ordinary experience of the members of the jury, the jury was still free to determine their credibility and to decide the wei…
-
Andrews v. Strecker Body Builders, Inc., 92 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1957)…vidence presented to him. Star Fruit Co. v. Canady, 159 Fla. 488, 32 So. 2d 2; Johnson v. Dicks, Fla.1954, 76 So. 2d 657. The same rule has been applied to jury cases in evaluating the opinion of experts. Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Shelton, 155 Fla. 586, 21 So. 2d 39. We are not here intending to minimize the importance of competent expert testimony. We merely hold that it is the responsibility of the deputy commissioner to evaluate all of the testimony and in the evaluation process he may, if it appears approp…
-
Dep't OF Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Bogorff, 35 So. 3d 84 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)…he reasons given by the witness for the opinion expressed, and all the other evidence in the case”); Shaw v. Puleo, 159 So. 2d 641, 644 (Fla.1964), modified on other grounds, Griffis v. Hill, 230 So. 2d 143 (Fla.1969); Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Shelton, 155 Fla. 586, 21 So. 2d 39 (1945). . Trolinger v. State, 300 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974), cert. denied, 310 So. 2d 740 (Fla.1975). . Orlando Sports Stadium Inc. v. State ex rel. Powell, 262 So. 2d 881, 884 (Fla.1972). . See also Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence