TERRY LEE REDDEN, PETITIONER,
v.
LOUIS L. WAINWRIGHT, SECRETARY, OFFENDER REHABILITATION DEPARTMENT, RESPONDENT
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In this habeas corpus petition, a defendant challenges two drug convictions from 1974. The court reversed and remanded for a new trial on the first conviction due to improper cross-examination limitations, but affirmed the guilty plea in the second conviction as knowing and voluntary.
The court reversed and remanded Case 74-835 for a new trial, finding the trial court erred in limiting cross-examination of the witness with a pending criminal charge. However, the court affirmed the conviction and guilty plea in Case 74-836, finding the plea was freely and voluntarily given and that petitioner was fully informed of his rights with counsel present.
[1] A defendant's right to cross-examine a state witness includes inquiry into pending criminal charges against the witness, as such charges may indicate bias or motive.
[2] A conviction based on a guilty plea will be affirmed if the defendant was fully informed of their rights, represented by counsel, and freely and voluntarily entered the p…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The facts of this case are almost exactly the same as those in Lee v. State, 318 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). In fact, the informer in the present case and the informer in Lee v. State were one and the same person.”
Establishes that the court's reversal in Case 74-835 was based on applying precedent from an identical factual scenario involving the same witness.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePetitioner was charged in two separate informations with possession and sale of cocaine on March 12, 1974 (Case No. 74-835) and March 7, 1974 (Case No…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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PER CURIAM.
In this habeas corpus proceeding petitioner was allowed delayed appellate review as authorized by Hollingshead v. Wainwright, 194 So. 2d 577 (Fla.1967).
Two points have been presented by petitioner. In Case No. 74-835, petitioner in a two count information was charged with possession and sale of cocaine on March 12, 1974. A trial was held and the jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged. Petitioner was adjudged guilty and sentenced to a term of fifteen years with credit for time served. The sole issue raised by this conviction is whether the trial court erred in limiting defendant’s cross-examination of the state witness who allegedly purchased the cocaine from petitioner and who, between the date of the alleged sale and its prosecution, was himself charged with a crime of robbery which was pending at the time he was called by the State to testify against petitioner.
The facts of this case are almost exactly the same as those in Lee v. State, 318 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). In fact, the informer in the present case and the informer in Lee v. State were one and the same person.
The facts of the present case cannot be materially distinguished from Lee v. State, and for the reasons set out therein we reverse and remand for a new trial in Case No. 74-835. See also Fulton v. State, 335 So. 2d 280 (Fla.1976); Morrell v. State, 297 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974).
In Case No. 74-836, petitioner in a two count information was charged with possession and sale of cocaine on March 7, 1974. Immediately after his conviction in Case No. 74 — 835, petitioner asked to withdraw his previous plea of not guilty in Case No. 74-836 and to be allowed to enter a plea of guilty. As part of the plea bargain the State agreed to dismiss another pending drug case against the defendant, Case No. 74-440. Further, it was agreed that any sentence in Case No. 74-836 would run concurrently with the sentence imposed in Case No. 74-835.
Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in accepting his guilty plea in Case No. 74r-836. He alleges that the plea was not freely and voluntarily given due to the fact that he had been convicted of possession and sale of cocaine in Case No. 74-835 only fifteen minutes earlier. We have reviewed the transcript of the plea conference before the trial judge and conclude that there is no merit to this contention. Petitioner was fully informed of his rights, was represented by counsel, and freely and voluntarily entered a plea of guilty.
Having found no error, we affirm petitioner’s adjudication of guilt and sentence in Case No. 74-836.
MAGER, C. J., ALDERMAN, J., and STOKES, ROBERT G., Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Keane v. State, 357 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)…arge against him to which he had pleaded guilty. When a prosecution witness is under criminal charges at the time he testifies, the defense is entitled to bring this fact out. Blanco v. State, 353 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Redden v. Wainwright, 340 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Fulton v. State, 335 So. 2d 280 (Fla.1976); Morrell v. State, 297 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). Secondly, we concluded that the comments and repeated interjections by the trial court during the course of the trial deprived th…
Authorities Cited
- Cleveland Hollingshead v. Louie L. Wainwright, 194 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1967)
- Fulton v. State, 335 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 1976)
- Morrell v. State, 297 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)
- LEE v. State, 318 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)