SIMON SIMRING, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Simring was convicted of two separate crimes involving obscene literature: possession for purposes of sale and sale of obscene literature. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court addressed whether evidence was properly admitted and whether Simring's confession was voluntary, ultimately affirming his conviction.
The court held that no search occurred because Simring freely consented by admitting he had obscene literature and opening his trunk himself; that any fear Simring experienced was not the reaction of a reasonably prudent person and his confession was voluntary by any objective standard; and that evidence of the sale to Takacs was properly admissible in the possession-for-sale case to show intent and purpose.
“the record, however, shows an unmistakable case of consent, in that the appellant freely admitted his automobile contained obscene literature, and he himself opened the trunk to disclose it”
Establishes that consent was freely given, negating any search violation claim.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSimring was tried on two informations: one charging possession of obscene literature for purposes of sale (case #6075) and another charging sale of ob…
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HOBSON, Justice.
Appellant was tried on two separate in-formations: (1) #6075, which charged him with possession of obscene literature for purposes of sale, and (2) #6076, which charged him with sale of obscene literature. He was convicted and sentenced under each information. On motion of the State, appellant was required to elect the case he desired to appeal, under the principle we announced in Rocklin v. State, Fla., 61 So. 2d 484. On July 24, 1954 he filed notice that he elected case #6075 as the one from which this appeal should stand.
Appellant first contends that it was error to admit in evidence the obscene literature obtained as the result of an unreasonable “search”. The record, however, shows an unmistakable case of consent, in that the appellant freely admitted his automobile contained obscene literature, and he himself opened the trunk to disclose it.
The next contention is that a confession was obtained from appellant by putting him in fear. This is not supported by the record, which shows that the officer merely tapped appellant on the shoulder, exhibited his badge, and said, “I want to talk to you,” whereupon appellant urinated in his trousers and “started shaking awfully”. Although appellant was apparently in fear, it was not the fear of a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances. Stated differently, it was not the reaction of a reasonable man to so mild an approach. Declarations against interest which were thereafter made 'by appellant were entirely voluntary, by any objective standard. Appellant further contends that it was error to admit evidence of a sale of obscene literature to the witness Takacs when appellant was informed against for the sale of literature to one Kindt. The court instructed the jury that this testimony was to be considered only for its hearing upon “the question of intent or the purpose for which the defendant had in his possession these things * * * ” For its hearing on the purpose for which appellant had the literature in his possession in Case #6075 (possession for purposes of sale) this evidence was patently unobjectionable, and Case #6075 is the only one before us, by appellant’s own election.
Other points are raised, but we have considered them and find them to be without merit on this record.
Affirmed.
MATHEWS, C. J., and TERRELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur.
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Woolley v. State, 193 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)…ndant, pro se, filed a single notice of appeal directed to all five judgments. This is case number 7038 in this Court. It has long been the law in Florida that separate notices of appeal are necessary to review separate judgments. Simring v. State, 77 So. 2d 833 (Fla.1955); Rocklin v. State, 61 So. 2d 484 (Fla.1952); Wilcox v. State, 171 So. 2d 425 (D.C.A.Fla.1965); and Carroll v. State, 171 So. 2d 196 (D.C.A.Fla.1964). Defendant’s notice of appeal filed in case number 7038 attempts to appeal all five judgm…
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DYE v. Reichard, 169 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)…he six cases, thus enabling him to pursue one of the appeals. The Court stated that if the notice of appeal were not so amended, all the purported appeals would be dismissed. The principle of this case was also applied in Simring v. State, Fla.1955, 77 So. 2d 833. Although these were criminal cases we see no reason why this same procedure should not be available to a single appellant in a civil case. In the Orange Belt Packing Co. and Borland cases, supra, the appellants were not given the opportunity to el…
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Carroll v. State, 171 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)…d criminal case No. 45183 heard before Judge Frank Smith. Judge Parker Lee McDonald separately denied the post conviction motions in both cases. Separate notices of appeal are necessary to review separate judgments. See Simring v. State, Fla.1955, 77 So. 2d 833; Rocklin v. State, Fla.1952, 61 So. 2d 484. It is therefore the order of this court, sua sponte, that the appellant shall have thirty days to amend his notice of appeal by expunging and eliminating one of the file numbers so that the notice of appea…
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- Crawford v. McGraw, 61 So.2d 484 (Fla. 1952)