JOHN PATRICK GILMORE AND MARGARET GILMORE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS HUSBAND AND WIFE, APPELLANTS,
v.
THOMAS SIDNEY MORRISON ET AL., APPELLEES
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Mrs. Gilmore recovered a jury verdict of $225,000 for injuries from a bus collision, but the trial court initially reduced it to $112,500 due to comparative negligence. On appeal, the court reinstated the full $225,000 verdict. The issue on this second appeal concerns whether interest accrues on the full $225,000 from the original judgment date or only from the date of the modified judgment.
Interest on a judgment modified on appeal runs from the date of the original judgment, regardless of whether the appellate court reduces the original judgment or increases it. The distinction between a remittitur (reducing a judgment) and a reinstatement of a jury verdict (increasing a judgment) is not significant for interest-accrual purposes.
[1] Where a money judgment is modified on appeal and the trial court's only action is to comply with the appellate mandate, interest on the modified judgment accrues from the…
[2] Interest on a modified money judgment runs from the date of the original judgment, regardless of whether the appellate court reduces or increases the original award.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the jury verdict entered in favor of the plaintiff-wife is reinstated and the final judgment modified to the extent therewith; in all other respects the final judgment is affirmed.”
Establishes the outcome of the first appeal that reinstated Mrs. Gilmore's full $225,000 verdict.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMrs. Gilmore, a passenger in her husband's automobile, was injured in a collision with a Greyhound bus. A jury awarded her $225,000 in damages but fou…
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ALDERMAN, Judge.
Mrs. Gilmore, a passenger in an automobile driven by her husband, was injured when the vehicle in which she was riding was involved in a collision with a Greyhound bus. She sued the bus driver, Greyhound Lines, Inc., and its liability insurance carrier. Trial was held and the jury’s verdict determined Mrs. Gilmore’s damages to be $225,000. However the jury also found the percentage of negligence of her hus band and the bus driver to be fifty percent each. The trial court reduced the amount awarded to Mrs. Gilmore by fifty percent and entered judgment in her favor for $112,500.
On a prior appeal from the original judgment we held that the trial court had erred in reducing the non-negligent wife’s recovery by the proportion of her husband-driver’s negligence. Gilmore v. Morrison, 314 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). We held that “. . . the jury verdict entered in favor of the plaintiff-wife is reinstated and the final judgment modified to the extent therewith; in all other respects the final judgment is affirmed.”
Upon receipt of the mandate from the first appeal, the trial court entered another judgment in favor of Mrs. Gilmore in the amount of $225,000. However the trial court refused to award interest on the full $225,000 from the date of the original final judgment. Instead interest was allowed only on $112,500 from March 21, 1974, the original date of the final judgment, until September 18, 1975, the date on which the trial court entered judgment for $225,000. Thereafter interest was allowed on the full amount.
Mrs. Gilmore contends that she is entitled to receive interest on $225,000 from the date of her original judgment. We agree. Courts in Florida have long recognized that where the judgment of a trial court is modified upon appeal and not reversed, the modification stands as of the date of the original judgment, and interest accrues on the judgment as modified. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Watkins, 99 Fla. 395, 126 So. 489 (1930); Smith v. Goodpasture, 189 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966); Novack v. Novack, 210 So. 2d 215 (Fla.1968). We recognize that the above cited decisions are factually distinguishable from the present case because they involve a remitti-tur, rather than a reinstatement of the jury’s verdict resulting in an increase in the original judgment. In our opinion the distinction is not significant. In either event the effect is the same — that is, there has been a modification by the appellate court of the original judgment.
We find that the original judgment in this case was modified by the mandate of this court in the first appeal. We hold that where a money judgment has been modified on appeal and the only action necessary in the trial court is compliance with the mandate of the appellate court, interest on the judgment as modified runs from the date of the original judgment. This is true regardless of whether the appellate court reduces the original judgment, as in the remittitur decisions cited above, or increases the original judgment as in the present case. Although there is a contrary minority view, our holding is consistent with most cases from other jurisdictions. See Annotation in 4 A.L.R.3rd 1221.
REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions that interest be allowed on the full amount of the modified judgment from the date of the original judgment.
CROSS, J., and COBB, WARREN H., Associate Judge, concur.
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Norval M. GUY v. Kight, 431 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)…ion necessary by the trial court is compliance with the mandate. In other words, no further judicial labor is required and the act mandated is purely ministerial. St. Cloud Utilities v. Moore, 355 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Gilmore v. Morrison, 341 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). We agree with the trial court’s order finding that the opinion and order of this court, remanding the case for trial on the settlement issue, constituted more than a mere modification of the Final Judgment and required further j…
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McNITT v. Osborne, 371 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…, 208 So. 2d 827 (Fla.1968); Skinner v. Ochiltree, 148 Fla. 705, 5 So. 2d 605 (1942); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Watkins, 99 Fla. 395, 126 So. 489 (1930); St. Cloud Utilities v. Moore, 355 So. 2d 446, 448 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Gilmore v. Morrison, 341 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); City of Miami Beach v. Jacobs, 341 So. 2d 236, 238 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), cert. denied, 348 So. 2d 945 (Fla.1977) (“interest . . . would accrue from the time of the entry of the judgment . . ”); cf. Comment to Fla. R.App.P. 9.340,…
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Clay v. The Prudential Ins. Co. OF Am., 617 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)…Interest on the August 20, 1991 Attorney’s Fee Judgment, runs from August 20, 1991 up to October 8, 1991. The court went on to deny interest even on the fee originally awarded. The beneficiary essentially argues as follows. In Gilmore v. Morrison, 341 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), we held: * * * that where a money judgment has been modified on appeal and the only action necessary in the trial court is compliance with the mandate of the appellate court, interest on the judgment as modified runs from the d…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Watkins, 99 Fla. 395 (Fla. 1930)
- Novack v. Novack, 210 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 1968)
- Smith v. Goodpasture, 189 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966)
- John Patrick Gilmore et ux. v. Morrison, 314 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)