THOMAS B. RIGGS, APPELLANT,
v.
SALTMARSH, CLEAVELAND AND GUND, A PARTNERSHIP, APPELLEE
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An accountant who became a general partner in an accounting firm sued for damages upon his retirement, seeking his partnership interest and demanding a jury trial. The court affirmed the trial court's order striking the jury trial demand, holding that despite being framed as a damages action, the case was fundamentally an equitable action for accounting that belonged in equity court, not law court.
The court held that despite Riggs' attempt to frame the complaint as a damages action, it was in substance a classical equitable action seeking to establish a partnership and obtain an accounting. Because establishing the partnership interest would require extensive accounting over a five-year period to unravel the partnership's affairs, the matter properly belonged in equity court, and the trial court correctly struck the jury trial demand.
[1] An action seeking to establish a partnership and then an accounting of partnership assets is a matter within the jurisdiction of equity.
[2] Matters involving extensive or complicated accounts are a traditional source of equity jurisdiction.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is well settled that in suits for an accounting, where the answer does not admit the allegations of the complaint and there is no consent to entry of a decree, the proper practice is for the court to determine the initial question of plaintiff's right to an accounting, and an accounting may then be decreed if the finding is in favor of plaintiff upon the preliminary issue.”
Establishes the proper procedure and equitable nature of partnership accounting disputes.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRiggs became a general partner in the accounting firm Saltmarsh, Cleaveland and Gund on February 1, 1969, acquiring a one-ninth interest in the firm's…
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RAWLS, Judge.
Appellant Riggs, an accountant, does not want an accounting in a court of equity, but to the contrary seeks damages in a court of law arising out of an alleged six-year partnership with his former accounting firm. By this interlocutory appeal, Riggs seeks reversal of an order of the trial court striking his prayer for a jury trial.
Riggs’ second amended complaint alleged that on or about February 1, 1969, he became a general partner of defendant-appel-lee accounting firm, and that, as a general partner, he was entitled to a one-ninth interest in the assets of said firm. Riggs further alleged that on January 31,1975, he voluntarily terminated and retired from the partnership, and upon his retirement, he was entitled to his interest in the partnership consisting of his share of the profits and surplus over and above his draws as of January 31, 1975, for the preceding fiscal year, and the value of a one-ninth interest in the assets of the firm, plus interest. He demanded a jury trial.1
Although Riggs attempted to frame his complaint as an action seeking damages, salient allegations reflect that it is a classical case of seeking to establish a fiduciary relationship, i. e., a partnership,2 and then an accounting in the event he is successful in the first instance. In Maiming v. Clark,
in which a termination of an alleged partnership and accounting was sought, the Supreme Court stated:
“It is well settled that in suits for an accounting, where the answer does not admit the allegations of the complaint and there is no consent to entry of a decree, the proper practice is for the court to determine the initial question of plaintiff’s right to an accounting, and an accounting may then be decreed if the finding is in favor of plaintiff upon the preliminary issue.”
Dairy Queen v. Wood,4 cited by Riggs, is not applicable for there plaintiff sought to metamorphize a classic law action for breach of contract into an equitable action by incorporating equitable terms in his allegations. Assuming Riggs proves his allegation that he was a general partner, the unravelling of the partnership’s affairs spanning a period of five years to ascertain his claim of “one-ninth interest in the assets of the firm” will obviously entail an accounting between fiduciaries5 which involves extensive or complicated accounts. Matters of account are one of the ordinary sources of equity jurisdiction, and on its face this case falls squarely within the rule that although courts of law have jurisdiction to enforce contract demands which involve an accounting, equity will take cognizance of cases where the alleged contract demands extensive accounting.6
AFFIRMED.
BOYER, C. J., and McCORD, J., concur. . Defendant-appellee answered denying the allegations in the complaint and counterclaimed that this is an action for an accounting.
. Wood v. Brackett, 266 So. 2d 398 (1 Fla.App. 1972).
. Manning v. Clark, 56 So. 2d 521 (Fla.1951).
. Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 8 L.Ed.2d 44, 82 S.Ct. 894 (1962).
. Alter v. Finesmith, 214 So. 2d 732 (3 Fla.App. 1968).
. F.A. Chastain Construction, Inc. v. Pratt, 146 So. 2d 910 (3 Fla.App. 1962).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Amin Dahlawi v. Zahid Ramlawi, 644 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)…id Urbana Co., 118 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960), complicated partnership accountings are to be conducted in equity by the trial court, and not by the jury. See RBC I, Inc. v. AJAR I, Inc., 519 So. 2d at 743; Riggs v. Saltmarsh, Cleaveland and Gund, 341 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). As this court has previously noted: “Matters of account are one of the ordinary sources of equity jurisdiction and ... equity will take cognizance of cases where the contract demands between litigants involve extensive or compl…
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Escandar v. S. Mgmt. & Inv. Corp., 534 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…109 So. 577 (1927); Sodikoff v. Allen Parker Company, 202 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967), but they are generally considered as equitable matters. R.O. Holton & Company v. Hull, 140 Fla. 687, 192 So. 229 (1939); Riggs v. Saltmarsh, Cleaveland and Gund, 341 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).…
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Parliament Ins. Co. v. Hanson, 676 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1982)…rackett, 266 So. 2d 398 (1 D.C.A.1972). Under Florida law, a party seeking an accounting has the burden of showing a relationship between the parties that requires or permits the ordering of an accounting. See, Riggs v. Saltmarsh, Cleaveland & Gund, 341 So. 2d 818 (1 D.C.A. 1977). Equity jurisdiction to obtain an accounting in Florida may rest upon the existence of a trust or fiduciary relationship, or the complicated nature of the transaction. F.A. Chastain Construction, Inc. v. Pratt, 146 So. 2d 910 (3 D.C.…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (U.S. 1962)
- F. A. Chastain Constr., Inc. v. Pratt, 146 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)
- Alter v. Finesmith, 214 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- Wood v. Brackett, 266 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)