JOHN L. HERMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE; JAMES C. CAUSEY, APPELLANT, V. STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Two defendants convicted of attempted breaking and entering, possession of burglary tools, and petit larceny appeal their convictions. The Florida District Court of Appeal reverses because the trial court improperly allowed the prosecutor to elicit testimony about the specific nature of the defendant's prior crimes during cross-examination, violating evidentiary rules that limit such questioning.
The trial court committed reversible error by permitting the prosecutor to elicit testimony about the specific nature of prior crimes. Once a defendant admits or denies conviction of a crime, the inquiry must stop; the prosecutor may not pursue questions identifying the specific crimes committed unless the opposing party produces documentary evidence of conviction.
[1] A prosecutor may question a defendant who testifies in his own behalf about prior convictions, but the inquiry must stop at the point of admitting the conviction or the n…
[2] A prosecutor may not name the specific crime for which a defendant was previously convicted when questioning the defendant on cross-examination.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The law is well settled that when a defendant testifies in his own behalf he may be asked if he has ever been convicted of a crime. Section 90.08, Florida Statutes 1975. If he admits such conviction, he may be asked how many times he has been convicted. If he denies the conviction, the opposing party may produce the record of conviction. In either event, the inquiry must stop at that point. The matter may not be pursued to the point of naming the crime.”
Establishes the controlling legal standard for cross-examination of defendants regarding prior convictions.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJohn L. Herman and James C. Causey were tried jointly by jury on charges of breaking and entering an automobile, possession of burglary tools, and pet…
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CROSS, Judge.
Appellants-defendants, John L. Herman and James C. Causey, appeal a judgment of guilty and sentence for attempted breaking and entering of an automobile, possession of burglary tools and petit larceny. We reverse.
Appellants-defendants were charged by information with breaking and entering of an automobile, possession of burglary tools and petit larceny, to which they filed written pleas of not guilty. Appellants were tried together by jury. The jury found appellants guilty of all three charges. Appellants filed a motion for new trial, which was denied. The trial court entered judgments accordingly and sentenced appellants to terms of five years imprisonment for each count to run concurrently. It is from these judgments and sentences that appellants appeal.
During the trial of the cause, appellant James C. Causey took the stand in his own behalf. Upon cross examination appellant was asked had he ever been convicted of a crime. Appellant then asked the prosecutor what he was calling a crime. The prosecutor responded by asking appellant had he ever been convicted of stealing an automobile or breaking into an automobile, which appellant denied. The prosecutor further questioned appellant about committing crimes on specific dates in specific places. During this inquiry, the prosecutor elicited testimony that appellant had been convicted of using a car without permission in 1957,' transporting a stolen automobile in 1962, and a robbery in 1968. Objection to the prosecutor’s line of questioning raised by defense counsel was overruled by the trial court.
The sole point on appeal is whether the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to question Appellant-Causey on cross examination regarding the nature and occasion of specific prior alleged crimes.
The law is well settled that when a defendant testifies in his own behalf he may be asked if he has ever been convicted of a crime. Section 90.08, Florida Statutes 1975. If he admits such conviction, he may be asked how many times he has been convicted. If he denies the conviction, the opposing party may produce the record of conviction. In either event, the inquiry must stop at that point. The matter may not be pursued to the point of naming the crime. Whitehead v. State, 279 So. 2d 99 (Fla.2d DCA 1973); Morton v. State, 205 So. 2d 662 (Fla.2d DCA 1968); Mead v. State, 86 So. 2d 773 (Fla.1956).
In the instant case, after appellant responded to the prosecutor’s question of whether he had been convicted of a crime by not appearing to know the meaning of a crime, the trial judge allowed the prosecutor to follow a procedure outside the rules and ask appellant if he had been convicted of particular crimes. Appellant denied the conviction and the prosecutor asked further improper questions as to a specific time and place. Even after appellant’s attempt to clarify his denial to earlier questions by confessing to using a car without permission, the prosecutor was not justified in pursuing the interrogation without supplying the court with documentation of appellant’s past convictions. Such an improper inquiry into specific crimes committed by a witness is so harmful as to be reversible error. Accordingly, the judgments and sentences appealed herein are reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
DOWNEY, J., concurs.
MAGER, C. J., concurs specially.
MAGER, Chief Judge,
concurring specially:
The conclusion reached here is consistent with this court’s recent opinion in Irvin v. State, 324 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Kyle v. State, 650 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)…on by the police before.” The prosecutor then asked him whether he had a felony conviction for battery on a law enforcement officer as a result of a guilty plea. The prosecutor followed this with “you did time for that right?”. In Herman v. State, 341 So. 2d 1010, 1011 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), we said: The law is well settled that when a defendant testifies in his own behalf he may be asked if he has ever been convicted of a crime [citation omitted]. If he admits such conviction, he may be asked how many times…
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Johnson v. State, 382 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1980)…ny other offense may be introduced only if the witness denies the conviction, and then only by a certified copy of the judgment of conviction. Mead v. State, 86 So. 2d 773 (Fla.1956); Ward v. State, 343 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Herman v. State, 341 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Smith v. State, 340 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). The testimony elicited here related to the crime of knowingly giving false information to a law enforcement officer.3 On appeal the District Court of Appeal, Third District, aff…
Authorities Cited
- Blackman v. State, 279 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)
- Mead v. State, 86 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 1956)
- Arthaniel Irvin v. State, 324 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
- Aubrey v. Morton, 205 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968)