IRMA SOSNOWITZ, APPELLANT,
v.
ROBERT BARRY SOSNOWITZ, APPELLEE
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A Florida appellate court reversed a trial court's order interpreting a property settlement agreement in a divorce case, holding that the express enumeration of deductible expenses (taxes, insurance, mortgage payments, and repairs) limited what expenses could be deducted from rental income, excluding additional items the husband's audit included.
The court held that the enumerated expenses constituted words of limitation, not description, and therefore the definition of net income in the property settlement agreement limited the type of expenses that could be deducted from rentals to only those specifically listed in the agreement.
[1] Property settlement agreements incorporated into final judgments of dissolution of marriage are interpreted like any other contract.
[2] The plain language of a contract is the best evidence of the parties' intent when the terms are unambiguous.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the definition of net income specified in the property settlement agreement limits the type of expenses to be deducted from the rentals to determine net income”
The holding that enumerated expenses are words of limitation rather than description
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIrma and Robert Sosnowitz were divorced in 1972 pursuant to a final judgment that incorporated a property settlement agreement. The agreement provided…
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PER CURIAM.
The interlocutory appeal is by the wife from an order of the trial court denying her motion to enforce the terms of a property settlement agreement incorporated in a final judgment of dissolution of marriage entered in 1972.
The sole issue presented on this appeal is the construction of the following portion of the property settlement agreement under the heading, “Alimony to Wife”:
“Property jointly held in Connecticut consisting of two 4-family houses shall continue to be so held. The net income realized from the rentals of the property defined as the rents collected less taxes, insurance, mortgage payments including interest, and repairs, shall be divided equally on a quarterly basis subject to an annual certified audit. If at any time within three years the Husband desires to purchase the equity of the Wife, the Wife agrees to sell such equity for the total sum of $8,000.00 cash. This option to purchase the Wife’s equity by the Husband shall remain for a period of three years from date hereof.” (Emphasis added)
In 1976, the husband exercised his option and filed a certified audit reflecting the income and expenses of the property.
The husband’s audit included those items of expense enumerated in the agreement, plus professional fees, utilities and auto usage. The wife contends by motion to enforce final judgment that these additional items of expense were not included in the definition of net income according to the agreement incorporated in the final judgment because the language of that agreement limits the type of expenses to be deducted in making a determination of net income. The trial court found that the expenses enumerated in the property settlement agreement were words of description or explanation and not words of limitation, and accepted the husband’s accounting.
Generally, where a property settlement agreement has been executed prior to a dissolution of marriage, purporting to resolve the property rights of the parties, the provisions therein are to be interpreted by the courts like any other contract. Davis v. Davis, 301 So. 2d 154 (Fla.3d DCA 1974). Where, as here, the terms of a property settlement agreement are unambiguous, we apply the rule that the test of the meaning and intention of the parties is the content of the written instrument itself. Azalea Park Utilities, Inc., v. Knox-Florida Development Corporation, 127 So. 2d 121 (Fla.2d DCA 1961). Therefore, since we have found that the terms of this property settlement agreement are clear and unambiguous, the agreement itself is the best evidence of the specific intent of the parties at the time it was executed. We hold that by its terms, the definition of net income specified in the property settlement agreement limits the type of expenses to be deducted from the rentals to determine net income.
The order of the trial court is reversed and remanded with directions to enter an order consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Brandt v. Brandt, 525 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)…for payment of expenses during a period of exclusive use. There is nothing in this agreement to suggest that the parties intended that the appellant would be entitled to reimbursement out of the net proceeds of the sale. See Sosnowitz v. Sosnowitz, 342 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 352 So. 2d 174 (Fla.1977). There is no reason to impose upon joint co-owners the extra burden of proving a quid pro quo for specified provisions in a written agreement where no issue is raised [*1022] of a lack of consid…
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Bingemann v. Bingemann, 551 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…. 2d 281 (Fla.1953); Herrero v. Herrero, 528 So. 2d 1286 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); Kenyon v. Kenyon, 496 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) rev. denied, 506 So. 2d 1042 (Fla.1987); Bacardi v. Bacardi, 386 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Sosnowitz v. Sosnowitz, 342 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 352 So. 2d 174 (Fla.1977). Fundamental to contract interpretation is the rule that contract terms will be given their plain meaning in the absence of any evidence that the parties intended the words to have a special mea…
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Anne Pumo v. Pumo, 405 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…with the court’s rulings. The Agreement indicates that the wife released only her interest in the property of the other party and not her interest in her property. The language of paragraph five is clear and unambiguous. See Sosnowitz v. Sosnowitz, 342 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 352 So. 2d 174 (Fla.1977). We need not delve into the question of the proper interpretation of the Agreement, however, because we find the court should not have entertained a declaratory action. A final judgment of diss…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Azalea Park Utils., Inc. v. Knox-Florida Dev. Corp., 127 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961)
- Davis v. Davis, 301 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
- Brown v. State, 301 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)