THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF KISSIMMEE, A UNITED STATES BANKING CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
C. M. DUNHAM AND W. A. DILBECK, APPELLEES
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A Florida bank sued a non-resident defendant (Dilbeck) on a promissory note and sought to exercise jurisdiction under Florida's long-arm statute. The trial court dismissed the defendant for lack of jurisdiction, but the appellate court reversed, holding that a defendant who breaches a contract in Florida by failing to perform payment obligations there is subject to jurisdiction under the current long-arm statute.
The court held that Dilbeck was subject to jurisdiction under Section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1973), because he breached a contract in Florida by failing to pay the promissory note due at the bank's location in Kissimmee, Florida. The judgment quashing service of process was reversed and the case remanded.
[1] A non-resident defendant may be subject to personal jurisdiction under a state's long-arm statute for breaching a contract in the state by failing to perform acts require…
[2] The signing of a promissory note and the subsequent defense of a lawsuit thereon are not, in themselves, sufficient to constitute engaging in a business or business ventu…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Breachpng] a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state.”
The 1973 statutory language that expanded Florida's long-arm jurisdiction to cover contract breaches occurring within the state
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn May 10, 1974, C. M. Dunham and W. A. Dilbeck, both present at the bank, executed a promissory note to The First National Bank of Kissimmee. Dilbeck…
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DOWNEY, Judge.
We have for review a final judgment dismissing one of two defendants from the cause for lack of jurisdiction.
On May 10, 1974, C. M. Dunham and W. A. Dilbeck executed a promissory note to The First National Bank of Kissimmee. Though only Durham was a Florida resident, both men were present at the Bank when the note was executed. ' When the note became in default, the Bank filed suit and, acting pursuant to a “long arm” statute, Section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1973), served Dilbeck in accordance with Section 48.194, Florida Statutes (1973). Dilbeck moved to quash the service of process upon him and supported the motion with an affidavit stating that he was at all pertinent times a resident of the State of Indiana, so that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over his person. The motion was granted and this appeal followed.
The Bank contends that Dilbeck was subject to the jurisdiction on at least one of the following two theories. First, Dilbeck’s act of signing the note constituted engaging in a business or a business venture, within the meaning of Section 48.193(l)(a). Second, Dilbeck’s failure to repay the note was a breach of contract within the meaning of Section 48.193(l)(g).
In response to the Bank’s first theory, Dilbeck relies upon Odell v. Signer, 169 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1964), to support the trial court’s decision, pointing to the statement therein to the effect that the mere signing of a promissory note and defense of a lawsuit thereon are not sufficient acts, in and of themselves, to constitute carrying on or engaging in a business or business venture so as to enable Florida courts to obtain personal jurisdiction over non-residents by service of process under Section 47.16, Florida Statutes (1963) (now Section 48.161, Florida Statutes (1973)). Dilbeck did not respond to the Bank’s second theory.
We reverse the judgment under review on the ground that the Bank’s second theory is a correct statement of the law as it applies to the facts of this case.
It should be noted that the holding in the Odell case involves a long arm statute that is different from the one involved in the present case. The latter statute was enacted nine years after the Odell decision was rendered.
In 1973 the Legislature enacted Chapter 73-179, Laws of Florida, which added to the reach of the “long arm” statutes any person “Breachpng] a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state.” In the case at bar we have a purported breach of contract in this state by Dilbeck’s alleged failure to pay the promissory note to the Bank at Kissimmee, Florida. Feldman v. Southeast Bank of Dadeland, 323 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1975). The note does not mention the place of payment so it is payable at the residence of the payee. See, e. g., Florida Forms, Inc. v. Barkett Computer Serv., Inc., 311 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).
Dilbeck was subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state under Section 48.-193(l)(g), Florida Statutes (1973), and the judgment quashing service of process was erroneous. Accordingly the judgment ap pealed from is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
MAGER C. J., and ALDERMAN, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (13 total)
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Cosmopolitan Health SPA, Inc. v. Health Indus., Inc., 362 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)…how that the defendant failed to perform an act or acts whose performance was to be in Florida and that such breach formed the basis for the cause of action for which relief is sought by the plaintiff. See First National Bank of Kissimmee v. Dunham, 342 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Madax International Corp. v. Delcher Intercontinental Moving Services, Inc., 342 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Lewis v. Cues, Inc., 338 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); [*369] Feldman v. Southeast Bank of Dadeland, 323 So. 2d 6…
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Engineered Storage Sys., Inc. v. Nat'l Partitions & Interiors, Inc., 415 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…2d 1364 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Professional Patient Transportation, Inc. v. Fink, 365 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Madax International Corporation v. Delcher Intercontinental Moving Services, Inc., supra; First National Bank of Kissimmee v. Dunham, 342 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Dublin Company v. Peninsular Supply Company, 309 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). See also Bank of Wessington v. Winters Government Securities Corp., 361 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (jurisdiction could not be invoked under Sec…
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Global Satellite Commc'n Co. v. Sari Sudline and Fernand Sultan, 849 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)…as to place of payment, it is presumed to be the place of residence of the payee. See Buto v. Sirius Int’l Ins. Co., 807 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Harris v. Caribank, 536 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); First Nat’l Bank of Kissimmee v. Dunham, 342 So. 2d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)(stating “[t]he note does not mention the place of payment so it is payable at the residence of the payee”). Global had only two offices, one in Dade and the other in Broward County, Florida. Here, while the contract does no…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Odell v. Burton R. Signer and David Marks, 169 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)
- Fla. Forms, Inc. v. Barkett Computer Servs., Inc., 311 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)
- Feldman v. Se. Bank OF Dadeland, 323 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)