HERBERT WELCH, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Herbert Welch appeals his conviction for breaking and entering with intent to commit petit larceny, arguing the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine the state's sole witness by restricting questions about the witness's bias and motives. The court affirmed, holding that the trial judge did not abuse discretion in limiting cross-examination where defense counsel offered no evidence to support his theory of witness bias.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in restricting the cross-examination. Although the trial judge has broad discretion to permit cross-examination regarding a witness's bias, interest, motives, or animus, such discretion is not unlimited. Here, defense counsel failed to establish that continued questioning about the rule to show cause would elicit new facts to discredit the witness, and the restriction did not constitute an abuse of discretion because any such testimony would be redundant.
[1] The extent to which cross-examination should be permitted to show a witness' bias, interest, motives, or animus rests largely within the sound discretion of the trial jud…
[2] A trial judge's rulings on the scope of cross-examination will not be disturbed absent a showing of a clear abuse of discretion.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The extent to which cross-examination should be permitted to show a witness' bias, interest, motives or animus rests largely within the sound discretion of the trial judge and his rulings will not be disturbed in the absence of a showing of a clear abuse of that discretion.”
Establishes the standard of review for trial court restrictions on cross-examination and the deference given to the trial judge's discretion.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHerbert Welch was charged with breaking and entering with intent to commit petit larceny and petit larceny. The state's sole witness, Linda Stanley, t…
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PER CURIAM.
Herbert Welch appeals his conviction for breaking and entering with intent to commit petit larceny and petit larceny, and argues that the trial court unduly restricted defense counsel’s right of cross-examination of the State’s sole witness in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
At trial the sole prosecution witness, Linda Stanley, testified that on the evening of the incident she awakened at 11:00 P.M. and observed the defendant, Herbert Welch, walking out of her house with her television set. On cross-examination she testified that Welch had been in her house on many prior occasions. Defense counsel then sought to impeach Linda by asking whether her husband had told her that he was “gonna get” Herbert. Linda responded in the negative. At this point defense counsel sought to question Linda about a rule to show cause which had been issued against her and whether her court appearance was voluntary. The prosecution objected to these questions and the objections were sustained. At a side bar conference, defense counsel proffered to the trial court that the rule to show cause was issued against Linda because she did not want to testify in court as her husband had put her up to testifying the way she did on direct examination. However, no evidence to support this theory was proffered and the trial court refused to allow this line of questioning. Thus, Welch contends his right to cross-examination was unduly restricted.
The extent to which cross-examination should be permitted to show a witness’ bias, interest, motives or animus rests largely within the sound discretion of the trial judge and his rulings will not be disturbed in the absence of a showing of a clear abuse of that discretion. Pandula v. Fonseca, 145 Fla. 395, 199 So. 358 (1940); Matera v. State, 218 So. 2d 180 (Fla.3d DCA 1969); Maycock v. State, 284 So. 2d 411 (Fla.3d DCA 1973).
Linda had already been questioned by defense counsel as to whether her husband had told her he was going to seek revenge against the defendant and she denied he told her this. Further, defense counsel admitted to the judge he had no evidence to support his theory that Linda’s husband had put her up to testifying as she did on direct examination. Defense counsel failed to establish that continued cross-examination with respect to the rule to show cause would bring out new facts to discredit Linda; therefore, the restriction of such testimony which, in effect, would only be redundant, did not constitute an abuse of discretion. See Slaughter v. State, 301 So. 2d 762 at 767 (Fla.1974).
Affirmed.
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Valentin Hernandez v. State, 360 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)…o a showing of bias. We hold that no abuse of discretion appears on this record, nor can it be said that the rulings of the court amounted to a denial of due process. Cf. Pandula v. Fonseca, 145 Fla. 395, 199 So. 358 (1940); and Welch v. State, 342 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Affirmed.…
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Chandler v. State, 366 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)…o give the matter greater prominence but the trial court’s ruling was well within the range of the discretion granted to it by the holding of the Supreme Court of Florida in Eldridge v. State, 27 Fla. 162, 9 So. 448 (1891).9 See also Welch v. State, 342 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Dabney v. Yapa, 187 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966); and H. I. Holding Company v. Dade County, 129 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961). And cf. Irvin v. State, 66 So. 2d 288, 294-295 (Fla.1953). The sixth point claims error because ther…
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Gonzalez v. State, 590 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla.1986); Welch v. State, 342 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Matera v. State, 218 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)
- Pandula v. Pinkey Fonseca, 145 Fla. 395 (Fla. 1940)
- Slaughter v. State, 301 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1974)
- Maycock v. State, 284 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)