STATE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER,
v.
DAVID MANGAM, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court held that a probationer may be required to provide information about his compliance with probation terms and that his silence during a revocation hearing can be considered as evidence of non-compliance, rejecting the argument that such consideration violates the Fifth Amendment.
The court held that a probationer's refusal to explain his compliance or non-compliance with probation terms, particularly regarding residence requirements, is a permissible factor for consideration in a revocation hearing and does not violate the Fifth Amendment because a probationer's agreement to accept probation terms effectively waives Fifth Amendment privileges regarding supervisory information.
[1] A probationer's agreement to accept the terms of probation effectively waives their Fifth Amendment privilege regarding information necessary for supervision, including r…
[2] Failure to respond to a probation supervisor's requests for information, such as the place of residence or confirmation of location, can be grounds for probation revocati…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[A] probationer, upon a specific request and at periodic intervals, may be required to identify himself and provide all necessary information for his supervision including the place of his residence and his employment. He may be required to confirm or deny his location at a particular place at a particular time, to explain his noncriminal conduct, and to permit the search of his person and quarters by the supervisor. Failure to do so may itself be grounds for revocation or probation. His agreement to accept the terms of probation effectively waives his Fifth Amendment privilege with regard to this information.”
Establishes that probationers waive Fifth Amendment protections by accepting probation and may be required to provide supervisory information.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn February 1972, Mangam pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit felony breaking and entering and was placed on probation for three years in May 1972. …
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OVERTON, Chief Justice.
This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to review the Fourth District Court of Appeal decision in Mangam v. State, 324 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). That decision conflicts with Brill v. State, 159 Fla. 682, 32 So. 2d 607 (1947), and Bernhardt v. State, 288 So. 2d 490 (Fla.1974), and we have jurisdiction.1
In February, 1972, respondent Mangam plead guilty to conspiracy to commit a felony, breaking and entering. The following May, he was placed on probation for three years. Mangam violated the terms of that probation, admitting he failed to maintain his residence in Riveria Beach and failed to report to his probation supervisor as required.
The Court found him guilty of violating the order of probation, and in lieu of revoking probation extended his probation one year and required him as a further condition of probation to successfully reside at and complete the Pride House program and abide by all the rules and regulations in the program.
On June 13, 1974, respondent was charged with violating his probation by leaving the Pride House. Mangam plead not guilty, but at the revocation hearing chose not to testify on his own behalf when asked by the court to explain his leaving the Pride House program. The probation supervisor testified that the probationer was absent when he went to the Pride House and that the manager advised him the probationer had left the program. The judge said that he considered respondent’s silence a factor weighing against him and revoked probation. On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, ruling that the trial court abridged respondent’s Fifth Amendment rights by penalizing him for refusing to testify.
We recently held in State v. Heath, 343 So. 2d 13 (filed February 10, 1977), that:
“[A] probationer, upon a specific request and at periodic intervals, may be required to identify himself and provide all necessary information for his supervision including the place of his residence and his employment. He may be required to confirm or deny his location at a particular place at a particular time, to explain his noncriminal conduct, and to permit the search of his person and quarters by the supervisor. Failure to do so may itself be grounds for revocation or probation. His agreement to accept the terms of probation effectively waives his Fifth Amendment privilege with regard to this information. There would be no practical means to properly supervise an individual on probation without a requirement that the probationer respond to directions and requests for information from the probation supervisor. . . . ”
Proper supervision is an essential ingredient of any probation. To adopt the contention of the probationer in this case would make probation supervision a farce. A probationer is allowed to live outside of confinement as a matter of judicial grace. It is clearly proper to require a probationer to maintain a residence, report his movements, report regularly to the supervisor or the court, and to require any other reasonable conditions which will assure rehabilitation of the probationer and protect the public. We hold the revocation of probation was proper. When a probationer refuses to discuss his compliance or non-compliance with the terms of his probation concerning his residence, this is a factor the judge may consider in a revocation hearing. It was not error for the judge to infer from Man-gam’s silence confirmation of Mangam’s failure to maintain, his residence at the Pride House and thus the violation of a condition of his probation.
The decision below of the Fourth District Court of Appeal is reversed, and the revocation of probation reinstated.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS, BOYD, ENGLAND and SUNDBERG, JJ., concur. . Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla.Const.
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Citator
Cited By
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Watson v. State, 388 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)…434 U.S. 893, 98 S.Ct. 269, 54 L.Ed.2d 179 (1977). Moreover, when a probationer refuses to testify concerning compliance with the terms of probation relevant to residence, the judge may consider this factor in a revocation hearing. State v. Mangam, 343 So. 2d 599 (Fla.1977). In fact, the court may properly infer non-compliance, and thus a violation of the condition of probation, from the probationer’s silence. Id. Accordingly, we find that the trial court acted properly in requiring the defendant to testify…
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Manigault v. State, 534 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)…can find no material difference between this case and Brown v. State, 338 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), in Which the court reversed the revocation of probation on an almost identical fact situation. The court’s opinion relies upon State v. Mangam, 343 So. 2d 599 (Fla.1977), as authority for the conclusion that the record supports the revocation in this instance. That case is cited for the proposition that appellant did not dispute the occurrence of the robbery in her testimony and therefore the court was pe…1 / 2
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Nelson v. State, 498 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)…fense pending for sentencing. In addition, we find no error with respect to appellant’s contentions that the trial court erred in considering the defendant’s silence in the face of his invocation of a Fifth Amendment privilege. See State v. Mangam, 343 So. 2d 599 (Fla.1977); Hudson v. State, 489 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Watson v. State, 388 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). AFFIRMED. GLICKSTEIN and DELL, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gideon Bernhardt v. State, 288 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1974)
- Brill v. State, 159 Fla. 682 (Fla. 1947)
- State v. Heath, 343 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1977)
- Gonzalez v. State, 159 Fla. 681 (Fla. 1947)
- Williams v. State, 324 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)