BETTY M. TOOLEY, APPELLANT,
v.
RHODA MARGULIES, APPELLEE; MONROE WEILER, APPELLANT, V. RHODA MARGULIES, APPELLEE; MONROE WEILER AND RAYMOND REED, APPELLANTS, V. RHODA MARGULIES AND SIDNEY MARGULIES, HER HUSBAND, APPELLEES
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This case arose from an automobile collision at an intersection in Miami Beach involving guest passengers suing the other driver. The appellants challenged jury verdicts finding them not liable while finding the other driver negligent, and the court affirmed those verdicts based on conflicting testimony that properly went to the jury.
The jury's verdict finding the appellants not liable and finding Reed negligent was supported by conflicting testimony that properly went to the jury. The court committed no error in refusing to charge on contributory negligence where it was not pleaded, and the jury instructions adequately covered the material issues.
“The evaluation of conflicting testimony is properly a jury function, and it is the province of the jury to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses and to appraise the weight of the evidence.”
Establishes that the jury properly resolved conflicting testimony regarding fault in the collision.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn January 5, 1953, Raymond Reed was driving his Cadillac westbound on 15th Street in Miami Beach with guest passengers Betty M. Tooley and Monroe Wei…
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KANNER, Associate Justice.
These cases arose out of-an intersectional collision of automobiles. They were consolidated for trial.
Betty M. Tooley and Monroe Weiler, appellants, who were guest passengers in the automobile driven by appellant Raymond Reed, sought to recover damages from Rhoda Margulies, .appellee. The appellee, Rhoda Margulies, sought damages against the appellant,, Raymond Reed, and Reed counterclaimed for damages against the appellee. As basis for recover}’ of damages, each charged negligence in the operation of an . automobile. The jury-found for the appellee in the cases brought by Betty M. Tooley and Monroe Weiler. The jury returned a verdict in the amount of $1,500 in appellee’s case against the appellant Reed. Judgments were entered -on the verdicts; the appeal is from such judgments.
It is urged by the appellants, Betty M. Tooley and Monroe Weiler', that the appel-lee was guilty of negligence which proxi-matély caused or contributed to cause the collision^ and consequently as-a matter of law they were entitled to a verdict against the appellee on the issue of liability; and it is urged by the appellant, Raymond Reed, that under-all the-evidence he was entitled to recover-against the appellee, but that in any event he was not -liable in damages because, even if he was guilty of negligence, the ' appellee 'was equally guilty of negligence which cáused or contributed to cause the collision.
On January 5, 1953, the appellant,, Raymond Reed, was driving his Cadillac automobile 'in a westerly direction on 15th Street in the City of Miami Beach with"the appellants, Betty M. Tooley and Monroe Weiler, as guest passengers. Their ultimate destination was the Tropical Race Track. The -appellee, Rhbda Margulies, was driving alone in a De Soto automobile; proceeding in a southerly direction on West Avenue. When these vehicles reached the intersection of 15th Street and West Avenue at approximately one o’clock P.M., there occurred the accident out of which these cases arose.
West Avenue; which runs north and south, 'is a “through street;” while 15th Street, running east and west, has “stop signs” at West Avenue. .
- The testimony is conflicting in material aspects. -To demonstrate: appellants-testified that the Cadillac automobile was completely stopped at the stop sign before starting across the intersection, while for the appellee,"it was testified that the 'Cadillac automobile did not stop; it -was testified on behalf of appellants that the Cadillac car was not speeding, while witness for the appellee testified that he saw the car speeding on 15th Street; it was testified on behalf of appellants that no alcohol could be detected on the breath of the appellant Reed, while witness for - appellee testified he smelled whiskey on the breath of appellant Reed, the driver of the Cadillac car; appellants testified that appellee drove the De Soto automobile into the Cadillac, while appellee testified that it was the Cadillac car that ran into and struck the De Soto automobile which she was driving.
The evaluation of conflicting testimony is properly a jury function, and it is the province of the jury to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses and to appraise the weight of the evidence. It thus clearly appears that the nature of the conflicting testimony here concerned created a jury question.-for-determination of who was at fault. 'The contentions-of the appellants are -therefore-untenable. ’ ’
-Under the evidence adduced, the jury agreed with the appellee’s position taken during the-trial that the-sole proximate cause of the accident-was appellant Reed’s negligence in running -the stop sign, together , with other contributing circumstances. A ' “stop - sign” established and maintained -by lawful authority on a street or highway is a proclamation of danger and the duty of an automobilist approaching a street or highway intersection, where there is a stop sign from a less favored street, is to stop and look.
The contention is made by the appellant, Raymond Reed, in the case brought by the appellee, Rhoda Margulies, against him that the.court erred in that it refused to charge upon the issue of contributory negligence. It was not pleaded; no prejudicial ¿rror was committed by the court in refusing to give such charge.
Appellants further contend that the refusal by the court to give certain charges requested’ deprived appellants of a material right’ in the presentation of their case. A review of the-charges given by the court plainly shows that the issues were clearly defined and that such issues were adequately covered and comprehended by the court’s instructions. The trial court' committed no error' in declining to give these particular chárges.
When. the record is considered and weighed in its entirety, no harmful error is made to appear. The judgments appealed from are hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.
MATHEWS, C. J., and TERRELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur.
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Montgomery v. Fla. Jitney Jungle Stores, Inc., 281 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 1973)…ordered. CARLTON, C. J., and ERVIN and Mc-CAIN, JJ., concur. DEKLE, J., dissents. . 171 So. 2d 589 (Fla.App.2d 1965). . 234 So. 2d 132 (Fla.App.4th 1970). . 227 So. 2d 745 (Fla.App.2nd 1969). . Id. at 745-746. . 238 So. 2d 561 (Fla.1970). . 79 So. 2d 421 (Fla.1955). . 254 So. 2d 44 (Fla.App.1st 1971). . Id. at 45. . See note 1, supra. . 171 So. 2d at 591. . See note 2, supra. . 234 So. 2d at 134. . 264 So. 2d 862 (Fla.App.3rd 1972). . Id. at 863. . Id. at 864. . 229 So. 2d 266 (Fla.App.4th…
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Hilkmeyer v. Latin Am. AIR Cargo Expediters, Inc., 94 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1957)…es on this issue is conflicting and permits different reasonable inferences. The well-settled rule in Florida is that under such circumstances the issue should not be taken from the jury. E. g. Bryan v. Loftin, supra; Tooley v. Margulies, Fla. 1955, 79 So. 2d 421; concurring opinion joined in by the Court in Townsend Sash Door & Lumber Co. v. Silas, Fla.1955, 82 So. 2d 158; Merwin v. Kellems, Fla.1955, 78 So. 2d 865. For this reason, although it is a close question in this particular situation, we have exer…
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Alonzo v. Robbins, 103 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958)…the right-of-way and the driver of the other car was negligent in failing to slow down. It has also been held that a stop sign is a proclamation of danger putting a duty on an approaching driver to stop and look. See Tooley v. Margulies, Fla.1955, 79 So. 2d 421. Finally, in Katz v. Bear, Fla. 1951, 52 So. 2d 903, 904, we find the following: “Power to direct a verdict should be cautiously exercised . and the same should never be granted unless the evidence is such that under no view which the jury might l…
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