SEARS, ROEBUCK & COMPANY, PETITIONER,
v.
MARGUERITE A. RICHARDSON, RESPONDENT
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Sears sought review of a trial court's denial of its motions to tax costs against the plaintiff and hold her in contempt after the court declared a mistrial due to the plaintiff's improper attempt to discuss witness testimony with a juror. The appellate court affirmed, holding that costs cannot be taxed until after final determination of the case, though the trial court may later consider the plaintiff's misconduct when assessing final costs.
The trial court properly denied the motion to tax costs at that stage because costs are only taxable when litigation is finally determined. However, the trial court retains authority to consider the plaintiff's misconduct and resulting costs when determining costs after final judgment.
[1] Costs are not awarded except where authorized by statute or agreement of the parties and are taxable only pursuant to statute or rule.
[2] A trial court retains jurisdiction to determine all questions of costs when litigation has been finally determined.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is well established that costs are not awarded except where authorized by statute or agreement of the parties and that such costs are taxable only pursuant to statute or rule.”
Establishes the legal requirement that costs must be authorized by statute before they can be taxed.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDuring trial, the plaintiff improperly attempted to discuss a witness's testimony with a jury member. The trial court declared a mistrial as a result …
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DREW, E. HARRIS, (Retired) Associate Judge.
During the progress of the trial of this cause, the court entered an order declaring a mistrial because of the improper conduct of the plaintiff in attempting to discuss the testimony of a witness with one of the members of the jury. After the entry of the order declaring the mistrial, the defendant moved the court for an order taxing costs against plaintiff occasioned by her misconduct and moved that she be adjudged in contempt. Both motions were denied. We are asked to review such orders.
The statute governing the assessment of costs1 provides “The clerk or the judge shall tax the costs accruing in each action when it is determined . . . (Emphasis added). It is well established that costs are not awarded except where authorized by statute or agreement of the parties and that such costs are taxable only pursuant to statute or rule.2 In the light of the plain language of the statute, the trial court correctly denied the motion to tax costs at that stage of the trial. We find no merit to Petitioner’s contention concerning the denial of the motion to hold the plaintiff in contempt.
The trial court retains full jurisdiction and authority under the statute to determine all questions of costs when the litigation has been finally determined. In the taxation of costs after final determination of the cause, he may take into consideration events arising out of both the proceedings prior to the declaration of a mistrial and those which occur thereafter. In the event of a judgment favoring the plaintiff, we see no reason why, if the trial court should so determine, the amount of costs occurring because of the conduct of the plaintiff, causing the mistrial, should not be deducted from the amount awarded in said judgment.3
Certiorari Denied.
McCORD, Acting C. J., and MASON, ERNEST E., (Retired) Associate Judge, concur. . § 57.021, Fla.Stat. (1975).
. American Service Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wilson, 323 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), and Lake Region Paradise Island, Inc. v. Graviss, 323 So. 2d 610 (Fla.2d DCA 1975).
. Chatlos v. City of Hallandale, 220 So. 2d 353 (Fla.1968), concerning procedures for reviewing cost judgments.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Miller v. Colonial Baking Co. OF Ala. & Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 402 So. 2d 1365 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)…intiffs’ attorney. Generally, “[i]t is well established that costs are not awarded except where authorized by statute or agreement of the parties and that such costs are taxable only pursuant to statute or rule.” Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Richardson, 343 So. 2d 678, 679 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). In the present case, we can find no statutory authority for the award of costs. Additionally, the taxation of costs provided for in § 57.021, Fla. Stat. (1979), may not take place after a mistrial. See Richardson, 343 So. 2…
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Brinker v. Ludlow, 379 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…ction 57.021, Florida Statutes (1977), costs are taxed after an action [*1002] is determined. This provision has been construed to mean that costs may not be taxed until after final determination of the cause. Sears, Roebuck & Company v. Richardson, 343 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). In the case sub judice, appellee prevailed in her action and obtained a judgment. It is that judgment upon which she has obtained an order taxing costs. She now seeks to record the order taxing costs, so that it may become a li…
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Stringer v. Lawrence Katzell, M.D., 695 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…ute or by the parties’ agreement and, if awarded, such costs are taxable only pursuant to the statute or rule. Israel, 470 So. 2d at 863; Miller v. Colonial Baking Co., 402 So. 2d 1365, 1367 (1st DCA 1981) (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Richardson, 343 So. 2d 678, 679 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)). The statute on court costs states that costs shall be taxed “in each action when it is determined.” § 57.021, Fla. Stat. (1995). This statute has been uniformly construed to mean that taxable costs are only allowable at o…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Chatlos v. City OF Hallandale, 220 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1968)
- Werner v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 323 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)
- Lake Region Paradise Island, Inc. v. Graviss, 323 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)