ESTHER WOLF, APPELLANT,
v.
SAM MALEVANI, APPELLEE
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Esther Wolf appeals the dismissal of her amended complaint seeking restitution for money she contributed toward a condominium purchase with her son-in-law under an oral agreement. The trial court dismissed the complaint based on the Statute of Frauds, but the appellate court reversed, holding that a restitution claim for recovery of monetary consideration is not barred by the Statute of Frauds even when the underlying agreement is oral.
The court held that the Statute of Frauds does not bar a restitution claim for recovery of monetary consideration. Wolf is not seeking to enforce the oral agreement itself, but merely requesting restitution as her remedy at law for the money she contributed.
[1] Recovery of money paid towards a purchase is not barred by the Statute of Frauds when the claim is for restitution based on unjust enrichment or promissory estoppel, rath…
[2] A claim for restitution of monetary consideration is a legal remedy distinct from the enforcement of an oral agreement and is therefore not subject to the Statute of Frau…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Esther is not seeking to enforce the alleged oral agreement, but merely is asking for restitution, her remedy at law for recovery of her monetary consideration. Therefore, recovery is not barred by the Statute of Frauds.”
The court's central holding distinguishing between enforcement of an oral contract (barred by Statute of Frauds) and restitution for money paid (not barred).
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn fall 1974, Esther Wolf and her son-in-law Sam Malevani, who was married to Wolf's daughter, allegedly entered into an oral agreement whereby Wolf w…
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PER CURIAM.
Esther Wolf, plaintiff in the trial court, seeks reversal of an order dismissing with prejudice her amended complaint to recover money allegedly given to the defendant, her son-in-law, towards the purchase of a condominium.
In the fall of 1974 Esther Wolf and the defendant, Sam Malevani, who at the time was married to Mrs. Wolf’s daughter, allegedly entered into an oral agreement whereby Wolf would be permitted to live with her daughter and son-in-law in a two bedroom condominium if she would contribute money towards its purchase. Wolf alleges she contributed a substantial sum of money; but prior to the purchase, her daughter died and now Malevani refuses to allow her to live in the condominium as agreed. Wolf filed a complaint and thereafter, pursuant to an agreed order of the parties, an amended complaint to recover from Malevani the monies she contributed on the theories of unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel. Malevani filed a motion to dismiss on the ground Wolf was barred from recovery by the Statute of Frauds, Section 725.01, Florida Statutes (1975). After hearing argument on this motion, the trial judge entered an order dismissing the amended complaint. We reverse.
Esther is not seeking to enforce the alleged oral agreement, but merely is asking for restitution, her remedy at law for recovery of her monetary consideration. Therefore, recovery is not barred by the Statute of Frauds. See Neal v. Gregory, 19 Fla. 356 (1882); Avery v. Marine Bank & Trust Company, 216 So. 2d 251 (Fla.2d DCA 1965). It appears that the following quote from Cook v. Adams, 89 So. 2d 6, 8 (Fla.1956) may be applicable to the instant cause of action:
“ This case is typical of many in which those of advanced years pledge their lands and belongings to others to take care of them for the balance of life and when the burden becomes onerous, the pledgee welches on the bargain.”
Reversed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Neal v. Ivey H. Gregory, 19 Fla. 356 (Fla. 1882)
- Cook v. Cora B. Adams (R. Lee Freeman, 89 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1956)
- Avery v. Marine Bank & Tr. Co., 216 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968)