CONCETTA R. SCHEIDL, APPELLANT,
v.
JULIUS SCHEIDL, APPELLEE
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In this dissolution of marriage case, the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's division of marital property, finding that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding the husband all real estate while giving the wife minimal compensation despite her substantial financial contributions to the marriage. The court held that the wife was entitled to at least a one-half special equity in certain property.
The trial court abused its discretion and its judgment was reversed. The wife is entitled to at minimum a one-half special equity in the two Walton County lots, as her contributions to family expenses were essential to their purchase and the husband himself assumed they would become joint property.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion in a dissolution of marriage proceeding by failing to award a spouse a special equity in marital property acquired with marital funds…
[2] A spouse's unrebutted testimony regarding contributions to marital expenses, including income deposited into a joint account and spent for joint living expenses, can esta…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“I think I've made over excess of $45,000.00 [during the marital venture] and it's all gone into the marriage; that's the way I thought it was supposed to be.”
The wife's testimony establishing her substantial financial contributions to the marriage through joint account deposits
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were married in 1967 and separated in 1975. Throughout the marriage, the wife worked and deposited her income (exceeding $45,000) into a j…
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RAWLS, Acting Chief Judge.
The aftermath of this dissolution of marriage is that the wife is of the firm opinion that she has been shortchanged by the trial court’s disposition of the material goods involved in this litigation. We agree and reverse.
The parties were married on May 24, 1967, and cohabited together as husband and wife until on or about March 10, 1975. Except for two years when she was attending college, the wife worked and deposited her income in a joint account which was spent for household and joint living expenses. Her unrebutted testimony was, “I think I’ve made over excess of $45,000.00 [during the marital venture] and it’s all gone into the marriage; that’s the way I thought it was supposed to be.”1 During their marriage, they built a home on land that the husband owned at. the outset which, according to the husband’s testimony, had a value of $48,000.00.2 In addition, he had accumulated two lots in Walton County in his name, which “I assumed that they were going to put those in joint property; I didn’t know.”
By its final decree, the trial court awarded all of the real estate to the husband along with two automobiles and other personal property. The wife was awarded a Karman Ghia automobile, one-half of a joint savings account of some $1,400.00, along with the observation that with her master’s degree her earning power is in excess of the husband’s.
The trial court abused its discretion in not awarding the wife, at the minimum, a one-half special equity in the two Walton County lots. Without the wife’s contributions to the family expenses, it is most apparent from this record that the subject lots could not have been purchased. Coupled with the foregoing contributions on the wife’s part is the husband’s candid ad mission that he assumed the two lots would be joint property. Brown v. Brown, 300 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975).
Reversed and remanded.
SMITH and ERVIN, JJ., concur. . The wife also sold a house which she had owned prior to the marriage and deposited approximately $2,500.00 into the joint account.
. The husband also testified that a $19,000.00 mortgage was outstanding and that the increase in value was mostly “in the lot itself . There’s only about a $1,300.00 equity in the house.”
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Roffe v. Moises Roffe, 404 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…fully justifies — if, indeed, it does not require — the imposition of a special equity of half of the property in question, so that he and his wife would indeed be partners with respect to that marriage-acquired parcel. See also, Scheidl v. Scheidl, 343 So. 2d 963 (Fla.1st DCA 1977); Wollman v. Wollman, 235 So. 2d 315 (Fla.3d DCA 1970); cf. Duncan v. Duncan, supra. Moreover, even if a “special equity” is not technically permissible, it is apparent that the trial court justifiably felt that the award to the h…
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Walser v. Walser, 473 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)…showing that these funds were put into the husband’s business. The jointly owned settlement was used to support both parties. The wife made no showing she was the sole or main supporter of the family during this [*309] stage. See Scheidl v. Scheidl, 343 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). We further find that the husband did not deserve a special equity in the marital home for his extraordinary contributions in labor. See Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949, 951 (Fla.1980); Smith v. Smith, 418 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. 1st…
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Vandegrift v. Vandegrift, 477 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)…ver and above normal marital duties.” [p. [*642] 1200]. It appears to me that the trial court’s award in this case can be sustained on this basis as well, whether the funds are deemed to be the wife’s “marital” income or not. See Scheidl v. Scheidl, 343 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Roffe v. Roffe; Green v. Green, 228 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969) cert. denied, 237 So. 2d 538 (Fla.1970). LUMP SUM ALIMONY: EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION Assuming arguendo that the facts in this case do not justify the finding of a…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Brown v. Brown, 300 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)