NORRIS H. BARR, APPELLANT,
v.
RUTH O. BARR, APPELLEE
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In this interlocutory appeal, the Florida Third District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court's denial of a husband's motion to transfer a dissolution of marriage case from Dade County to Broward County. The court held that under Florida Statutes § 47.011, venue in a dissolution case is proper only in the county where the parties were last present with a common intent to remain married.
Venue for a dissolution of marriage action is proper only in the county where the parties were last present with a common intent to remain married. Because the parties were last present together in Broward County with that intent, venue was improper in Dade County, and the case should be transferred to Broward County.
[1] A cause of action for dissolution of marriage accrues in the Florida county where the parties were last present with a common intent to remain married.
[2] Venue for a dissolution of marriage action is proper in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a cause of action for dissolution of marriage arises in the Florida county in which the parties were last present with a common intent to remain married”
This establishes the controlling legal standard for determining proper venue in dissolution of marriage cases under § 47.011.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe wife filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in Dade County Circuit Court. The parties were married in Hollywood, Broward County on December …
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PER CURIAM.
This is an interlocutory appeal by the husband, Norris H. Barr, from an order of the Dade County Circuit Court denying the husband’s motion to transfer cause to Bro-ward County Circuit Court, and finding that the Dade County Circuit Court has jurisdiction of the parties.
A petition for dissolution of marriage was filed by the wife, Ruth 0. Barr, in Dade County Circuit Court. The husband was served in Broward County, and he proceeded to file a sworn “motion to dismiss and/or transfer for improper venue”, stating that the parties were married in Hollywood, Broward County, Florida, on December 20, 1975; that in April of 1976, they separated, the separation being effectuated at Bro-ward County; that when the marriage became irretrievably broken and at the time of the separation, the parties were living in Broward County; that at all times material, the husband was and is a bona fide resident of Broward County; that in accordance with Section 47.011, Florida Statutes, venue would only be proper in the Broward County Circuit Court; and that jurisdiction does not lie in Dade County.
The wife then filed an affidavit of domicile stating that at the time of the filing of the petition for dissolution of marriage, she was a resident of Dade County; and that she is and has been employed at Mount Sinai Medical Center in the recovery room, Miami Beach, Florida.
There was a hearing on the husband’s “motion to dismiss and/or transfer for improper venue.” The trial court entered its order denying the motion, and this interlocutory appeal ensued.
As held in Carroll v. Carroll, 322 So. 2d 53, 57 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), for purposes of Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1975), which provides that,
“Actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located. . . .” (emphasis supplied)
a cause of action for dissolution of marriage arises in the Florida county in which the parties were last present with a common intent to remain married. In our opinion, this holding is dispositive of the venue issue in this case, and we find that the only county in which venue is proper is Broward. See Winter v. Curtis, 311 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), and Auritt v. Auritt, 334 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976).
Therefore, the trial court erred in denying the husband’s motion to transfer to Broward County, and we reverse. This cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to enter an order transferring the action to the Circuit Court of Broward County as provided for by Rule 1.060, Fla.R. Civ.P. Reversed and remanded.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Smith v. Smith, 430 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)…gle county where the parties last lived with a common intent to remain married. Carroll v. Carroll, 322 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), affirmed 341 So. 2d 771 (Fla.1977). See also Hoskins v. Hoskins, 363 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Barr v. Barr, 343 So. 2d 1326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). In our opinion, Carroll is dispositive of the venue issue in this case. The husband stated in his affidavit that the parties last lived together in Pinellas County with the intent of remaining married in Pinellas County. He also…
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Friedman v. Friedman, 383 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…§ 61.052, Fla.Stat. (1979)] accrues in the Florida county in which the parties were last present with a common intent to remain married, and, accordingly, the venue for such action against a Florida resident may be laid in such county. Barr v. Barr, 343 So. 2d 1326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Carroll v. Carroll, 322 So. 2d 53, 57 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). A different rule prevails, however, with reference to an action for separate maintenance unconnected with marriage dissolution under Section 61.09, Florida Statutes (1979…
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Evans v. Boggess, 352 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)…court denying their motion to dismiss for improper venue. We are of the opinion that appellants’ motion to dismiss for improper venue should be treated as a motion to transfer and that the trial court improperly denied the motion. See Barr v. Barr, 343 So. 2d 1326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Winter v. Curtis, 311 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Allen v. Summers, 273 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973); and Sections 47.011 and 47.051, Florida Statutes (1973). Therefore, the order appealed is reversed and, pursuant to Fla.R.C…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Carroll v. Vernell Carroll, 322 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)
- Winter v. Curtis, 311 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)
- Simpson v. State, 334 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)