LARRY STEADMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant challenges his conviction and sentencing for grand larceny and aggravated assault on double jeopardy grounds, arguing he was sentenced twice for aggravated assault. The court remanded the case because no proper written judgments were entered by the trial judge as required by the Florida Criminal Procedure Rules, making it impossible to determine which sentences applied to which charges.
The court remanded the case because no proper written judgments signed by the judge were entered for the initial grand larceny and aggravated assault charges as required by Rule 3.670, RCrP. Without proper judgments, the court could not determine which sentences applied to which charges and thus could not resolve the double jeopardy issue.
[1] A court cannot determine the validity of sentences when no proper written and signed judgment has been entered in open court.
[2] A cause must be remanded for the entry of appropriate judgments and clarification of sentences when the record lacks proper written judgments.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Appellant now argues double jeopardy as to the aggravated assault charge contending that, in effect, he had been once sentenced therefor in that such sentence was necessarily included in the original one year sentence imposed for the grand larceny count at the time of the first violation of probation.”
States appellant's double jeopardy argument regarding whether he was sentenced twice for the same offense.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant was placed on probation for grand larceny and aggravated assault on September 15, 1972. He was later found guilty of violating probation. Th…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant was originally placed on probation for grand larceny under the first count of an information, and for aggravated assault under the second count, on September 15, 1972.
Thereafter, he was found guilty of violation of probation. Probation was revoked as to the grand larceny count and a sentence of one year imprisonment was ostensibly imposed therefor. Probation under the aggravated assault count was apparently continued, to run concurrently with a subsequent order of probation entered for the offense of robbery. This latter probation was subsequently revoked and sentences were imposed on the aggravated assault count included in the original order of probation and on the robbery charge included in the second order of probation.
Appellant now argues double jeopardy as to the aggravated assault charge contending that, in effect, he had been once sentenced therefor in that such sentence was necessarily included in the original one year sentence imposed for the grand larceny count at the time of the first violation of probation. He may be right but we can’t tell.
It affirmatively appears from the record before us that no proper judgment was entered in open court, that is, in writing and signed by the judge, as required by Rule 3.670, RCrP, with respect to the initial two charges of grand larceny and aggravated assault. We can’t say, therefore, which sentences applied to which “judgments” or, for that matter, vice versa.
Whereupon the cause is remanded with directions to enter appropriate judgments on said charges, in the presence of appellant if necessary, and to clarify the sentences imposed thereon with appropriate credit. It is further directed that, upon compliance herewith, the trial court cause to be returned to us copies of the judgments and sentences so entered for further consideration of the matters raised on this appeal.
McNULTY, C. J., and GRIMES and SCHEB, JJ., concur. It appearing that the trial court has entered an order, dated January 18, 1977, which complies with the mandate of this court temporarily remanding the cause on July 14, 1976, upon consideration, it is ORDERED that the above-styled appeals be and they are hereby closed.