STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
D. R. S., A JUVENILE, APPELLEE
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The court held that the juvenile division judge had jurisdiction to reconsider a prior waiver order when the original waiver order failed to state adequate reasons for waiving jurisdiction.
[1] A juvenile court waiver order is invalid if it fails to state the reasons why the best interests of the public require waiver of juvenile jurisdiction.
[2] A circuit court may reconsider a juvenile waiver order ending juvenile division jurisdiction when the original waiver order is procedurally deficient.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe State appealed an order rescinding its prior waiver of juvenile jurisdiction for D.R.S., who was charged with robbery and conspiracy. The original…
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SMITH, Judge.
The State appeals from an interlocutory order of the Escambia County circuit court, juvenile division, rescinding its prior order which waived juvenile jurisdiction and certified D.R.S. for trial as an adult in the criminal division on charges of robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery. The State urges that the criminal and juvenile divisions of circuit court are distinct jurisdictions, State v. Robinson, 336 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), and that neither the criminal division judge who ordered the case remanded to juvenile division for reconsideration of the waiver order nor the juvenile division judge who there reconsidered that order had jurisdiction to do so. Three months passed between the waiver and remand orders.
Without foreclosing the existence of other circumstances in which a circuit court may before a juvenile’s felony trial properly reconsider a waiver order ending juvenile division jurisdiction, we find ample reason for that action in this case, in which the waiver order did not state reasons why the best interest of the public required juvenile jurisdiction to be waived. Such a statement is required by Fla.R.Juv.P. 8.100(c).
The waiver order’s sole recitation on that subject was that “the defendant through his attorney stipulates probable cause.” The circuit court was correct in considering that recitation inadequate and in causing reconsideration of the waiver order on substantial evidence that reasonable prospects do exist to rehabilitate this juvenile. See Rice v. State, 311 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975).
Contrast J.M.D. v. State, 328 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); O.A.H. v. State, 332 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976).
Possible prejudice to the State arising from the speedy trial rule, Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191, was alleviated by the juvenile’s waiver of that Rule’s benefits and by orders tolling the Rule.
No error having been demonstrated, the interlocutory appeal is DISMISSED. Fla. App.R. 4.2 c.
RAWLS, Acting C. J., and ERVIN, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Eddunio Corraliza v. State, 391 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…rdingly, the issue sought to be preserved is not properly before us, Brown v. State, 376 So. 2d 382 (Fla.1979); see Woods v. State, 369 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Mitchell v. State, 351 So. 2d [*331] 1142 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); State v. D. R. S., 344 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Spencer v. State, 332 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); and (b) the imposition of five years probation for the crime of petit larceny as a second degree misdemeanor [§ 812.014(2)(c), Fla.Stat. (1979)] constitutes fundamental error…
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State v. The Honorable Steve D. Levine, 655 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)…residing over the criminal proceeding itself to rule upon the issues presented. See Iglesias v. State, 599 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Johnson v. State, 379 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), cert, denied, 388 So. 2d 1114 (Fla.1980); State v. D.R.S., 344 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). See generally State v. Gary, 609 So. 2d 1291, 1294 (Fla.1992) (“the interests of justice require a rule designed to inhibit trial courts from engaging in a ‘ping-pong game’ by transferring a case back and forth, thereby jeopardi…
Authorities Cited
- Plant v. State, 336 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)
- Rice v. State, 311 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
- O. A. H. v. State, 332 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- Rahming v. Cornelius & Sons, Inc., 328 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- J. M. D. v. State, 328 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)