MONDE INVESTMENTS NO. 2, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
R. D. TAYLOR-MADE ENTERPRISES, INC., ET AL., APPELLEES (TWO CASES)
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Monde Investments, the building owner, appealed judgments in two mechanic's lien foreclosure cases brought by contractors Taylor-Made Enterprises and Hardrives. The court reversed both judgments, finding that Taylor improperly used parol evidence to prove contract extras and that Hardrives, although entitled to a lien, could only recover its proportionate share of the retained funds rather than the full amount claimed.
Taylor-Made's attempt to prove extras through parol evidence was improper and the judgment in its favor is reversed. Hardrives, though entitled to a lien under the statute, can only recover its proportionate share of the 10% retained funds ($3,944.60) rather than the full amount claimed, and is not the prevailing party because Monde made a pre-suit offer of the statutory amount.
[1] Parol evidence is inadmissible to alter the terms of a written contract in a mechanic's lien foreclosure action.
[2] A party seeking to foreclose a mechanic's lien must prove "extras" by admissible evidence, not by altering the written contract's terms.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In order for Taylor to prove this extra he had to do it by offering parol evidence to change the terms of a written contract. This was error.”
Establishes that parol evidence is improper to modify the express terms of a written construction contract.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMonde Investments owned a building for which Taylor-Made Enterprises initially agreed to construct an office building for $242,000, including exterior…
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DAUKSCH, Judge.
These two cases were presented to us jointly but we shall determine them separately in this opinion as we did in our considerations. They both involve the same Appellant who was the Defendant below and the owner of a building for which the Appellees provided goods and services. The Appellee-Taylor did not file a brief and therefore was not able to participate in the oral argument making our consideration of this matter much more difficult than it should have been.
We shall first consider the appeal as it concerns the Appellee-Taylor. It appears from the complaint and other documents in the record that Taylor wanted to foreclose a mechanic’s lien against the property owned by the Appellant for certain work done to improve the real property. The particular work in question here is the finishing of some portions of the exterior of the building. Initially Taylor agreed to build the office building for $242,000 including the finishing of the exterior, 12,000 square feet, for $1.00 per square foot.
At trial the court permitted Taylor to attempt to prove an “extra” as defined in Section 713.01(5), Florida Statutes (1975). In order for Taylor to prove this extra he had to do it by offering parol evidence to change the terms of a written contract. This was error. The Order of the trial court awarding Judgment to R.D. Taylor-Made Enterprises, Inc. against the Appellant is reversed. The Ap-pellee-Taylor not having been the prevailing party is therefore not entitled to attorneys’ fees below and the award of those attorneys’ fees is reversed.
Also, we must reverse the Judgment of the trial court against the Appellant in favor of the Appellee-Hardrives. This Appellee provided the paving around the building and was one of the last, if not the last, providers of services and material. He came in just as the money ran out. Har-drives was not in privity with the owner and is entitled to a lien under Section 713.-06, Florida Statutes (1975).
The Appellant properly complied with all the requirements under Chapter 713, Florida Statutes and held back 10% of the original contract price as required under Section 713.06(3)(d)(5), Florida Statutes (1975) in order to pay Har-drives and all those similarly situated. The unfortunate part is that the 10% held back is not enough to cover the amount due Hardrives under contract and no improper payments by the owner were shown to have been made as contemplated in Section 713.-06(3)(h), Florida Statutes (1975).
Therefore, Hardrives must accept its proportionate share of the 10% retained amount which was in the amount of $3,944.60. We are compelled to note the Appellee-Hardrives would have us change the law as we may feel we should but we have determined we cannot.
We further note that before the complaint was filed against Monde by Hardrives, Monde offered to pay to Hardrives the amount to which Hardrives was entitled, $3,944.60.1 Since Hardrives did not accept the amount it should have accepted it was not the prevailing party in this lawsuit as defined in Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1975). Therefore, we most reluctantly must reverse the additional Judgment against Monde in favor of Hardrives which awarded attorney’s fees to the attorney for Hardrives.
The Judgments in favor of Hardrives Co., Inc. and R.D. Taylor-Made Enterprises, Inc. against Monde Investments No. 2, Inc., are REVERSED.
LETTS, J., and SCHWARTZ, ALAN R., Associate Judge, concur. . Evidence of this type of “offer of settlement” is peculiarly permitted in mechanics’ lien cases.
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C.U. Assocs., Inc. v. R.B. Grove, Inc., 472 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 1985)…ourt because the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal, C.U. Associates v. R.B. Grove, Inc., 455 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), conflicts with decisions of the Fourth District, Monde Investments No. 2, Inc. v. R.D. Taylor-Made Enterprises, 344 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), and the Second District, S.C.M. Associates v. Rhodes, 395 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). We approve the decisions of the Second and Fourth Districts and quash the decision of the Third District. Grove brought an action to forec…
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King Partitions & Drywall, Inc. v. Donner Enters., Inc., 464 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)…pressly required by the written contract between the parties. Although the trial judge believed evidence of such extra work should be admissible, he felt constrained by the case of Monde Investments No. 2, Inc. v. R.D. Taylor-Made Enterprises, Inc., 344 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), to find that such evidence was inadmissible because of the parol evidence [*716] rule. Accordingly, he allowed King to make a proffer of its evidence but dismissed the complaint and entered judgment for Donner. We hold the trial…
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S. C. M. Assocs., Inc. v. Rhodes, 395 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)…ined to accept this payment. Yet, as a result of the suit, S.C.M. recovered only $3,280.40. Under these circumstances, S.C.M. could hardly be considered the prevailing party.1 Cf. Monde Investments No. 2, Inc. v. R. D. Taylor-Made Enterprises, Inc., 344 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), in which the court held that when a lienor declined to accept an earlier offer in the same amount as ultimately recovered, it was not entitled to attorney’s fees as the prevailing party.2 There is one ancillary issue which requ…
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