EMOGENE HAWKESWORTH, APPELLANT,
v.
J. ARTHUR HAWKESWORTH, JR., APPELLEE
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The appellate court held that permanent alimony was appropriate given the wife's sacrifice of her career for the family over a long marriage, and that the rehabilitative alimony award was inadequate.
[1] Permanent alimony is appropriate when a marriage dissolves after many years, particularly when a spouse has forgone a career to manage the household and raise children.
[2] Rehabilitative alimony is generally inappropriate for a spouse who has undeveloped or lost earning capacity due to focusing on domestic duties during a long-term marriage…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe wife, Emogene, appealed a dissolution judgment awarding her rehabilitative alimony, child support, and denying her a special equity in the marital…
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PER CURIAM.
Respondent, Emogene Hawkesworth, appeals those provisions of a final judgment of dissolution of marriage awarding (1) $950 per month to her for a period of five years as rehabilitative alimony; (2) $300 monthly per child for child support; (3) the Ocala property to the petitioner, J. Arthur Hawkesworth, Jr., upon recognizing his special equity therein.
We find merit in Emogene’s contention that she should have been awarded permanent instead of rehabilitative alimony. When Emogene was first married, she worked for a short time as a clerk-typist. After the first child was born, she stopped working to concentrate upon managing the household and raising the four children born of the marriage. In the meantime her husband, Arthur, had the opportunity of enhancing his professional career as an attorney. After some 24 years, the marriage dissolved leaving Emogene a 46 year old woman who suffers from high blood pressure and a kidney ailment with the task of raising the youngest of the four children (the other three having reached the age of majority at the time of the appeal) and rehabilitating herself within five years.
Rehabilitative alimony necessarily assumes on the part of the person seeking alimony either a previous potential or actual capacity for self-support which has been undeveloped or completely lost during the marriage. Reback v. Reback, 296 So. 2d 541 (Fla.3d DCA 1974). This type of alimony is more appropriate where the parties are still young, the marriage is of a relatively short duration and the wife has the ability to develop or redevelop her qualifications for self-support. See Reback, supra, and Lash v. Lash, 307 So. 2d 241 (Fla.2d DCA 1975).
However, where the dissolution comes after many years there are different circumstances to be considered, particularly when the wife has given up her career upon marriage to manage the home and raise the children. Lash, supra. Taking into account Emogene’s poor health and on the other hand, Arthur’s income, we find the award of only rehabilitative alimony to be erroneous. See Reback, supra; Lash, supra; Patterson v. Patterson, 315 So. 2d 104 (Fla.4th DCA 1975); Sommese v. Sommese, 324 So. 2d 647 (Fla.1st DCA 1976); McNaughton v. McNaughton, 332 So. 2d 673 (Fla.3d DCA 1976).
Having determined that permanent rather than rehabilitative alimony is appropriate, we now must consider the further question of the proper amount of alimony to be awarded.
The guidelines in determining the amount of alimony are the needs of the wife, the financial ability of the husband and the standard of living established by the parties during the duration of their marriage. Royal v. Royal, 263 So. 2d 277 (Fla.3d DCA 1972). The heart of an alimony award is and always has been the needs of the demanding spouse for support and the ability of the other spouse to respond. Thigpen v. Thigpen, 277 So. 2d 583 (Fla.1st DCA 1973).
With respect to this issue, the record establishes the comfortable standard of living enjoyed by the parties during the marriage and Arthur’s ability to make substantial permanent alimony payments.
The testimony presented reflected that the cost of household and personal expenses totaled approximately $1,600 per month. We, therefore, conclude that the award of $950 per month rehabilitative alimony is so inadequate as to constitute an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge and in place thereof have determined that Emo-gene should be awarded $1,300 1 per month as and for permanent alimony subject to the right of obtaining relief under changed circumstances. Cf. Klein v. Klein, 122 So. 2d 205 (Fla.3d DCA 1960); Massey v. Massey, 205 So. 2d 1 (Fla.3d DCA 1967); Schultz v. Schultz, 290 So. 2d 146 (Fla.2d DCA 1974); Norton v. Norton, 328 So. 2d 484 (Fla.1st DCA 1976).
This award we find to be in accord with the accepted principle that a divorced wife is entitled to alimony which will permit her to live in a manner commensurate with that provided by her husband during the coveture, if he has the ability to pay (which Arthur has).
See Sommers v. Sommers, 183 So. 2d 744 (Fla.3d DCA 1968).
After consideration of Emogene’s remaining points on appeal concerning the amount of child support and the Ocala property, we find no abuse of discretion and, thus, no reversible error. Accordingly, the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to enter an award of permanent alimony of $1,300 per month with a retention of jurisdiction to modify the alimony award upon the requisite showing of changed circumstances. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
. This amount plus $300 per month child support for the minor child equals $1,600.
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Colucci v. Colucci, 392 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…atton, 358 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Garrison v. Garrison, 351 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), (per Alderman, J.); Bowen v. Bowen, 347 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); West v. West, 345 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Hawkesworth v. Hawkesworth, 345 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 355 So. 2d 514 (Fla.1978); McAllister v. McAllister, 345 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), cert. denied, 357 So. 2d 186 (Fla.1978); McNaughton v. McNaughton, 332 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), cert. denied, 345 So. 2d…
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Winnifred A. Cowan v. Cowan, 389 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)…to reversal where an incorrect legal rule is applied. Canakaris. The disparity between appellant’s income and appellee’s is acute, especially when the standard of living established during the marriage is considered. See Hawkesworth v. Hawkesworth, 345 So. 2d 359 (Fla.3d DCA 1977). While this court should not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13 (Fla.1976), it is necessary to determine if an incorrect rule or standard has been applied. Apparently the trial court di…
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Gratton v. Gratton, 358 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)…tend it for a further rehabilitative period. In a case which on the facts is strikingly similar to the instant case, this court reversed an award of rehabilitative alimony and directed allowance of permanent alimony. See Hawkesworth v. Hawkesworth, 345 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). The fact that the legislature authorized rehabilitative alimony did not do away with permanent alimony, and in a proper case permanent alimony is still desirable and lawful. Messer v. Messer, supra, 342 So. 2d 1076 (Fla. 4th DCA…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (13 total)
- Reback v. Reback, 296 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
- Lash v. Lash, 307 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
- Manly W. Thigpen v. Thigpen, 277 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)
- Lily Klein v. Klein, 122 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960)
- Monserrate B. McNAUGHTON v. McNAUGHTON, 332 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- Bettie B. Schultz v. Schultz, 290 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)
- Patterson v. Patterson, 315 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)
- Massey v. Massey, 205 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)
- Lovie Royal v. Royal, 263 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)
- Melvyne Wahnish Sommers v. Sommers, 183 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)