MYRA RIDDLE AND WILLIAM RIDDLE, APPELLANTS,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that Florida's burglary statute is constitutional and not void for vagueness, despite the absence of an explicit prohibitory statement.
[1] A statute is not unconstitutionally vague for failing to expressly state that defined conduct is criminal, if the statute is located within a title of the Florida Statute…
[2] A statute is constitutional if its text, when read as a whole, adequately informs persons of common understanding that the described conduct is prohibited, even if a dire…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellants pleaded no contest to burglary charges under Section 810.02, Florida Statutes (1975), reserving the right to appeal the trial court's rulin…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Criminal Statutes cases and more on FLexlaw
ENGLAND, Justice.
This case brings to us by appeal from the Pinellas County Circuit Court the constitutionality of Florida’s current burglary statute, as set forth in Section 810.02, Florida Statutes (1975). Appellants entered “no contest” pleas to burglary charges under the statute and specifically reserved the right to appeal the trial court’s ruling that the statute is constitutional. We have jurisdiction.1
Appellants’ challenge to the statute is rather unique. They argue that the statute is constitutionally vague, and therefore violative of due process of law under the federal and state constitutions, because the conduct which constitutes “burglary” under the law is not said to be proscribed — that is, not prohibited in express terms in the text of the law. Appellants acknowledge that the elements of burglary are adequately set out so that persons of common understanding would know what acts constitute a “burglary”, but they say that the Legislature failed to put in the statute words to the effect that the defined conduct is criminal.2
We reject appellants’ contention. The challenged statute appears in Title XLIV of the Florida Statutes, which is entitled “Crimes”. It states in relevant part that “burglary is a felony.”3 Taken as a whole the law is adequate to apprise persons of common understanding that the described conduct is also proscribed even if, technically speaking, a declarative prohibition is missing from the language of this statute. No constitutional infirmity exists which would warrant our invalidation of Section 810.02.
The order of the trial court is affirmed.
OVERTON, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD, SUNDBERG and KARL, JJ., concur. . Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.Const.; State v. Ashby, 245 So. 2d 225 (Fla.1971).
. Appellants also concede that the Legislature plainly intended to make the crime of burglary a statutory offense. They argue, simply, that the Legislature made a mistake in drafting the law and left out a directive that “thou shaft not burgle”.
. § 810.02(2) and (3), Fla.Stat. (1975).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Valentino DeGEORGE v. State, 358 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)…ermine whether the language of the Florida Statutes (Section 810.011(1) and Section 810.01) are sufficiently informative to those of common understanding. The constitutionality of 810.02, Florida Statutes (1975), is not in question. Riddle v. State, 345 So. 2d 1073 (Fla.1977), also see Simmons v. State, 354 So. 2d 1211 (Fla.1978). Section 810.02 of the Florida Statutes (1975) provides: “810.02 Burglars- “(1) ‘Burglary’ means entering and remaining in a structure or a conveyance with the intent to commit an…
-
State v. Opitz, 357 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)…eme court. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.; Simmons v. State, 354 So. 2d 1211, 1212 (Fla. 1978) (finding no substantial constitutional issue because the constitutionality of the statute there in question had previously been upheld in Riddle v. State, 345 So. 2d 1073 [Fla.1977]); Harrell's Candy Kitchen, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Authority, 111 So. 2d 439, 441-42 (Fla.1959). See also Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Bryant, 189 So. 2d 614 (Fla.1966) Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Distri…
-
Simmons v. State, 354 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. 1978)…tent to commit a misdemeanor is a felony. Copeland v. State, 275 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973). After careful review of the record, we find that appellant’s allegations fail to constitute a substantial constitutional question. See Riddle v. State, 345 So. 2d 1073 (Fla.1977). Accordingly, the appeal is transferred to the First District Court of Appeal for further action consistent herewith. It is so ordered. OVERTON, C. J., and BOYD, ENGLAND, SUNDBERG, HATCHETT and KARL, JJ., concur. . Article V, Section…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Ashby, 245 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1971)