AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
STUART GOLDMAN, APPELLEE
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Aetna appeals the trial court's dismissal of its declaratory relief action seeking to determine whether uninsured motorist coverage applies when Goldman was injured by a bomb placed in his car. The Third District reverses, holding that questions of insurance coverage are judicial matters that must be decided by courts, not arbitration, even when arbitration clauses exist in insurance contracts.
Questions of insurance coverage are judicial matters that must be determined by courts, not through arbitration. Although the insurance policy contains an arbitration provision, coverage determinations are within the exclusive province of the judiciary. The trial court erred in dismissing the declaratory relief action, and the case must be remanded to the trial court to determine the coverage issue.
[1] The question of insurance coverage is a judicial matter to be determined in the courts, notwithstanding any arbitration provisions in an insurance contract.
[2] A trial court errs in dismissing a declaratory judgment action seeking to determine insurance coverage.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“in this State [notwithstanding any provisions pertaining to arbitration in an insurance contract] the question of coverage was a judicial matter to be determined in the courts”
Establishes the core holding that coverage questions are exclusively judicial matters, regardless of arbitration clauses in insurance policies.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGoldman was insured by Aetna for automobile coverage. On October 27, 1974, Goldman's car exploded due to a bomb when he turned on the ignition, seriou…
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[*112] PER CURIAM.
The appellee, Goldman, insured an automobile with the appellant, Aetna. During the policy period, he undertook to use his automobile and when he turned on the ignition a bomb exploded, seriously injuring him. The policy contained a provision for arbitration.1
On October 27, 1974, Goldman’s car exploded due to a bomb. Goldman was told that a late model brown car was seen leaving near his own car prior to the explosion. Goldman did not know who had placed the bomb, nor was it ever ascertained who the owner and driver was of the late model brown car. Goldman applied for uninsured motorist benefits under his policy with Aet-na and, on February 4,1975, filed a demand for arbitration. After demand for arbitration, but before the scheduled hearing, Aet-na filed its complaint for declaratory relief, contending that Goldman was not entitled to uninsured motorist benefits to which he made a claim. Both parties moved for summary judgment. Goldman filed a motion to dismiss Aetna’s complaint; the trial court granted Goldman’s motion to dismiss, concluding issues involved were to proceed to arbitration. This appeal ensued.
The appellant contends the trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss the complaint and that issues should be determined by a panel of arbitrators. Appellant contends the trial court should have ruled on the legal issue as to whether uninsured motorist coverage was applicable, because in this case it cannot be reasonably concluded that the injuries of Goldman resulted from the ownership, maintenance or use of an uninsured motorist. The appellant also contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant the motion for summary judgment filed by it, since as a matter of law it could not be concluded that Goldman’s injuries arose out of the ownership, use, or maintenance of either an uninsured or hit-and-run vehicle, as defined under Section 627.727, Florida Statutes (1975), or in the policy between the parties.
We reverse on the error alleged in dismissing the declaratory decree action, with instructions to the trial court to enjoin the arbitration proceedings and to determine the issue of coverage. This court, in Cruger v. Allstate Insurance Company, 162 So. 2d 690 (Fla.3rd D.C.A. 1964), clearly outlined that in this State [notwithstanding any provisions pertaining to arbitration in an insurance contract] the question of coverage was a judicial matter to be determined in the courts. This case has been followed in Zeagler v. Commercial Union Insurance Company of New York, 166 So. 2d 616 (Fla.3rd D.C.A. 1964); Jones v. New Amsterdam Casualty Company, 213 So. 2d 502 (Fla.3rd D.C.A. 1968); Perez v. State Automobile Insurance Association, 270 So. 2d 377 (Fla.3rd D.C.A. 1972); Government Employees Insurance Company v. Mirth, 333 So. 2d 545 (Fla.3rd D.C.A. 1976).
We do not agree with the appellant’s second point; that we should direct the trial judge to grant Aetna’s motion for summary judgment. No ruling having been made by the trial judge, the matter should first be presented to and ruled on by the trial court.
This opinion is not to be construed as finding that there is or is not coverage under the facts alleged, but the matter is returned to the trial court for further proceedings to determine this issue.
Reversed and remanded to the trial court, with directions.
. “ARBITRATION. If any person making claim hereunder and the Company do not agree that such person is legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile because of bodily injury to the Insured, or do not agree as to the amount of payment which may be owing under this Coverage, then, upon written demand of either, the matter or matters upon which such person and the Company do not agree shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the award rendered by the arbitrators may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof. Such person and the Company each agree to consider itself bound and to be bound by any award made by the arbitrators pursuant to this Coverage.”
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Glass, 421 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)…ssues concerning the existence of uninsured motorist coverage may be determined only by the court, and, conversely, may not be a subject of the arbitration proceedings commonly provided for in such policies. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Goldman, 346 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Mirth, 333 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Zeagler v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. of New York, 166 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964); Cruger v. Allstate Ins. Co., 162 So. 2d 690 [*761] (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)…
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The Travelers Ins. Co. v. Columbus LEE and Bessie Lee, 358 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)…hat the trial court erred by denying its motion to enjoin the arbitration proceedings because coverage was an issue in the matter and this question was a judicial matter which should be determined by the courts. In Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Goldman, 346 So. 2d 111, 112 (Fla.3d DCA 1977), we stated as follows: “This court [3d DCA], in Cruger v. Allstate Insurance Company, 162 So. 2d 690 (Fla.3rd D.C.A. 1964), clearly outlined that in this State (notwithstanding any provisions pertaining to arbitration in an i…
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State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Elicer Licea and Hermida Licea, 649 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)…ay not be a subject of the arbitration process); Travelers v. Lee, [*912] 358 So. 2d 88 (Fla.3d DCA 1978) (notwithstanding any provision for arbitration, the question of coverage is a judicial matter to be determined by the court); Aetna v. Goldman, 346 So. 2d 111 (Fla.3d DCA 1977) (question of coverage is judicial matter to be determined by court notwithstanding insurance policy provisions pertaining to arbitration); G.E.I. Co. v. Mirth, 333 So. 2d 545 (Fla.3d DCA 1976) (under liability indemnity policy issu…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Cruger v. Allstate Ins. Co., 162 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)
- Zeagler v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. OF NEW York, 166 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)
- Bernardo Perez v. State Auto. Ins. Ass'n, 270 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)
- Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. v. Mirth, 333 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- Jones v. The NEW Amsterdam Cas. Co., 213 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)