HATTIE EYSMAN, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF STELLA GANZ, APPELLANT,
v.
WARREN W. MULLINS ET AL., APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1977-05-24
No. 77-295
Before BARKDULL, HAVERFIELD and NATHAN, JJ.
346 So. 2d 596 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1977) Caution
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

In a mortgage foreclosure proceeding involving surplus funds, the trial court denied the personal representative of a judgment creditor's motion to compel the defendant property owner to submit to a deposition regarding the homestead status of the foreclosed property. The appellate court reversed, holding that discovery on the homestead issue was relevant and necessary to resolve the parties' competing claims to the surplus proceeds.


Holding

The trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to compel discovery. The homestead status of the property and the character of the surplus funds are directly relevant to the litigation and must be subject to discovery under the discovery rules.


Headnotes

[1] Discovery is permissible regarding any matter relevant to the subject matter of the litigation, provided it is not privileged.

[2] A trial court abuses its discretion by denying a party the opportunity to conduct discovery concerning the homestead status of property.

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Key Quotes

“discovery may be made of any matter as long as it is relevant to the subject matter of the litigation and, of course, not privileged”

Establishes the broad scope of discovery available under Florida procedural rules

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Facts & Procedural History

Central Savings Bank foreclosed on real property owned by Warren W. Mullins. Stella Ganz held a recorded judgment lien against the property. After for…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, Hattie Eysman, personal representative of the estate of Stella Ganz who held a recorded judgment against certain real property owned by Warren W. Mullins, appellee herein, appeals an order denying her motion to compel discovery.

Plaintiff Central Savings Bank (not a party to this appeal) instituted a mortgage foreclosure action against the subject property and named, among others, as defendants, appellee Warren Mullins by virtue of his ownership of the property and Stella Ganz1 by virtue of her recorded judgment. At the time this action commenced Mullins no longer resided in Florida and service was perfected on him in Georgia. He failed to answer and default was entered against him. Thereafter, pursuant to a summary final judgment of foreclosure against all defendants, the property was sold at a public sale and after plaintiff bank received the $11,557.63 due under the mortgage, a surplus of $4,116.74 remained. Defendant Ganz then filed a motion for an order directing the clerk to disburse $4,066.57 to her out of the surplus on the ground that she held a judgment lien for that amount which is superior to any claim or estate of any other defendant. Mullins then filed a motion for award of the entire surplus as owner of the subject realty for the reason that the premises constituted his homestead and, therefore, a judgment could not operate as a lien thereon. Thereafter Ganz noticed Mullins for the taking of his deposition and Mullins refused. Appellant, Hattie Eysman, as representative of the estate of Stella Ganz, filed a motion to compel discovery seeking to have Mullins submit to a deposition by oral examination. After a hearing, the trial judge denied the motion. We reverse.

Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.280(b), in effect, provides that discovery may be made of any matter as long as it is relevant to the subject matter of the litigation and, of course, not privileged.

Whether appellant or appellee will prevail on their respective motions for award of the surplus funds revolves around the determination of (1) whether the property was in reality homestead at all times prior to the foreclosure action,2 and (2) whether the funds retain their homestead character. We, therefore, conclude that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying appellant an opportunity to make inquiry and discovery with respect to the homestead status of the property. Cf. Orlowitz v. Orlowitz, 199 So. 2d 97 (Fla.1967).

The order denying appellant’s motion to compel discovery is reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court with directions to grant the motion to compel discovery with any limitations which the trial judge in his discretion may deem necessary or proper. Reversed and remanded.

. Ganz did file an answer. . A question of fact. See Brady v. Brady, 55 So. 2d 907 (Fla.1952).


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