CHARLOTTE C. YOVAN, APPELLANT,
v.
BURDINE'S, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEE

Fla. | 1955-06-22
DREW, C. J., and ROBERTS and THORNAL, JJ., concur.
81 So. 2d 555 Florida Supreme Court (1955) Positive Treatment
Cited by 24 cases

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Synopsis

Charlotte Yovan was injured at Burdine's store while employed to display Rex Cutlery products. The trial court granted Burdine's motion for summary judgment, holding that Yovan was Burdine's employee and thus barred from suing at law because her exclusive remedy was workers' compensation. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, holding that despite conflicting factual assertions, the evidence conclusively established Yovan as Burdine's employee as a matter of law.


Holding

The trial court correctly granted summary judgment because the evidence conclusively established as a matter of law that Yovan was employed by Burdine's, not Rex Cutlery Company, and therefore her exclusive remedy for workplace injuries was workers' compensation. No genuine issue of employment existed that should have gone to a jury.


Key Quotes

“Any claim she had against Burdine's was limited by the Workmen's Compensation Law.”

Establishes the legal consequence of the employment determination: workers' compensation becomes the exclusive remedy.

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Facts & Procedural History

Yovan was injured on December 23, 1952, while ascending stairs in Burdine's West Palm Beach store where she was employed to display and sell Rex Cutle…

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Opinion of the Court
TERRELL, Justice.

TERRELL, Justice.

Appellee was the owner and operator of a store in West Palm Beach at which appellant was employed to display and sell the goods of Rex Cutlery Company. December 23,1952, while appellant was ascending the stairway in said store, she fell and was injured because of appellee’s alleged negligence in failing to maintain said stairs in a safe and sound condition. Pursuant to these facts, the appellant filed this suit against appellee, claiming damages for her injuries. She requested a jury trial. Appellant will hereinafter be referred to as the plaintiff and appellee as defendant.

Defendant moved to dismiss on the ground the complaint stated no cause upon which relief could be granted. The trial court did not rule on this motion. December 8, 1953, defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff was an employee of defendant and could not maintain a law action against it because any claim she might have against it was covered by Workmen’s Compensation Law of Florida, F.S.A. § 440.01 et seq. On consideration said motion for summary judgment was granted and final judgment was entered for the defendant. The plaintiff has appealed from the final judgment.

The point for determination is whether or not the Circuit Court committed error in granting the motion for summary judgment.

When the Circuit Court entered the summary judgment, it was confronted with the complaint, the deposition of the plaintiff taken at the instance of defendant May 12, 1953, order of the Deputy Commissioner of the Florida Industrial Commission dated October 20, 1953, and an affidavit of the manager of defendant’s West Palm Beach store, dated January 5, 1954. The disputed issue is whether the plaintiff was an employee of Rex Cutlery Company, or the defendant, Burdine’s.

The complaint asserts that plaintiff was an employee of Rex Cutlery Company; in her deposition plaintiff stated that she was an employee of Rex Cutlery Company; the transcript refers to plaintiff’s employment by and the fact that she was paid by Rex Cutlery Company. Plaintiff further asserts that Rex Cutlery Company sent her commissions from their New York office; that she was supervised by them and was not supervised by any employee of Bur-dine’s, and that she was responsible only to Rex Cutlery Company. The defendant’s motion for summary judgment was predicated on the allegation that plaintiff was not an employee of Rex Cutlery Company, that Rex Cutlery Company controverted said claim before the Florida Industrial Commission and the Deputy Commissioner entered his order October 20, 1953, holding that the plaintiff was an employee of Burdine’s.

Plaintiff contends that account of this variety of evidence before the court, the case should have gone to a jury for determination on the issue of employment.

Orders of the Deputy Commissioner in a workmen’s compensation proceeding become final upon expiration of the time for appeal to the full Commission. McDonough v. Versailles Hotel, Fla.1952, 57 So. 2d 16; Faulk & Coleman v. Harper, Fla.1952, 62 So. 2d 62. The adjudication and award of compensation boards or commissions, as well as the judgments of courts are generally held to be conclusive on the parties as to matters and issues involved within their jurisdiction. 58 Am. Jur., Workmen’s Compensation, Sec.

493. The doctrine of res adjudicata has under certain circumstances been held sufficient to bar subsequent actions at law for the same injury. See collection of cases in the annotation to 122 A.L.R. 614 et seq. The finding of the Deputy Commissioner that the plaintiff was Burdine’s employee was not res adjudicata as to the instant case. Gray v. Gray, 91 Fla. 103, 107 So. 261, and Avant v. Hammond Jones, Inc., Fla.1955, 79 So. 2d 423. Nor would the plaintiff be barred under the equitable doctrine of estoppel by judgment as set forth in Universal Const. Co. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, Fla.1953, 68 So. 2d 366, 369, citing Gordon v. Gordon, Fla.1952, 59 So. 2d 40, to the effect that estoppel by judgment is applicable only in those cases wherein the parties are the same in the second suit as in the former action but the causes of action are different.

Whether the plaintiff was barred by some other equitable remedy as recited in 50 C.J.S., Judgments, § 765, Note 33, we do not think necessary to explore for we are convinced that in view of the issue before the trial court no other judgment could have been entered. Although the plaintiff filed a claim for workmen’s compensation against Rex Cutlery Company, the evidence showed that she was employed by Burdine’s. She was selling Rex Cutlery Company’s products from a couri-ter in Burdine’s; the counter was a part of Burdine’s equipment; it was controlled by Burdine’s; she was on Burdine’s payroll and Burdine’s withheld federal taxes, old age benefits and other payments and deductions required by law to be made from her compensation. Any claim she had against Burdine’s was limited by the Workmen’s Compensation Law. The trial Court therefore correctly ruled as a matter of law that there was no issue as to employment of the plaintiff that should go' to a jury.

The judgment .appealed .from is accordingly affirmed.

Affirmed.

DREW, C. J., and ROBERTS and THORNAL, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By (12 total)

  • State v. Antoine L. McBRIDE, 848 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 2003)
    …action. Indeed, the decisions in which this Court has limited application of collateral estoppel to “those cases wherein the parties are the same in the second suit as in the former action but the causes of action are different,” Yovan v. Burdine’s, 81 So. 2d 555, 557 (Fla.1955), are myriad. Probably the most succinct and direct expression of this principle is found in this Court’s statement in Universal Construction Co. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 68 So. 2d 366 (Fla.1953): “Estoppel by judgment is applicabl…
  • Stogniew v. McQUEEN, 656 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 1995)
    …say points and questions — common to both causes of action and which were actually adjudicated in the prior litigation. Florida has traditionally required that there be a mutuality of parties in order for the doctrine to apply. Yovan v. Burdine’s, 81 So. 2d 555 (Fla.1955); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Turkal, 528 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). Thus, unless both parties are bound by the prior judgment, neither may use it in a subsequent action. In Romano the question presented was whether a litigant, who was not…
  • …e of collateral estoppel is the doctrine of mutuality of parties which holds that strangers to a prior litigation — those who were neither parties nor in privity with a party — are not bound by the results of that litigation. See Yovan v. Burdine’s, 81 So. 2d 555 (Fla.1955), and cases cited therein. We recognize that the federal courts have abandoned the requirement of mutuality of parties as a prerequisite to asserting the doctrine of collateral estop-pel. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 99 S.…

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