CARL LEE JONES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Carl Lee Jones was convicted of aggravated battery, but his conviction is reversed because the trial court improperly admitted inculpatory statements he made to police after he had invoked his right to remain silent and request an attorney, violating Miranda protections.
The admission of the inculpatory statements violated Miranda because Officer Spivey engaged in continued interrogation after Jones clearly indicated he did not want to talk and requested his lawyer. The court rejected the state's argument that the statements were admissible merely because they were not the product of direct questioning; the officer's continued conversation designed to elicit incriminating responses constituted impermissible interrogation.
[1] Once a suspect in police custody indicates a desire to remain silent, further interrogation must cease.
[2] Statements obtained by police through continued conversation about an incident after a suspect has invoked the right to remain silent are inadmissible, even if not the pr…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“when a suspect in police custody indicates that he wishes to remain silent, further interrogation at that time must cease”
Establishes the fundamental Miranda principle at issue in the case
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJones was arrested at 5:00 a.m. and given Miranda warnings. He initially stated he did not want to talk and requested his lawyer. At the police statio…
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GRIMES, Judge;
This is an appeal from a conviction for aggravated battery. Appellant’s only point of merit pertains to the admissibility of certain inculpatory statements he made to the police.
Appellant was arrested at 5:00 a. m. in the morning and placed in handcuffs. He was then given Miranda warnings. At the trial, officer Spivey explained what happened next:
“Q Did you ask Mr. Jones if he understood those rights?
A Yes.
Q And what did he respond?
A He said that he didn’t want to say anything.
Q Did he eventually say anything?
A Yes, he did.
Q Was that pursuant to your questions?
A Yeah.”
The officer later recounted what occurred at the police station:
“Q And would you tell the Judge, please, what if any conversation you had with Mr. Jones at the Bradenton Police Department.
A Yes, sir. I asked did the defendant, did he want to tell his side and he said no, he just wanted to talk to his lawyer. We asked him who his lawyer was and he said Mr. Schultz. I asked him if he wanted to call him and he said, yes. All right, I didn’t press the issue. I told him what I had through investigation learned. He said, ‘No, that’s not correct.’ He said, ‘Let me remember now to make sure.’
They had been playing pool and he said that Mr. Cadle had pulled his hair and said it made him mad, that he done it two or three times and he told him to quit but Mr. Cadle didn’t do that so he said he went out to his car, got his gun, came back in and shot him. He said although I did not — when I shot him, I didn’t run out of the bar. I walked out of the bar. * * * * *
Q Now Officer Spivey, he said he wanted to talk to his lawyer. Would you describe to the Court, please, how it is that the questioning continued and how this conversation ensued?
A Yes, sir. I would tell him how I had it for my report. He would say, ‘That’s not correct. It was this way.’
Q Was he volunteering these things to you?
A If I asked him questions, he would say, T don’t choose to answer, sir.’ but if I would say something or if I would go on to say how I, through investigation what I had learned; then he said, ‘No, that’s not right. It happened this way.’
Q And so you weren’t questioning him?
A Whenever I asked him questions he would say T don’t choose to answer,’ and so I would drop that.”
The admission of the inculpatory statements over appellant’s objection violated the principles of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The Miranda court made it clear that when a suspect in police custody indicates that he wishes to remain silent, further interrogation at that time must cease.
We are compelled to reject the state’s contention that the inculpatory statement given at the police station was admissible because it was not the product of direct interrogation. No one can seriously doubt that officer Spivey was attempting to obtain incriminating statements when he continued to converse with appellant about the incident after appellant had told him he did not want to talk. In Brewer v. Williams, — U.S. —, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977), the U.S. Supreme Court recently quashed some incriminating statements obtained by the police in an equally subtle manner after the suspect’s attorney had made it clear that his client did not wish to make a statement.
This is not a case in which interrogation has been terminated at a suspect’s request and later resumed under circumstances in which it is apparent that the suspect has changed his mind and desires to make a statement. Rivera Nunez v. State, 227 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969); cf. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). Here, the appellant clearly indicated that he didn’t want to talk, and the state failed to meet the heavy burden of showing that he thereafter made a knowing intelligent waiver of his right to remain silent. See State v. Dixon and Godbolt, (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (Case No. 75-1384, Opinion filed May 4, 1977; Singleton v. State, 344 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
REVERSED and REMANDED for a new trial.
McNULTY, Acting C. J., and OTT, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Bowen v. State, 404 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)…police and the suspect in an interrogation situation, Florida cases have recognized that relatively little pressure by the police may overcome a suspect’s will to remain silent. Breedlove v. State, 364 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Jones v. State, 346 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Webber v. State, 305 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). Jones demonstrates that courts carefully scrutinize the actions of interrogating officers where a defendant has asserted his right to remain silent. There, the defendant was ar…
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Heathcoat v. State, 430 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)…he incriminating statements. We agree with the trial court that appellant did not exercise his right to remain silent. There is no evidence that Heathcoat requested an attorney or desired for the officer to stop questioning him. Cf. Jones v. State, 346 So. 2d 639 (Fla.2d DCA 1977). Additionally, our review of the record finds nothing to suggest that Heathcoat was improperly induced or coerced into making the confession. See Gannady v. State, 427 So. 2d 723 (Fla.1983). The trial court properly allowed Philli…
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State v. Paschal, 358 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)…made after Miranda warnings had been given and a waiver of those rights had been shown. We agree that the taped statements were inadmissible under the principles enunciated in State v. Prosser, 235 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 1 DCA 1970), and Jones v. State, 346 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2 DCA 1977). That portion of the order suppressing the taped statement is, therefore, AFFIRMED. The order is otherwise REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent herewith. BOYER and SMITH, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966)
- Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (U.S. 1977)
- Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (U.S. 1975)
- Nunez v. State, 227 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969)
- Singleton v. State, 344 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)