IN THE INTEREST OF S. R., A CHILD, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court held that dismissal with prejudice is mandatory, not discretionary, when a delinquency petition is not filed within 30 days of receiving a complaint at the Division of Youth Services intake office. The decision resolved a conflict between district courts and clarified that the statutory language "shall" imposes a mandatory obligation protecting juveniles' substantive rights.
Dismissal with prejudice is mandatory when a petition alleging delinquency is filed more than 30 days after a complaint is received by the intake office. The word "shall" in Section 39.05(7), Florida Statutes (1975), is mandatory in nature, providing a juvenile with a substantive right that supersedes procedural rules.
[1] Dismissal with prejudice is mandatory when a petition alleging delinquency is filed more than 30 days after a complaint is received by the intake office of the Division o…
[2] The word "shall" in a statute is normally mandatory in nature.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“By enactment of Section 39.05(7), Florida Statutes (1975), the legislature provided that a juvenile shall be free from further prosecution if a petition alleging delinquency is not filed within 30 days after a complaint is received by the intake office of the Division of Youth Services.”
Establishes the legislative intent to provide juveniles with a substantive right to timely prosecution
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceS.R., a child, was taken into custody on February 27, 1976, on three charges and referred to the Division of Youth Services on February 28, 1976. The …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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HATCHETT, Justice.
The following question was certified to the Second District Court of Appeal by the Circuit Court of Pinellas County: Is dismissal with prejudice mandatory or discretionary when a petition alleging delinquency is not filed within 30 days from the date the complaint was received by the intake office or intake officer of the Division of Youth Services?
The Second District Court held that dismissal is discretionary. In the Interest of S. R., a child v. State, 336 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). That decision directly conflicts with Interest of S. L. M., 336 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution. We hold that dismissal is mandatory.
On February 27, 1976, S. R., a child, was taken into custody by the St. Petersburg Police Department and referred to the Division of Youth Services on three charges: obscene language, resisting arrest with violence, and obstructing and opposing an officer. The Division of Youth Services received the complaint February 28, 1976. On April 9, 1976, 41 days later, the State Attorney filed three petitions alleging delinquency. The child’s attorney filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Section 39.05(7), Florida Statutes (1975), which reads:
On motions by or in behalf of a child, a petition alleging delinquency shall be dismissed with prejudice if it was not filed within 30 days from the date the complaint was referred to the intake office. (Emphasis supplied).
The state opposed the motion relying on Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure 8.020 which reads:
On motions by or in behalf of a child, a petition alleging delinquency or need of supervision may be dismissed with prejudice if it was not filed within 30 days from the date the complaint was received by the Intake officer. (Emphasis supplied).
The language of the above-quoted statute is essentially identical to that of the rule. The difference lies in the use of the words “shall” and “may.” The Second District Court of Appeal determined that the statute is a grant of authority and that its language is discretionary. We do not agree. Although there is no fixed construction of the word “shall,” it is normally meant to be mandatory in nature. Neal v. Bryant, 149 So. 2d 529 (Fla.1962). Its interpretation depends upon the context in which it is found and upon the intent of the legislature as expressed in the statute. White v. Means, 280 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973). By enactment of Section 39.05(7), Florida Statutes (1975), the legislature provided that a juvenile shall be free from further prosecution if a petition alleging delinquency is not filed within 30 days after a complaint is received by the intake office of the Division of Youth Services. The statute further provides that an untimely petition shall be dismissed with prejudice. We can think of no better example of a mandatory requirement.
The Second District Court of Appeal also held that Section 39.05(7), Florida Statutes (1975), is procedural in nature and therefore subject to the rules promulgated by this Court. Again, we disagree. Section 39.05(7), Florida Statutes (1975), provides a juvenile with a substantive right and substantive statutes supersede procedural rules, State v. Garcia, 229 So. 2d 236 (Fla.1969). We therefore hold that dismissal with prejudice is mandatory when a petition alleging delinquency is filed more than 30 days after a complaint is received by the intake office of the Division of Youth Services.
Accordingly, the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal is quashed, and this matter is remanded for action consistent with this opinion.
OVERTON, C. J., and ENGLAND and KARL, JJ., concur. BOYD, J., dissents.
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Citator
Cited By (62 total)
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State v. Goode, 830 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 2002)…days after the •' determination of probable cause. See § 394.916(1), Fla. Stat (1999). We have previously stated that “[ajlthough there is no fixed construction of the word ‘shall,’ it is normally meant to be mandatory in nature.” See S.R. v. State, 346 So. 2d 1018, 1019 (Fla. 1977). However, we have also noted that its interpretation “depends upon the context in which it is found and upon the intent of the legislature as expressed in the statute.” Id. For example, courts have held that the term “shall” shoul…
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State v. Goodson, 403 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 1981)…1338 (emphasis in original). In deciding whether the word “shall” should be construed as being mandatory or directory, we should look to the context in which it is found and the intent of the legislature as expressed in the statute. S. R. v. State, 346 So. 2d 1018 (Fla.1977). Within section 958.04, there are two types of statutory prerequisites: the eligibility requirements in subsection (1) and the disqualification requirements in subsection (2). If a person meets the eligibility requirements in subsection (…
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Allied Fid. Ins. Co. v. State, 415 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 218 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969). Whether “shall” is mandatory or discretionary will depend, then, upon the context in which it is used and the legislative intent expressed in the statute. S. R. v. State, 346 So. 2d 1018 (Fla.1977). Thus, for example, where “shall” refers to some required action preceding a possible deprivation of a substantive right, S. R. v. State, supra; Neal v. Bryant, supra; Gilliam v. Saunders, 200 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967), or the imposi…
Previewing 3 of 62 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Domingo Garcia, 229 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 1969)
- Neal v. Farris Bryant, 149 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 1962)
- White v. Means, 280 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)
- In the Interest of S. L. M., 336 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
- In the Interest of S. R. v. State, 336 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)