JOHN FRANCIS TRAINER, A/K/A ROBERT EDWARD WHITE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Trainer was convicted of breaking and entering with intent to commit grand larceny after police questioning without Miranda warnings and testimony regarding an accomplice's prior consistent statements. The First District Court of Appeal reversed, finding the custodial interrogation violated Miranda and the admission of prior consistent statements violated evidentiary rules.
The court held that Trainer's custodial interrogation violated Miranda because his answers beyond identification were inadmissible without prior Miranda warnings. The court also held that prior consistent statements may not be introduced on direct examination to shore up witness testimony unless the testimony has first been impeached as a recent fabrication.
[1] A suspect's answers to police questioning beyond mere identification are inadmissible without prior Miranda warnings when the suspect is significantly restrained and the…
[2] A limited interrogation to secure an officer's safety does not privilege questioning beyond the scope of identification without Miranda warnings.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We find that Trainer was questioned while significantly restrained by an officer whose suspicion was trained on him. The interrogation was custodial and Trainer's answers, beyond those of identification, were inadmissible without prior Miranda warnings.”
Establishes the court's finding that the interrogation was custodial and violated Miranda regarding non-identification answers
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAfter an accomplice was apprehended at a burglary scene, police approached Trainer's parked car in a high-crime area at night. An officer holding a sh…
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SMITH, Judge.
Trainer was convicted of breaking and entering with intent to commit grand larceny and attempted breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony. His appeal urges that his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) were compromised by police testimony concerning his evasive answers to questioning before he was advised of his right to remain silent, and that the trial court also erred in admitting testimony of his alleged accomplice, during the State’s direct examination, of prior consistent accusatory statements made by the accomplice to the prosecutor. After the accomplice was apprehended and identified at the burglary scene after dark in a high-crime area, one of the police approached Trainer’s nearby parked car. Holding a shotgun, but not pointing it, the officer called “Freeze!” to the dozing Trainer and asked his identity. After receiving an answer, the officer inquired what Trainer was doing there, to which Trainer replied he had car trouble and was napping. The officer then inquired whether anyone was with Trainer (“and he said, yes, he had somebody with him”) and where (“and then he tells me he don’t know where the guy is”) and who (“and he wasn’t sure about it”). The officer then examined a wallet found on the front floorboard which contained identification of the accomplice.
We find that Trainer was questioned while significantly restrained by an officer whose suspicion was trained on him. The interrogation was custodial and Trainer’s answers, beyond those of identification, were inadmissible without prior Miranda warnings. State v. Ecker, 311 So. 2d 104 (Fla.1975). There is no plausible argument here that a limited interrogation was privileged to secure the officer’s safety. Contrast United States v. Castellana, 488 F. 2d 65, 500 F. 2d 325 (5th Cir. 1974).
In the necessary retrial, the State should not be permitted to elicit on direct examination of its accusatory witness, the accomplice, that the witness had previously told the prosecutor “the same thing that you have stated to the Jury here about what happened.” A prior consistent statement may not be introduced to shore up a witness’ direct testimony unless and until an effort is made to impeach his testimony as a recent fabrication. Van Gallon v. State, 50 So. 2d 882 (Fla.1951); Kellam v. Thomas, 287 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974).
REVERSED.
MILLS, J., concurs.
BOYER, C. J., dissents.
BOYER, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In my view appellant’s Miranda rights were not violated and State v. Ecker, cited in the majority opinion, does not require reversal. As to the second point relating to the eliciting of a prior consistent statement, in my view that error was harmless.
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Jordan v. State, 549 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…ade no showing of entitlement to a belated appeal, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. SHIVERS, C.J., and WENTWORTH and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur. . The failure to timely file a notice of appeal is a jurisdictional defect, Benz v. State, 346 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). . The writ of habeas corpus to secure a belated appeal is available under certain circumstances to, in effect, excuse the late filing of a notice. State v. Meyer, 430 So. 2d 440 (Fla.1983); Baggett v. Wainwright, 229 So. 2d 239…
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Royer v. State, 389 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…(1979); State v. Frost, 374 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); see United States v. Carollo, 507 F. 2d 50 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 874, 96 S.Ct. 143, 46 L.Ed.2d 105 (1975); Brown v. Beto, 468 F. 2d 1284 (5th Cir. 1972); Trainer v. State, 346 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), cert. denied, 352 So. 2d 175 (Fla.1977); In interest of R. L. J., 336 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); (b) the arrest was unlawful because, whether or not the officers were justified in “encountering” Royer in the concourse, see…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966)
- State v. Ecker, 311 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1975)
- Van Gallon v. State, 50 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1951)
- United States v. Castellana, 500 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1974)
- Kellam v. Thomas, 287 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)
- United States v. Castellana, 488 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1974)