SYLVESTER BELLAMY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Sylvester Bellamy challenged the constitutionality of Florida's gambling house statute on vagueness and overbreadth grounds after his conviction for operating a gambling operation. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the statute as sufficiently clear, holding that the terms 'gaming' and 'gambling' have well-established meanings that would not mislead ordinary citizens.
The statute is neither vague nor overbroad. The terms 'gaming' and 'gambling' as used in the statute are synonymous and have well-established meanings that would not mislead a person of ordinary intelligence into believing that innocent professional games like football, tennis, or jai-alai are prohibited.
[1] A statute prohibiting the keeping of a gambling house is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad when the terms "gaming" and "game" are understood in their common meani…
[2] The definition of "gambling" involves risking money or property without hope of return other than to gain from another.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Gambling has been defined by this Court as anything which induces risk of money or property without any other hope of return than to get for nothing any given amount from another.”
Establishes the clear legal definition of gambling that makes the statute sufficiently intelligible
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceUndercover police detectives observed a pool hall in Palmetto, Florida, and covertly participated in dice games played for money on a pool table in th…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Overbreadth Doctrine cases and more on FLexlaw
BOYD, Justice.
Undercover police detectives began to observe a pool hall in Palmetto, Florida, where they suspected gambling was being conducted. Eventually they covertly participated with others in dice games played for money on a pool table in the back of the hall. Sylvester Bellamy, the lessee of the building, was arrested and charged with operating a gambling house contrary to Section 849.01, Florida Statutes. After being found guilty by a jury, he moved for a new trial and arrest of judgment on the ground, among others, that the statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The motion was denied, an adjudication of guilt was rendered and Bellamy was sentenced to pay a fine of $2,500. Bellamy took a direct appeal here to present his challenge to the statute which reads:
“849.01 Keeping gambling houses, etc. —Whoever by himself, his servant, clerk or agent, or in any other manner has, keeps, exercises or maintains a gaming table or room, or gaming implements or apparatus, or house, booth, tent, shelter or other place for the purpose of gaming or gambling or in any place of which he may directly or indirectly have charge, control or management, either exclusively or with others, procures, suffers or permits any person to play for money or-other valuable thing at any game whatever, whether heretofore prohibited or not, shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082, § 775.083, or § 775.084.”
Bellamy complains that the statute is vague and overbroad because it would appear to outlaw games played for money (such as professional football, tennis, jai-alai, etc.) considered by reasonable men to be innocent. We cannot agree. The second definition of “game” in Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary, 3d Ed., p. 932 (1966) is “to play for a stake (as with cards, dice or billiards).” As used in the context of the statute, the words “gaming” and “game” are synonymous with gambling and the wording of the statute would not mislead a person of ordinary intelligence into thinking that the professional games mentioned by Bellamy are prohibited. “Gambling” has been defined by this Court as anything which induces risk of money or property without any other hope of return than to get for nothing any given amount from another. Creash v. State, 131 Fla. 111, 179 So. 149 (Fla.1938). Similarly, gaming has been defined as an agreement between two or more to risk money on a contest of chance of any kind, where one must be the loser and the other gainer. Id. As defined these terms are understandable by the citizenry of this State.
The other points raised on appeal by Bellamy are not meritorious. The conviction is affirmed and the cause remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, C. J., and ADKINS, ENGLAND, SUNDBERG, HATCHETT and DREW (Retired), JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
State v. Hagan, 387 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1980)…, and where a statute does not specifically define words of common usage, such words are construed in their plain and ordinary sense. See Tingley v. Brown, 380 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. 1980); Milazzo v. State, 377 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 1979); Bellamy v. State, 347 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1977); Goldstein v. Acme Concrete Corp., 103 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1958). The prohibited netting area encompassed by the Charlotte County waters of Charlotte Harbor may be ascertained with particular exactitude by resort to pertinent Florida law. S…
-
Downer v. State, 375 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1979)…duct is proscribed by the challenged enactment. See Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 96 S.Ct. 243, 46 L.Ed.2d 185 (1975); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 74 S.Ct. 808, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954); Tatzel v. State, 356 So. 2d 787 (1978); Bellamy v. State, 347 So. 2d 419 (Fla.1977). The dictionary definition of the term “authorize” is “to endorse, empower, justify or permit.” A “license” is permission to enter. Finally, to “invite” is “to request [one’s] presence.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1961)…
-
State v. Ferguson, 365 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)…§ 849.08, 849.11 and 849.-14, Florida Statutes seem to be more directly concerned with such offenses as misdemeanors. The Florida Supreme Court has recently ruled 849.01 was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad in the case of Bellamy v. State, 347 So. 2d 419 (Fla.1977). As to the first part of 849.01 the supreme court further strengthened the requirement of habitualness in its recent decision in Schultz v. State, 361 So. 2d 416 (Fla.1978). For the reasons set forth above the trial court’s order dismiss…
Authorities Cited
- Creash v. State, 131 Fla. 111 (Fla. 1938)