ALEXANDER H. BRETHAUER AND DONNA BRETHAUER, APPELLANTS,
v.
RICHARD D. BRASSELL, HUGHES SUPPLY, INC., AND HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COMPANY, A FOREIGN CORPORATION, APPELLEES
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In a rear-end collision case, the appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of the plaintiffs' motion for directed verdict on liability, holding that the defendant's explanation of his distraction was insufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence that arises when a vehicle strikes another lawfully stopped vehicle from behind.
The court held that the defendant's explanation was insufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence. A defendant must produce evidence that 'fairly and reasonably' shows the presumed negligence is not the real fact; a mere description of distraction does not constitute a 'substantial' or 'reasonable' explanation for failing to avoid the collision.
[1] A rear-end collision with a lawfully stopped vehicle creates a rebuttable presumption of the defendant's negligence.
[2] Once a plaintiff establishes a rear-end collision while lawfully stopped, the burden of going forward with evidence shifts to the defendant.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When the defendant produces evidence which fairly and reasonably tends to show that the real fact is not as presumed, then the impact of the presumption is dissipated.”
The standard for rebutting the presumption of negligence in rear-end collisions requires more than a mere explanation; the evidence must fairly and reasonably rebut the presumption.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe plaintiff had stopped his vehicle in the left-hand lane of southbound traffic behind two other stopped vehicles, all waiting for a left-turn vehic…
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NEWELL, EMERY J., Associate Judge.
The plaintiffs, husband and wife, appellants herein filed a tort action against appellees for damages. At the conclusion of all the evidence, the plaintiffs moved for a directed verdict as to liability which was denied. After the jury returned a verdict for the defendants, the plaintiffs filed their Motion for Judgment in Accordance with the Motion for Directed Verdict and Motion for New Trial. The appeal is prosecuted from the trial court’s denial of these post-trial motions.
The plaintiff had stopped his vehicle in the left-hand lane of southbound traffic behind two other vehicles who were also at a complete stop. All had stopped to await the passage of a vehicle making a left-hand turn in front of them. The highway at this point is two lanes southbound and two lanes northbound, with the north and southbound lanes being divided by a six foot asphalt median. It had rained and the road was damp. Defendant driver was driving a pick-up type truck, one to one and one-half tons in weight, when he struck the rear of plaintiff’s vehicle. In the words of defendant, he struck plaintiff’s vehicle “pretty close to square.”
Defendant’s only explanation for the accident was that he never saw the plaintiff’s stopped car until moments before impact because his attention was fixed upon a car immediately in front of him, which suddenly swerved and passed plaintiff’s vehicle by driving on the median strip. Defendant testified there was nothing wrong with the mechanical condition of his truck.
Appellees recognize the principle of law that the rear-ending of a plaintiff whu is lawfully stopped in traffic creates a re-buttable presumption of the defendant’s negligence upon which the plaintiff is entitled to prevail in the absence of an explanation by the defendant. Once the plaintiff establishes a rear-end collision when the plaintiff was lawfully stopped, the burden of going forward with the evidence shifts to the defendant. McNulty v. Cusack, 104 So. 2d 785 (Fla.2d DCA 1958), and Gulle v. Boggs, 174 So. 2d 26 (Fla.1965).
The question squarely presented in the instant case is whether the defendant has explained his inability to avoid the collision. We think not. A close examination of the language used by appellate courts in deciding similar eases reveals more definitive words than just “an explanation.” In Gulle v. Boggs, supra, the court said:
“When the defendant produces evidence which fairly and reasonably (emphasis ours) tends to show that the real fact is not as presumed, then the impact of ‘the presumption is dissipated.’ ”
In Kimenker v. Greater Miami Car Rental, Inc., 115 So. 2d 191 (Fla.3d DCA 1959), we find this explicit finding:
“In the instant case the record is devoid of any substantial (again our emphasis) evidence to rebut the presumption of negligence.”
The defendant’s “explanation” in the case at bar is, at best, a mere description of the nature of his distraction. It does not offer any substantial or reasonable explanation for his failure to avoid the collision.
The judgment for the defendant is, therefore, reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court with directions to enter an order granting plaintiffs’ motion for a directed verdict upon the issue of liability and granting plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial upon the issue of damages.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
CROSS and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.
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Dania Jai-Alai Palace, Inc. v. Sykes, 450 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 1984)…the district court affirmed the judgment against Carrousel for the negligence of its employee on the basis that there is a rebuttable presumption of negligence when the driver of a vehicle strikes another vehicle in the rear. Brethauer v. Brassell, 347 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Lincoln v. Miggins, 249 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971). We have no quarrel with the district court’s statement of the law, but find it inapplicable to the facts of this case. Petitioners were sued by respondent, who walked between…
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Pub. Health Tr. OF Dade Cnty. v. Gregoria Valcin, 507 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1987)…his staff would be considered “substantial” enough to “burst the bubble,” thus keeping the presumption from the jury. See Gulle v. Boggs, 174 So. 2d 26 (Fla.1965); see also Baughman v. Vann, 390 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Brethauer v. Brassell, 347 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). Plaintiff could rarely prove negligence by a preponderance of the evidence when the presumption has given him nothing more than the self-serving testimony of the defendant. Finally, in the usual case where a vanishing presumpti…
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Pierce v. Progressive Am. Ins. Co., 582 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)…jury question. Gulle v. Boggs, 174 So. 2d 26 (Fla.1965); Shaw v. York, 187 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966). The burden on the defendant is not to come up with just any explanation, but one which is “substantial and reasonable.” Brethauer v. Brassell, 347 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). As a matter of law, it is not a substantial and reasonable explanation by Pierce to merely say that the vehicles ahead of him — whether Boone, Reaves, or Tiroff— stopped abruptly. Such stops had to be reasonably anticipated at…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gulle v. Purley L. Boggs, 174 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1965)
- McNULTY v. Cusack, 104 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958)
- Kimenker v. Greater Miami CAR Rental, Inc., 115 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)